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The purposes of this study were (a) to analyze and organize key factors 
which define quality special education from legislation and subsequent 
judicial rulings; (b) to determine from experts within the field of special 
education what indicators of quality, based upon these factors, are perceived 
necessary in order to have quality special education; and (c) to analyze 
changes they anticipate will occur in how quality special education is defined. 
Three groups of individuals were selected who help develop (1) 
policies and procedures in special education (Policy group: n= 31); 
(2) legislation and judicial interpretation of special education law (Law group: 
n=30); and (3) practices for implementation of quality services in special 
education (Special Education Directors group: n=33). 
A survey instrument was designed, using statutes from P.L. 94-142, P.L. 
99-457, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as indicators of quality of 
special education. Using a Likert-type scale, the participants were asked to 
respond to each item four times, thus ranking the item for its value as an 
indicator of quality based upon its (1) current use; (2) current importance; (3) 
future use; and (4) future importance. 
An analysis of variance showed that the Directors group consistently 
assigned higher values to the current use of the items as indicators of special 
education quality. They reported that statutes related to the IEP process- from 
referral to placement— were important tools for measuring quality. 
The Policy group selected items which highlighted "participation," 
--including parents, school personnel, and agencies ~ as key factors in 
defining quality, and the Law group valued indicators which help define 
procedural issues that may extend the current concepts of services for the 
handicapped. 
Significant differences in responses (p < .05) were determined within 
the groups and among the three groups between (1) the current use of the 
indicators of quality and the predicted future use of these same indicators, and 
(2) the current importance of the indicators of quality and the predicted future 
importance of these same indicators. 
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The focus of this study is to explore issues related to the use and 
importance of quality in special education. In order to examine these issues, 
it is necessary to put them into a broader context of educational change, 
educational quality, educational reform, statutes, and litigation. A brief 
discussion of each of these components and their interrelationships and 
interdependency will help provide a framework to determine issues of 
quality in special education. 
One of the weakest fundamental concepts in education, which has been 
most recently pointed out by business leaders (e.g., David Kearns, CEO of 
Xerox), is that educators lack the understanding and knowledge of the 
importance of planning for change and the process by which it is 
implemented. A brief synopsis follows which discusses the key concepts of 
educational change, first and second order change, the rate of change, and the 
sociology of law as a function of the change process. 
Education as an institution fails to respond adequately to a fast-
changing society, one in which new ideas, new issues, new technology, and 
new social patterns which demand new priorities and performances from 
those who are at the center of the educational process—the public schools 
(Coombs, 1985). Methodology, facilities, and curriculum in American schools 
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often attempt to reflect the sociopolitical beliefs of what society considers the 
"best education" at a given moment. 
Certainly one of the dominant themes in social structures is change. 
Organizations, such as school systems, are typically structured and 
administered in a framework rich in tradition, and they tend to be highly 
resistant to change. As Sarason (1982) noted, the historical culture of school 
systems and their efforts to maintain their tradition make any attempt at 
change difficult at best. 
Educational systems' approach to change strategies is traditionally 
reactive, not anticipatory (Brubaker, 1979). Typically, schools tend to submit to 
society's demands for educational reform rather than to foresee 
independently the need to modify, adapt, or change the educational process. 
Every effort is made to retain the "status quo," and despite the introduction of 
new programs, the schools really do not change. As school personnel have 
been faced with these social and political demands for change, they have 
consistently proceeded to function intuitively and to fall back on long­
standing, hallowed practices which are perceived to be appropriate "common 
sense" strategies. The resulting changes have been minimal. Watzlawick, 
Weakland, and Fisch (1974) described this as "more of the same," or first order 
change. 
The Process of Educational Change 
Educational systems are influenced by both internal and external forces. 
The factors within the educational system which might provide the most 
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insight to promote change are fairly predictable and can be resisted. This 
limits the chance for meaningful, or second order change because of the 
system's natural desire to maintain the status quo. Coupled with a marginal 
knowledge base of how to bring about meaningful change, and even worse, a 
lack of clear definition of the goals sought, the educational system makes little 
headway from within its own framework. 
John Dewey, one of the founders of Progressive Education and a leader 
in the educational change process, discussed the need for educators to be 
aware of the process for implementing second order change within the 
educational environment. As early as the 1930s, Dewey noted that there was 
little consensus as to what the schools can do in relation to the forces of social 
change and how they should do it (Dewey, 1937). 
Twenty-five years later, Venn (1964) suggested, in a tone similar to 
Toffler's (1985) recent publication, that there was a change in change, an 
alteration new in man's history: 
The most significant aspect of the new technology is described by the 
word 'change.' It is not simply a case of new sets of social and 
economic relationships replacing older ones, but of the new ones 
themselves being replaced at a faster and faster rate, with only those 
adapting to change surviving. This concept of change is not new; what 
is new is the change in the rate of change. This has come as a result of 
the tremendous increase in the rate of scientific activity; significantly, 
the rate of that increase is not constant, but exponential (p. 3). 
About the same time, Anderson (1966) pinpointed this lack of 
knowledge base and lack of anticipatory planning for change, while Trump 
and Baynham (1961) emphasized that educational practices had not been 
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changed basically "for generations, and their inflexibility makes it difficult to 
alter them now," (p. 4) referring to what Watzlawick, et aL, described as first 
order change. 
One educational commission report written thirty years ago bears a 
marked resemblance to the concerns for improvement in the public schools 
expressed by educational task forces today. In that report, the commission 
stated, "It is with the quality of these schools that most Americans are 
concerned today. Education must therefore be appropriate to the needs of 
each pupil and to the needs of society" (Education Policies Commission, 1959, 
p. 5). 
Little has changed in the 30 years since these reports, which stressed 
that improvement in American education has been by refinement, not by 
redefinition. Each change produced an effect, but all improvements have had 
a common characteristic: they could fit into the existing framework of school 
arrangement (Trump and Baynham, 1961). Over fifty years ago, Dewey (1937), 
in a discussion of educators having the opportunity to influence the direction 
and force of the change process, noted that the schools' "failure to discuss 
educational problems...intensified the existing confusion. Schools must be 
involved in social forces and their movement" (p. 238). Dewey's call for 
increased "social intelligence," has been classified by Bennis, Benne and Chin 
(1969) as an example of a normative or equilibrium theory of the educational 
change process. 
Most of the forces for educational change have been initiated by social, 
political, and most recently, economic organizations which have a vested 
5 
interest in the improvement of education. Bennis, Benne and Chin (1969) 
noted that one strategic methodology to promote change is from a power-
coercive orientation, while political institutions, judicial rulings, and 
administrative decisions are examples of what Paulston (1976) referred to as 
the conflict strategy in promoting change. 
These forces or proponents of educational change need to be analyzed 
further while at the same time, the leaders of educational systems must 
determine the character and desired qualities of its organization to plan and 
implement desired change. 
First Order and Second Order Change 
First order change is defined as a change from state-to-state 
(Watzlawick, et al., 1974). The impression is of change, but nothing of 
substance has changed. The structure, whether it is labeled as a group or as an 
organization, has made no dynamic shift in its identity: it is essentially the 
same. The axiom, "the more something changes, the more it remains the 
same," represents the paradox that is most loosely associated with this concept 
of first order change—change that only leads to persistence. Silberman (1970) 
analyzed this phenomenon of first order change when he discussed the 
educational reform movements of the 1950s and 1960s. He described these 
two decades as one of the largest and most sustained educational reform 
movements in American history, "An effort that many observers thought 
would transform the schools. Nothing of the sort...happened; the reform 
movement...introduced innumerable changes, and yet the schools 
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themselves are largely unchanged" (pp. 158-159). 
Most second order change appears threatening to the system: it is, since 
second order change is characterized as change whose occurrence changes the 
system itself. 
Leaders of educational systems, who are accustomed to modifying and 
implementing internal first order change which has no systemic change 
effect, view second order change as something illogical or incomprehensible. 
An educational system, or any open system, cannot generate from within its 
framework the conditions for implementing second order change. 
First order change appears to be based upon common sense, while 
second order change seems irrational. The paradox of this situation is that 
first order change self-perpetuates the problems which existed in the first 
place. The use of second order change lifts the situation out of the paradoxical 
trap and places it in a new and different framework. The solutions are no 
longer the problems. 
School systems, traditionally, have yet to make use of second order 
change. 
Change in the Change Process 
The rate of change, rather than change itself, has been highlighted as 
one of the major struggles facing any organization today. Literature from 
authors who reviewed the success and failure of well-established business 
corporations were the first source of information which educated the general 
public on the rapid pace in which change is now occurring. They observed 
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that while tradition was still noteworthy in developing goals and direction of 
growth, forces were demanding quicker change. Social, political, and cultural 
forces were important, but economic and technological changes were 
foremost in determining directions taken within an organization. Toffler 
(1985) warned that those managers who intended to survive within the 
corporate system of the 1980s and 1990s would be those who were prepared to 
initiate "drastic change." He indicated that the methods of business success in 
previous decades were based on managers who had done "more of the same" 
(p. ix), or first order change. Toffler also noted two criteria which would be 
necessary to produce "significant" or second order change: "First, there must 
be enormous external pressures. Second, there must be people inside who are 
strongly dissatisfied with the existing order" (p. xxi). 
With so many technological advances happening in shorter and 
shorter timeframes, the pace of new discoveries has been perceived as 
overwhelming at times. Naisbitt (1982) argued that organizations reacting to 
these rapid advancements usually developed short term, technological 
solutions. He described this feeling as "living in the time of parenthesis: we 
are clinging to the known past in fear of the unknown future" (p. 279). 
Sarason (1982), however, took a different point of view. He noted: 
there certainly seems to be a sharpened awareness of what is happening 
in the world, but this is no warrant for the assumption that things are 
changing at an ever accelerating rate;... contributing to this belief...is 
the perception that one cannot keep up with the new settings created 
daily to cope with one or another type of problem. It is understandable 
if we confuse the rate of creation setting with real change, (pp. 2-3)... 
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This supports Watzlawick's definition of first and second order change. 
Some of the confusion may occur when an organization does not have 
the conceptual knowledge base or flexibility to adapt to change. As Reilly 
(1991) noted, it is difficult to initiate meaningful change unless the objectives 
are clear. If change is considered necessary and the objectives to accomplish it 
are not developed from within the organization, it may be imposed from 
outside the structure. One method which mandates the initiation of change 
is through the creation of new law. 
Law. Change, and Litigation 
Experts who have studied the sociology of law believe that law 
supports or aids the performance of other social institutions. One principle 
holds that when patterns of acceptable behavior break down, law is available 
to restore the breach. As these patterns of behavior change, law creates a new 
social solidarity consistent with its underlying supporters. There are also 
several instances in which law is used to initiate change, such as legislation 
which has been passed which focuses on the rights of the handicapped. 
Another component of this theory of change, law, and litigation is that 
jurisprudence stands apart from society as a means of legitimate, rational 
problem-solving (Weber, 1967). The "normative effects theory" holds that 
law responds directly to the needs of other institutions for order and conflict 
resolution. This theory equates law with rules or doctrine. Law is considered 
to be systemic, determined by the needs of the community. The normative 
effects theory uses a philosophical approach similar to that of Goffman (1959), 
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in which individuals are described by Weber as actors in "trouble" who turn 
to law, which then responds with a solution. Finally, it holds that a solution 
takes the form of intervention in which a rule imposes new behavior on the 
actors (Weber, 1967). Sarason (1982), in his discussion of the creation of 
settings, stated that "rules are necessary which maximize candidness of 
opinion and protect the individual against the irrationalities of himself and 
others" (p. 16). What is considered as rational or irrational, though, often 
fluctuates with the social mores and political ideologies in a given timeframe. 
These philosophies or diversified forces from seemingly polemic 
viewpoints can become interwoven for sake of cooperation or even need 
based upon interdependency. Goffman (1959) described this process as one in 
which the political and dramaturgical perspectives intersect clearly in regard 
to the capacities of one individual to direct the activity of another. Friedman 
and Ladinsky (1967) also support this relationship. They stated: 
social change may be revolutionary, but it normally comes about in a 
more-or-less orderly manner, out of the conscious and unconscious 
attempts of people to solve social problems through collective action... 
In mature societies, law will be an important indicator of social change 
(pp. 50-51). 
Hurst (1964) noted in his study of law and economic development that 
there is a relationship between rapid change and conflict or breakdown in the 
social order and a need for intervention through law. He referred to this as 
the "functional theory." This closely matches Benne, Bennis, and Chin (1969) 
and Paulston's (1976) observations of conflict strategy theory. 
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Conversely, law can also produce manifest dysfunctions. Law can be 
perceived as a source of problems as well as a source of authoritative 
guidance. Some areas of law change quickly in response to perceived 
problems, while in other areas problems persist. In education, legal rights of 
children in the United States, for example, have evolved over a period of 
decades, while the rights of the handicapped, once acknowledged, moved 
rather quickly and have remained as one of the most active areas of litigation. 
Normative effects theory implies that the more that social transactions 
occur, the more they are subjected to the effects of change, and the more 
frequently actors in those transitions turn to courts for dispute settlement and 
for appropriate norms. Social change, then, has a predictive and direct effect 
on litigation. 
The process of accomplishing educational change is complicated, and 
much of what has been attempted and perceived historically as significant 
change has resulted in minimal meaningful restructuring of the educational 
process. One sociopolitical avenue which has been used more recently in the 
past few decades as a process to promote educational change is through legal 
redress. This method of promoting educational change as it relates directly to 
students as individuals has only been available since the courts have 
recognized that children are entitled to some of the basic rights afforded to 
adults. 
This next section reviews two legal aspects of education: the expansion 
of rights of children in general, and the extension of children's rights to 
include those with handicaps. The resulting legislation which promoted a 
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change in the basic educational services offered to handicapped children had a 
significant impact on the quality of their schooling. 
Changes in Children's Rights 
Only in the past thirty to forty years have the courts viewed specific 
rights of children. Up until recently, the majority of rulings had been focused 
on the standard of equity or custody under the umbrella of parens patriae, in 
which courts legally interceded on the behalf of children. The other area had 
centered on the issue of in loco parentis, often involving schools, and is still a 
factor of frequent litigation. Even more recently, procedural rights afforded to 
adults have also been clarified and put into practice in juvenile court cases (In 
re Gault, 1967), along with the interpretation of children's basic constitutional 
rights (Tinker v. Pes Moines, 1969, and Hazel wood v. Kuhlmeier. 1988). 
Of these court rulings which have set precedents for children's rights, 
many have evoked questions concerning education. From this foundation of 
educational rights have evolved the legal rights of handicapped children. 
The expansion of children's rights in 1969 and 1970 added to the unrest 
that was being felt by parents and educators. While Tinker v. Pes Moines 
(1969) centered on children's freedom of expression, it was the final 
cornerstone laid prior to the advent of vigorous legislation and litigation for 
the handicapped. In a lawsuit similar to Hobson v. Hansen (1967) and the 
issue of tracking, a case was brought against Pasadena schools, which 
challenged ability grouping of blacks that continued the educational practice 
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of racial segregation (Spangler v. Bd. of Ed.. 1980). In a second test case of 
racial imbalance in educational grouping of children, Diana v. State Board of 
Education (1970) struck down the placement of Mexican-American children 
in classrooms for the retarded based upon tests that were culturally biased 
because of sample populations and norms that did not include experiential or 
language differences. Thus, a classification or grouping is considered 
unreasonable if it is overly inclusive or exclusive. These and other cases 
helped form a standard of basic rights for children, and paved the way for 
more detailed rights for children with handicaps. 
Changes in the Rights for the Handicapped 
The landmark segregation case, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), set 
the tone for equal educational opportunities and nondiscriminatory practices. 
The premise of disallowing a "separate but equal" school organization had 
the makings for second order change to be instituted through desegregation.1 
Nevertheless, even with its limited success, the Brown decision 
provided the impetus for further litigation which banned other 
discriminatory procedures ~ tracking of students (Hobson v. Hansea 1967), 
which perpetuated segregation, misplacement and misuse of tests to 
determine grouping and placement (Larry P. v. Riles, 1979) and unfair 
educational practices toward children who required modified teaching (Lau v. 
Nichols. 1974). From these and other cases (e.g., Rodriguez v. Antonio, 1971) 
1 While some progress has been noted, minority enrollment in Topeka varies from 5 to almost 
70 percent in individual schools, yet 70 percent of the total school population is white. Thirty-five 
years after this "landmark decision," the district court has chastised the school system for all but 
exercising "a form of benign neglect," thus acknowledging that only first order change had been 
implemented [U.S. Appeals, 10th Circuit, 1989). 
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evolved "suspect classes," which eventually included the handicapped. 
The right to humane treatment for institutionalized children was 
discussed in numerous cases,2 and the media highly contributed in exposing 
the inhumane conditions in which children were forced to exist in 
environments such as Pennhurst and Willowbrook. This issue of quality in 
the living conditions and care of the handicapped was the first signal that an 
expected standard was not being provided. 
Exclusionary practices in public education have also set precedents in 
court decisions. The practice of exclusion of illegal aliens (Hosier v. Evans. 
1970), and children who were pregnant (Qrdwav v. Hargraves. 1971), from 
receiving an education set the tone for court cases questioning the denial of 
an education for handicapped children. 
The two landmark cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Children (PARC 1971) and Mills (1972), set in motion the legislation needed 
to assure an educational opportunity for all. PARC was limited to 
representing just mentally retarded children, and the class action suit 
provided a means for these children to receive an education. Most of the 
members of the class action suit, however, remained in facilities separated 
from the general public school classrooms. Mills broadened the concept of 
equal educational opportunity for two primary reasons. The members of the 
Mills class action suit were characterized as displaying a wide variety of 
handicapping conditions, and several of the students had previously attended 
regular public schools prior to their exclusion. The other factor was the 
2 See e.g.. Wvattv. Sticknev. 325 F.Supp. 781 (M.D.Ala., 1971); and NYARC v. Rockefeller. 
357 F.Supp. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). 
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location of the lawsuit. While the PARC decision was binding within its 
judicial circuit, the Mills case was tried in Washington, D.C., thus expanding 
its impact. 
Except for a few isolated cases, most of the legal issues addressing 
children rights and in particular, the rights of the handicapped, have moved 
away from exclusionary concerns to the issue of inclusionary practices, 
embracing the appropriateness and quality of services rather than to one of 
access (Sage and Burrello, 1986). The focus is now on the type of rights and 
degree of programs, services, and practices that were to be included in the 
educational process of the handicapped. 
Since the purpose of this study is to explore issues related to quality in 
special education, and then determine if there are any significant differences 
among and between forces which help shape and change the concept of 
"quality" in special education, the last section in this chapter will then 
review: (a) the concepts of quality and change; (b) the process of educational 
reform which promotes that change take place in order to improve the 
quality of education; (c) the relationship of special education to the current 
reform movement; and finally, (d) the process of determining quality in 
special education. 
Quality and Change 
As political leaders, education professionals, and the public, including 
special interest groups become disenchanted with public education, they 
evaluate current services which are being provided to children and raise new 
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questions about its purposes and practices. In essence, these groups attempt to 
change and redefine what constitutes a quality education in their belief that 
most of the nation's problems can be resolved by a change in standards and 
practices of public education. 
It is difficult to adopt and orchestrate a plan to improve the quality of 
education if there is a lack of a clear definition of what is to be changed. The 
idea of "excellence" or "quality" needs to be conceptually tied to an agreed-
upon central purpose and definition of value if the process of achieving the 
desired change is to have any lasting and meaningful impact. This does not 
limit the concept of "quality education" to one single indicator or outcome, 
but it provides a framework which helps assess these elements needed for 
facilitating policy and procedural decisions. 
At the same time, while goals may be set, it is not always possible or 
even advantageous to have a framework so structured that it does not allow 
for adaptations in process (Miller and Lieberman, 1988). Nevertheless, the 
difficult task of improving the quality of public education would be enhanced 
by determining what it is that we are resolved to change. 
The current education reform movement reflects this resolution to 
overhaul public schooling. The impetus for many of the previous demands 
for improving educational quality has come from the desire to revamp social 
inequities. The driving force behind this current reform movement is the 
dissatisfaction with America's economic status in the global profit-making 
"market." Thus, many of the previous standards for educational change, 
such as entitlement, are being replaced by other elements, such as 
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standardization and efficiency (Cornbleth, 1986). 
The Educational Reform Movement and Change 
A basic principle of any organizational change is that it must be goal 
directed. Ironically, a basic problem that most educational reform efforts face 
is the failure to define what is meant by "education." Reform is typically 
viewed as an antecedent condition necessary for the subsequent condition-
quality education; but the term remains vaguely outlined. The fundamental 
desire to promote change in the belief that the outcome will result in an 
improvement in the quality of education is often based on general precepts 
which have yet to be clearly defined. 
The previous educational reforms attempted to improve the health, 
welfare, and general social condition of children. Others have focused on the 
improvement of a particular subject, such as reading or science. More 
recently, there has been an even broader debate over whether all students 
should take one academic curriculum or varied ones, under the issue of what 
constitutes an "equal education." The values of equity and excellence, as 
pointed out by Fantini (1986) and others, are defined in numerous ways and 
are entangled in any definition of equal education. 
The current reform movement is based on economic rather than social 
concerns. While there is some variation in the structure, content, and 
general methodologies proposed by the various commissions and task forces 
for educational reform, all of the reports outline suggestions for the 
improvement in the overall quality of American education. 
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A Nation At Risk (1983) recommends more rigorous standards, and 
Action for Excellence (1983) demands mastery of basic skills. So, too, does the 
Paideia Proposal (1982) require higher skill level mastery. Each suggests 
changes in different ways, but the essence of the reports is similar. Action for 
Excellence designates that a long-range goal should be to end remedial courses 
whenever possible, yet promotion should be based upon mastery, not age. 
The Paideia Proposal maintains that all children are truly educable and in 
precisely the same sense of the word. In one of the sequels, though, they are 
"prepared to concede that...we may never be able to achieve one hundred 
percent success" (Adler, 1983, Part 2, p. 32). 
In A Nation at Risk, the commission has set a goal higher than that 
which is necessary by current judicial ruling on quality of special education 
services. While the judicial ruling on Rowley (1982) helped define minimal 
levels of quality special education, A Nation at Risk proposes that the future 
goal of general education "must be to develop the talents of all to their fullest. 
Attaining that goal requires that we expect and assist all students to work to 
the limits of their capabilities" (p. 13). 
One of the emerging issues between regular education and special 
education is how special education students fit in the the proposed plans for 
educational reform. While several of the reform reports emphasize the need 
to examine each child as an individual, which is one of the basic 
fundamentals of special education, only four states (AZ, IL, OH, and WV) 
have formed a task force that specifically focused on special education (The 
Nation Responds, 1985). 
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Special Education and the Reform Movement 
There has been very little mention of special education in any of the 
reform movement reports. Some, including Hagerty and Abramson (1987), 
Wang and Reynolds (1989), and Stainback and Stainback (1987b), question the 
separation of special education from regular education, and believe that 
sound educational practices could be used to best meet the needs of the 
majority of the exceptional child population. 
Others, such as Lilly (1987), Bickel (1986) and Pugach (1987), believe that 
the present evaluative research of special education does not support its 
identity as a separate and successful component of regular education, and 
rightfully special education is omitted from the reform reports. 
A third reason that little detail is provided which relates specifically to 
the needs of the handicapped may be the nature and purpose of task force 
reports in general. While many critics have pointed out an overall lack of 
detail in general, the commissions and the resulting reports function perhaps 
as a vehicle of "announcement," similar to statements of the "State of the 
Art." The details are then to be supplied by others. Most of the task forces 
were composed of few educators. This, too, may have limited, by default, 
some of the specifications other critics have looked for in reading these 
reports. Individuals, such as Goodlad (1984), Lightfoot (1983), Adler (1984), 
and Boyer (1983), described specific characteristics, programs, and practices of 
quality education that they proclaim. It is much simpler to reach consensus 
and to provide specific blueprints from a singular viewpoint. With some 
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exceptions, the studies do not address the most difficult conceptual and 
political issues (Peterson, 1983). The sociopolitical issues related to special 
education and quality make such a task that much more difficult to attempt. 
Issues of Quality in Special Education 
While special education services have been available in the public 
schools for decades, comprehensive programs were not mandated nationally 
until 1975. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the presence of quality of special 
education in the public school setting was measured primarily using 
inclusion or exclusion as the key value or factor. 
The measurement of quality has begun to shift away from "zero reject" 
and other basic entitlements toward factors which are not as clearly defined or 
observed. P. L. 94-142, along with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
P. L. 99-457, are designed to define the terms "handicapped children" and 
"special education and related services." These documents can be used to 
assist public educators to evaluate the quality of special education services. 
There are some limitations of their use: the public laws primarily address 
procedural values rather than substantive values. Judicial rulings further 
clarify and interpret issues of quality to some degree, but much of what is 
reported stems from its own narrow definition based upon the specific case, 
and its significance is embedded in writings which focus on the general 
entitlements rather than on quality. 
At institutions of higher education, researchers have been able to 
recommend successful practices and adaptations for specific types of special 
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education populations. Most of this knowledge has focused on the 
improvement of the quality of education for the moderately and severely 
handicapped, yet the vast majority of identified exceptional children are 
classified as mildly handicapped, and most of them receive at least part of 
their education in the regular classroom setting. 
From within its own ranks, special education authorities are 
questioning the value of their own system. Proponents of the merger of 
special education with regular education hope to incorporate the best practices 
in special education into the regular classroom. Some even believe that there 
is little 'special' about special education. Others support the concept of a 
separate program for special education and are concerned about the lack of 
quality of services available for exceptional children in the regular school 
setting. The possibility of major changes occurring in the direction special 
education is headed is high: much of the scope of special education is directly 
tied to fiscal resources. 
As a method of evaluation of special education, many school systems 
nationwide have designed and implemented evaluation models to 
determine the quality of services being provided. Some of the states which 
have sponsored special education program evaluation include North 
Carolina, Massachusetts, Vermont, and California. Houston and Fort Worth, 
Texas, along with a 55-district cooperative in Illinois, are examples of "locally" 
developed models whose samples are also comprehensive.3 There are some 
3 N.C. Dept. of Public Instruction (1983). Program Quality Evaluation Manual: Conference 
Report Institute on Special Programs (1983), "Models for Evaluation and Related Services at the 
Local Level"; and Mclntire, R.G. and Wong, M.J. (1983), Special Education Team Member Quality 
Assurance Program-
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limitations of their use and much of the results is speculative. Typically, 
findings are written with generalizations of numeric figures representing 
ratios of compliance. Some measure quality based on the presence of 
indicators which provide an array of objectives to pursue in order to achieve 
a level of quality. Still others focus on the evaluation of the school personnel 
rather than on services. 
Overall, procedures to evaluate the issue of quality in special education 
have lagged behind the available data to identify the effectiveness of quality 
instruction and student outcomes. As Sarason (1982) has noted, an analysis of 
the value given to the setting or goal is critical to the success of the desired 
change. The need to clarify the underlying value or quality of special 
education, or "setting," illustrates one of the hurdles which Sarason refers to 
in the process of achieving a goal. 
Purpose of the Study 
Although there exists a substantial and growing general literature 
which discusses varying issues relating to quality of special education, no 
study has attempted to define and organize key factors of quality cited by those 
groups who help most in defining quality issues. The purpose of this study is 
to help interpret how various influencing forces shape and define the field of 
special education in terms of its quality. In order to accomplish this, it is 
necessary to complete several steps. First, an extrapolation from the extant 
literature was conducted for the purpose of reporting the historical patterns of 
legislative and litigative decisions which may have an impact on 
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determining definitions of quality in special education. Second, a survey was 
completed to determine from experts within the field of special education 
what indicators of quality they perceive as necessary in order to have quality 
special education, and what changes they anticipate in how quality special 
education will be defined. Third, an analysis of the findings was conducted to 
relate these factors of quality and change to the potential future 
responsibilities to special educators and to share these findings with these 
individuals who have the greatest influence in determining and organizing 
how quality special education will be defined. 
Undergirding its immediate purpose is the hope that this study will 
provide useful information to those who are actively involved in decision­
making roles that determine the direction and "quality" of special education, 
and that they will be better able to anticipate changes which may be needed or 
desired if the current trends continue. 
Importance of the Study 
Despite the presence of political empowerment which mandates 
change in a system, legislative policy does not automatically guarantee social 
endorsement. Additional confusion occurs when one considers that the 
special education reform movement and subsequent legislation were enacted 
to correct social inequities. The current educational reform movement is 
founded on economic concerns. These polemics further complicate the 
establishment of a framework to evaluate the quality of special education. 
Nevertheless, the legislative acts and judicial rulings are the standards by 
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which schools must comply. What inner values of quality educational 
leaders choose may be another matter. 
During the period of social awareness toward education reform, special 
education benefited from the fact that handicapped conditions are not tied to 
sociopolitical boundaries— exceptionalities are found in families of both 
political parties and in individuals of any race or religious affiliation. If the 
quality of education is to be based upon outcomes of economic productivity, 
the recent definitions constructed for quality in special education will not be 
compatible with those definitions of quality in regular education: the quality 
of special education will not be tied conceptually to an agreed-upon central 
purpose or platform presented by general educators. 
Further change in programs and services available to all children will 
occur. The direction of proposed change under this latest wave of educational 
reform and the organization of special education is still being defined. Three 
of special education's greatest influencers come from legislation, judicial 
interpretations, and professional educators. As policy, procedures, and 
programs are being formulated to improve the quality of special education, it 
is important to know and clarify whether these forces perceive special 
education quality in similar or dissimilar ways. 
If American public education is to remain competitive, its strength, in 
part, is contingent upon the knowledge base of individuals who have direct 
influence on the shape and direction of the forces of education. At the same 
time, this knowledge of change strategies needs to be applied intelligently and 
thoughtfully as part of the decision-making process. Special education is a 
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part of the education system, and the quality of its services is closely tied to 
the insight of its leaders. 
Burrello and Sage (1979) noted: 
The driving forces for change, which establish the environment and 
tasks of the current day leader in the field of special education, consist 
of such externally based sources as the general social climate, actions of 
the courts, and legislation at both the state and federal levels (p. 57). 
How each of these forces defines quality can have great significance in the 
further development, direction, and definition of special education. 
The concept of quality and its measurement may be described in a 
variety of ways. In this study, the terms "assess," "measure," and "evaluate" 
will be used interchangeably as pragmatic values in their broadest sense for 
determining quality of special education. 
Research Questions to be Addressed 
1. What is considered "quality special education?" 
A. How has legislation helped define quality special education? 
B. How have judicial rulings interpreted and further defined what is 
quality special education? 
C. How do nationally recognized experts in the field of special 
education define quality special education? 
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D. How do special education directors in local administrative units 
define quality special education? 
2. Are there any significant differences among legislative, judicial, and 
experts' definitions? 
3. Are there any significant differences between the current use of indicators 
of quality in special education and the predicted future use of these 
same indicators within each group? 
4. Are there any significant differences between the current use of indicators 
of quality in special education and the predicted future use of these same 
indicators among the three groups? 
5. Are there any significant differences between the current importance of 
indicators in defining quality and the predicted future importance of these 
same indicators within each group? 
6. Are there any significant differences between the current importance of 
indicators in defining quality and the predicted future importance of these 
same indicators among the three groups? 
Organization of the Study 
This chapter has provided an overview of the process in which quality 
in education is determined. The methodology, facilities, and curriculum in 
American schools often attempt to reflect the sociopolitical beliefs of what is 
considered the "best education" at a given moment. The process of change or 
reform is not limited to just regular education. Special education has also 
evolved as a result of various forces which help shape and change the concept 
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of quality. Two of these forces have a legal basis: laws, and their subsequent 
judicial interpretations. A third force which significantly influences the 
definition of "quality special education" is the interpretation of quality by 
special education practitioners. 
Chapter II presents a review of the literature. The major legislative acts 
which have had significant impact on defining special education are 
examined. The components which help determine issues of quality special 
education specifically are addressed. Judicial interpretations of these special 
education laws are reviewed, including landmark and Supreme Court cases. 
Other court cases which relate to issues of quality in special education are 
covered. 
Chapter III presents the procedures used to determine how various 
groups of special educators define quality in special education. The 
methodology used to determine a framework for reference, the design of the 
survey, and the method of collection of the data will be discussed. 
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the data and addresses the findings 
of the survey. The remaining questions addressed in Chapter II (1 c, 1 d, and 
questions 2-6) will be examined. An interpretation of the results is included. 
The final chapter, Chapter V, summarizes the major findings and offer 
conclusions and recommendations. Implications for further research in this 
area will be suggested. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF QUALITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 
Introduction 
Discriminatory and exclusionary practices toward the handicapped are 
not new. From ancient times, the handicapped have faced ostracism and 
persecution. Lack of knowledge and understanding often led to superstitious 
beliefs or prejudicial practices. As causes of disabilities were discovered and as 
communities became better informed, the stigmatization decreased and less 
social preclusion followed with acknowledgement of the existence of the 
handicapped as members of society. 
Education, though, is historically less advanced than society in its 
acceptance of deviance. Minimal, and therefore acceptable, standards for 
entrance have been assumed and traditional practices are well-entrenched. 
Flexibility has not been a dominant characteristic in schools settings which 
historically have been known for their rigidity. 
Legislation. Litigation, and Education for the Handicapped: 1950-1970. 
By 1950,108,000 mentally retarded students, 182,000 speech impaired 
students, 47,000 orthopedically and other health impaired students, and 37,000 
students with emotional problems were receiving special services in a variety 
of settings.4 Except for the speech impaired, many of these children were 
4 Mackie, Romaine P. (1969), p. 36. 
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located in institutions, and did not actually receive educational services as 
such. 
Prior to the denial of education for the handicapped, other exclusionary 
practices toward children were being litigated. The fundamental right of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
in reference to education was clearly outlined in Brown v. Board of Education: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. [Brown. 347 
U.S. 483, at 493.] 
The opening statement by the plaintiff's attorney, John W. Davis, more 
succinctly stated the application of Brown to the handicapped when he said, 
"If fBrownl should prevail, I am unable to see why a state would have any 
further right to segregate its pupils on the ground of sex or on the ground of 
age or on the ground of mental capacity."5 
John F. Kennedy provided the impetus for increased services for one of 
the areas of exceptionality: the mentally retarded. In 1961, Kennedy 
organized the President's Committee on Mental Retardation. Although this 
committee addressed issues for only one area of exceptionality, the mentally 
retarded were the largest group who were being denied appropriate services. 
Kennedy expanded the scope of educational programs to be established in his 
1963 creation of the Division of Handicapped Children and Youth within the 
5 Lippman and Goldberg (1973), p. 13 [emphasis mine]. 
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United States Office of Education, but its existence was short-lived. 
A countersuit to Brown was also filed in 1963,6 challenging through 
evidence, which consisted of educational and psychological tests, that 
segregation was more beneficial for black children than was desegregation. 
This case was settled just prior to another landmark act that was to have 
educational implications for the handicapped. The Civil Rights Act, P.L. 88-
352, did not publish guidelines for implementation or interpretation. 
However, the Act allowed civil action against any program or activity 
displaying discriminatory practices based upon race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Public Law 89-313, passed in 1965, provided funds for those public 
schools which educated children who had formerly attended an institution. 
Even with fiscal incentives, though, discriminatory practices toward the 
handicapped continued, and few states took advantage of these funds to 
deinstitutionalize the handicapped. Interest in the handicapped was 
beginning to build, though, and in 1967, the Bureau for the Education of the 
Handicapped was created. 
Two significant legal cases were decided in 1967. Neither case pertained 
to the handicapped, but each was to add decisions about discrimination which 
could pertain to the handicapped. The Supreme Court decided In re Gault.7 
and declared, generally, that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the 
Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"8 thus further defining the rights of 
6 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 220 F. supp. 667 (1963). 
7 In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1, 1967. 
8 Gault. at 13. 
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children. In Hobson v. Hansea9 the process of tracking, or placing children 
solely on the basis of ability was found to be discriminatory and ordered to be 
abolished. However, the judge maintained that he had no intention of 
denying schools the right to establish different educational settings for 
different kinds of students, and that grouping children with demonstrated 
lower ability with other students of equal limited abilities might be 
beneficial.10 
Another session of Congress began and further legislation was passed 
which assisted the handicapped. A plan to eliminate architectural barriers to 
the physically handicapped was enacted, in addition to the introduction of the 
first bill solely designed for handicapped children: P.L. 90-538, the 
Handicapped Children's Early Education Assistance Act, which helped 
establish demonstration centers for preschool handicapped children. 
The expansion of children's rights in 1969 and 1970 added to the unrest 
that was being felt by parents and educators. While Tinker v. Pes Moines " 
centered on children's freedom of expression, it was the final cornerstone laid 
prior to the advent of vigorous legislation and litigation for the handicapped. 
In a lawsuit similar to Hobson v. Hansen and the issue of tracking, a case was 
brought against Pasadena schools, challenging ability grouping of blacks on 
the basis of performance on a group intelligence test.12 In a second test case 
regarding racial imbalance in educational grouping of children, Diana v. State 
9 Hobson v. Hansen. 269 FISUDD. 401 (D.D.C., 1967). 
10Bryson and Bentley, (1980), p. 3. 
11 Tinker V. Pes Moines. 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed. 2d 731 (1969) 
12Spanoler v. Board of Education. 311 F.Supp. 266 (W .D. Ark., 1980). 
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Board of Education13 struck down the placement of Mexican-American 
children in classrooms for the retarded. It was determined that the 
evaluation instruments used for placement decisions were culturally biased 
because the sample populations and norms did not include experiential or 
language differences. 
Only in the past thirty to forty years have the courts viewed specific 
rights of children, and until recently, these rulings focussed on the standing of 
equity or custody under the umbrella of parens patriae, in which courts 
legally interceded on the behalf of children. The other area had centered on 
the issue of in loco parentis, which often involved school personnel, and is 
still a factor of frequent litigation. From these issues, laws which address 
children's rights and specifically, children's educational rights, have increased. 
Legal Aspects of Special Education for the Handicapped 
Historically, children's rights, including handicapped children's rights, 
were severely limited until recent times. The judicial system first had to 
establish some determinants which described basic rights for minors. From 
there, rights of students in general were decided by the courts and, most 
recently, judges have rendered decisions addressing the educational rights of 
the handicapped. 
While most decisions regarding educational programs for the 
handicapped are determined by local school policies and procedures, there are 
several special education issues that have become legal concerns. In the past 
two decades, state and federal legislation have provided some needed 
13 Diana v. California State Board of Education. Civil #C-70,37 RFP (N.D.Cal., 1970). 
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regulations, which have mandated services and rights for the handicapped. 
Interpretation of these laws, though, is still fairly new. 
Based upon content analysis of some of these judicial decisions, an 
analysis of current trends can be made from recent decisions, and a forecast of 
possible future trends from these judicial rulings. Most of these decisions 
have been based upon two major legislative acts, both of which address a 
handicapped child's legal right to obtain a free and appropriate public 
education. 
When these bills were first passed, the judicial courts were initially 
settling litigation cases concerning exclusionary practices by public schools. 
During the 1970s, two landmark cases, presented as class actions suits, 
provided the impetus for the passage of major legislative bills which helped 
shape and increase the quality of special education services to its current state. 
It has only been in the past few years that the term "appropriate" has been 
judicially addressed, and the courts have begun to further associate 
"appropriate education" with the issues of "quantity" and "quality." In 
determining the "appropriateness" of special education and related services, 
the courts usually make their decisions based upon the evidence furnished, 
in part, by the individualized education program proposed or furnished by 
the public schools. 
The Landmark Cases: PARC and Mills 
The class action suit under PARC M was filed on behalf of all mentally 
retarded children between the ages of 6 and 21 who resided in Pennsylvania 
14 Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children. 334 F.Supp. 1257 D.C. Ed. Pa., 1971). 
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and who were presently being excluded from public school. These exclusions 
by the public schools were based upon four state statutes: 
1) A child whom a school psychologist certifies as uneducable and 
untrainable could be excluded, with the Department of Welfare becoming the 
primary care agency. The Department of Welfare, though, was under no 
obligation to provide any educational service. 
2) Postponement could be continued indefinitely to disallow admission to 
any child who did not attain a mental age of five years. 
3) Exclusion of a previously enrolled student when it was determined by a 
psychologist that the child would not profit by attending. 
4) Automatic exclusion from admission of retarded children to the age of 8, 
and automatic "graduation" at age 17. 
In a consent agreement, the court barred the schools in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from (a) postponing or terminating or in 
any way denying any mentally retarded child access to a free public program 
of education and training; (b) denying tuition, or tuition and maintenance, 
to any mentally retarded child; and (c) denying homebound instruction 
(since they did not meet the current state guidelines of being physically 
handicapped or being temporarily unable to attend school). 
The court further directed that: 
1) All retarded children represented by the class action suit must be 
reevaluated immediately and be given a free public program of education and 
training. 
34 
2) By September 1,1972, every retarded person between age 6 and 21 years be 
provided a free public program of education and training. 
3) Where preschool programs are being provided for students less than 6 
years of age, these same districts must also provide services for the retarded. 
In summary, the court ruled: 
The Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child 
in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the 
child's capacity, within the context of a presumption that, among the 
alternative programs of education and training required by statute to 
be available, placement in a regular public school class is preferable to 
placement in a special school class and placement in a special public 
school class is preferable to placement in any other type of program of 
education and training fPARC(197l). at 1260]. 
The PARC decree included a provision for tuition payment to 
institutions, which certainly assisted those parents who had previously 
absorbed the cost of care for their child. On the other hand, though, the 
tuition reimbursement also resulted in some perpetuation of exclusion from 
a public school setting. 
The Mills lawsuit was filed in behalf of seven children who previously 
had been allowed to attend school but were subsequently excluded. The 
District of Columbia was found to have failed to provide publicly supported 
education and training to exceptional children and to have excluded, 
suspended, expelled, reassigned, or transferred exceptional children from 
regular public school classes without affording the children due process of 
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law. The seven children displayed characteristics described as 1) behavior 
problems, 2) physical disabilities, 3) retardation, 4) brain damage, 5) 
hyperactivity, and 6) epilepsy. Although all seven children were Black, the 
class they were representing was not to be limited by their race. Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act15 had been issued prior to the decision, so this was 
actually a test case. 
The District Court ordered that the District of Columbia provide to each 
child of school age a free and suitable publicly supported education regardless 
of the degree of the child's mental, physical, or emotional disability or 
impairment. 
Because of the wide variety of handicapping conditions, Mills had 
greater impact than the PARC case. In fact, the judge's orders were very 
similar to the PARC decree. Most of the students represented by this class 
action suit had previously attended public school, and would therefore be 
reentering, unlike the PARC members who had never attended public school. 
Although Mills did not have a court-appointed master to assure 
compliance, as did PARC, action was taken two years later for non­
compliance. By that time, however, P.L. 93-112 was outlined, and P.L. 94-142 
was only a year away from being passed. 
The Laws: The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and P.L. 94-142 
Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and P.L. 94-142 
have had such impact upon issues involving the handicapped that all other 
legislation pales in comparison. 
1887 Stat. 355 §504 (1973). 
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In September, 1973, P.L. 93-112 became the first federal civil rights law 
to protect the rights of handicapped individuals. Title V of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 contains five sections, four of which related to affirmative action 
for handicapped individuals, and one, Section 504, which related to remedial 
action, voluntary action, and self-evaluation. Section 501 deals with 
employment of handicapped individuals in agencies and department of the 
Federal government. Section 502 establishes an Architectural and 
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board. Section 503 covers employment 
under Federal contracts, and Section 504 prohibits discrimination by 
recipients of Federal financial assistance. In Section 504, the regulations 
include provisions for non-discrimination toward the handicapped that 
closely parallel those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (racial 
nondiscrimination) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (sex 
nondiscrimination). Summarized, Section 504 reads 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual...shall, solely by reason 
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance [87 Stat. 355 §504 (1973)]. 
The other federal policy to be passed was P.L. 94-142, the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA). The EHA provides a means to 
carry out educational programs which could be nondiscriminatory. The 
essence of the Act was to generate a funding formula in which financial 
assistance would "flow through" to the local educational agencies where the 
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handicapped children resided. The other major provision was that P.L. 94-142 
furnished a blueprint for procedures and practices that could assure due 
process to guarantee a free appropriate public education for the handicapped. 
The classification of "handicapped individuals" varies somewhat 
among these regulations. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines 
the handicapped as any person who 
1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one 
or more major life activities (functions such as caring for one's self, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working); 
2) has a record of such an impairment (or has a history of, or has been 
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment) that 
substantially limits one or more major life activity; or: 
3) is regarded as having such an impairment [87 Stat. 355 §504 (§84.3)]. 
Examples of (2) above include persons who have a history of a 
handicapping condition such as a mental or emotional illness, heart disease, 
or cancer, but no longer have the condition; and persons who have been 
incorrectly classified as having such a condition, such as mental retardation.16 
Examples of persons in (3) above who are protected by Section 504 
could include those displaying a limp or individuals with disfiguring scars, or 
others who are treated as if they are handicapped.17 These definitions also 
include persons suffering from drug and alcohol abuse.18 
16 See Larrv P. v. Riles. 343 F.Supp. 1306 (Cal., 1972). 
17 87 Stat. 355 §505 (84.3). 
18 Yet see.Travnorv. Turnaae U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1372 (1988). 
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Further issues of discrimination are covered under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act. A person may be included in this definition if he 
a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but is treated by an institution as though 
such a limitation exists. 
b) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major 
life activities only as a result of attitudes of others toward such an 
impairment, or 
c) has no impairment but is treated by the institution as having such 
an impairment. [87 Stat. 355 §504 (84.3) 
Under P.L. 94-142, the handicapped are children 
between the ages 3-2119 identified as being mentally retarded, hard of 
hearing, deaf, visually impaired, speech impaired, seriously 
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, other health impaired, 
deaf-blind, multihandicapped, or specific learning disabled who, 
because of these impairments, need special education and related 
services [20 U.S.C. §1401 (1)]. 
Section 504 is basically an entitlement bill, outlining provisions to 
guarantee nondiscrimination toward the handicapped. Although P.L. 94-142 
is limited to education, it specifies the systematic procedures required to 
guarantee and assure the educational rights of the handicapped. 
Public Law 94-142 consists of seven subchapters. Most prominent in 
litigation is the interpretation of issues covered in the first two subchapters: 
19 This has been amended through P.L. 99-457 to also include handicapped children ages 0-
5, effective 09/01/91. 
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General Provisions,20 and Assistance for Education of All Handicapped 
Children.21 Of these, Section 1401 is critical judicially in that it classifies the 
handicapped categorically as previously cited. Other sections that are often 
judicially addressed are Section 1412: Eligibility Requirements, and Section 
1415: Procedural Safeguards. 
Section 504 is comprised of six subparts, including general provisions; 
employment practices; program accessibility; preschool, elementary, and 
secondary education; postsecondary education; and health, welfare, and social 
services. 
Under Section 504, those sections which are usually addressed in 
judicial decisions relating to the education of the handicapped are (1) Subpart 
D and Section 84.33: Free Appropriate Public Education; (2) Section 84.34: 
Educational Setting; (3) Section 84.35: Evaluation and Placement, and (4) 
Section 84.36: Procedural Safeguards. While P.L. 94-142 initially did not allow 
awards for attorney's fees, Section 504 did, when litigation also pertains to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871.22 It reads in part that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress (42 U.S.C.§ 1983). 
20 20 U.S.C. §1401-1406. 
21 20 U.S.C. §1411-1420. 
22 For cases involving exceptional child and earlier awards of attorney's fees, see Mattie T. v. 
tMaday, 3 EHLR 126 (N.D.. 1981V Harris T. v. D C. Board of Education. 3 EHLR 553: 269 
(D.D.C., 1981); Derheim v. Hennepin County Board of Education. 3 EHLR 553: 266 D.M.N., 
1981); Anderson v. Thompson. 3 EHLR 553: (Cal. 7th, 1981); and Patsel v. D.C. Board of 
Education. 3 EHLR 553: 4395 (D.D.C., 1982). 
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The course of awards of attorney's fees and damage claims has changed 
since the Supreme Court ruling of Smith v. Robinson.23 As a result, 
legislation was introduced to allow proceedings for redress under P.L. 94-142.24 
More Recent Legislation: Comprehensive Rights for All Handicapped 
Although the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and P.L. 94-142 provided 
the basic foundation for educational opportunities, several features were 
omitted in their original passages. As a result, new laws have been passed 
which expand the scope of these original provisions to assist the handicapped. 
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act25 (HCPA), is an 
amendment to the EHA, as a result of the Supreme Court ruling on Smith v. 
Robinson. In that case, the Court found that the recover of attorney's fees was 
unavailable through P.L. 94-142. The HCPA allows for such recovery, and the 
legal recourse for filing has also been expanded. 
The HCPA is comprised of 5 sections; the first section is the title of the 
Act. Section 2 allows a court to award attorney's fees if the parents are the 
prevailing party in a lawsuit. There are some limitations placed on the 
amount of recovery, and the award must be based upon "reasonable" and 
local-prevailing fees. Section 3 allows for legal redress and monetary damages 
23 Smith v. Robinson. 104 S.Ct. 3456 (1984). 
24 See the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, P.L. 99-372. See also 
reauthorization and renaming of P.L. 94-142 to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, P.L. 
100-476. 
25 P.L. 99-372; 20 U.S.C. §1415 (e)(4) and 1415(f). 
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to be filed under other federal civil rights statutes in addition to the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
Section 4 requires a study of the impact of the HCPA; the purpose of the 
study is to determine the average costs of attorney's fees. The last section of 
the HCPA permits claims to be awarded retroactively to cases decided since 
Smith v. Robinson and the passage of this new Act. 
In summary, the HCPA allows not only the award of attorney's fees, but 
it also limits the amount of recovery, and expands the options for legal 
redress. 
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986 
Shortly after the passage of the HCPA, Congress enacted P.L. 99-457, the 
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986. This law, 
informally known as the "Preschool Handicapped Act," expanded services 
initially offered under P.L. 94-142. Public Law 99-457 mandated that services 
be designed and offered to children from birth to age 5. The Act includes two 
major provisions which are categorized by age groupings. 
The first part of the amendment is designed to require early 
intervention services to infants and toddlers from birth to 3 years of age. An 
intervention committee is to be formed locally, whose membership includes 
individuals employed by service organizations under the auspices of the 
Department of Human Resources and the Department of Education. Each 
community group is to work cooperatively with one another to plan and 
implement services and to assist in the transition of these children to 
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preschool programs. Under the guidelines of P.L. 99-457, an individualized 
family plan is developed, which contains components similar to the IEP; it 
also provides projected goals not only for the child, but his family unit as 
well. 
The second provision of P.L. 99-457 describes similar methods of 
service delivery to the preschool participants, ages 3-5. Beginning with the 
school year 1991, educational programs must be available to all preschool 
handicapped children. Since this bill was first passed, the monies available to 
states and local systems to initiate these services have lagged behind projected 
fiscal allotments. Whether states will be mandated to comply with the 1991 
deadline of full implementation for this population remains to be 
determined by upcoming legislative sessions. 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
Although the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided for non­
discrimination of the handicapped, it was limited to compliance review and 
penalties assessed only at those facilities and institutions which received 
federal monies. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),26 in part, 
extended the legal rights mandated by the Rehabilitation Act; businesses in 
the private sector which employ as few as 15 individuals were required to 
comply with its regulations. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination under 5 titles. Title I covers equal 
employment opportunities; Title II protects equal opportunities to programs, 
services, and activities; while Title III specifies access of services to any place 
26 P.L. 101-336. 
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of commerce or entertainment. 
Title IV requires the availability of telecommunication services for the 
handicapped. The last section, Title V, discusses how the ADA relates to other 
legislation for the handicapped; provides a protection clause for those 
reporting a violation; gives further organization guidelines; and declares the 
availability of attorney fee awards. Another section already incorporated in 
the Act is the abrogation of immunity for state violations of the ADA. As 
such, violations will not be dismissed under the direction of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
Most of the components required by the ADA are to be phased in 
gradually over a period of 4 years. While the law is designed primarily for 
adults, children may benefit in several areas. All new community 
construction must be designed to be accessible, and existing facilities must be 
modified if renovation costs are not prohibitive. The term, "reasonable 
modifications" appears to be a guideline for the type and amount of 
modifications required under this law. Theaters, stadiums, and other 
locations where educational field trips may be scheduled would be covered 
under this category. 
Urban school districts may benefit from the requirement for expanded 
transportation services for the handicapped. A proportional number of new 
purchases of buses, train, and subway cars must contain features suitable for 
the handicapped. Many city systems who currently contract with public 
transit systems may be able to eliminate separate transportation services often 
required for the handicapped under current conditions. Smaller 
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communities will also be required to provide services, but these more than 
likely will have to be individually contracted. Several "school generations" 
of handicapped children may not have these services available, as the public 
transit system will be gradually phased in over a period of 30 years. 
With the completion of this legislation, most of the rights for the 
handicapped are now affirmed through law. While further litigation may 
clarify definitions contained in these legislative acts, discover limitations and 
omissions of these laws and require amendments, the basic framework to 
guarantee equal opportunity for the handicapped may now be in place. 
Supreme Court and Current Landmark Cases 
There have been slightly more than a dozen Supreme Court cases 
involving handicapped children since the passage of the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act and P.L. 94-142. Of these cases, approximately half have 
had limited impact on redefining significant issues of quality of special 
education.27 Beginning with 1982, though, an average of one case per year has 
had a major impact on the definition of quality of special education. These 
Supreme Court cases have clarified such important and varying issues as the 
27 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis. 442 U.S. 397 (1979); University of Texas v. 
Camenisch. 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman. 451 U.S. 1 
(1981) and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Pennhurst I 
and Pennhurst 111: Citv of Cleburne. Texas v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); 
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind. 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and TrayriQrV. 
Turnaoe. U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1372 (1988). 
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definition of "free appropriate public education/'28 attorney's fees,29 
catheterization as a related health service,30 tuition reimbursement,31 
handicap discrimination,32 suspension and expulsion,33 and governmental 
immunity.34 Because of their significant contributions to the history and 
development of modern special education, each of these major Supreme 
Court rulings will be discussed separately. 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley35 
Rowley, a deaf youngster, was first enrolled in public school as a 
kindergartner for a trial period of time. After this observation period, it was 
decided that she should remain in a kindergarten class, but be provided with 
an FM hearing aid. She completed kindergarten satisfactorily. 
In the fall, a new IEP was developed for first grade. The school 
committee recommended the child attend a regular first grade class with 
augmentative amplification from an FM hearing aid, receive tutoring 
assistance from a teacher for the deaf one hour each day, and speech therapy 3 
hours per week. The Rowleys agreed with the IEP, but also requested that a 
full time interpreter be hired. During the previous year in kindergarten, an 
28 Board of Education v. Rowlev. 458 U.S. 17, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982). 
29 Smith v. Robinson. 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984). 
30 Irving Independent School District V. Tatro. 468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984). 
31 Burlington School Committee v. Dept. of Education of Massachusetts. 471 U.S. 359, 105 
S.Ct. 1996 (1985). 
32 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline. 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987). See pp. 61-62 for 
discussion. 
33Honio v. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988). 
34 Dellmuth v. Muth. 109 S.Ct. 2397 (1989). 
35 Rowlev. 632 F.2d 945 (1980), 483 F.Supp. 530,32 F.2d 945 (1980), 458 U.S.176, 102 
S.Ct. 3034 (1982). 
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interpreter had been tried for a two week period. At the end of that time, the 
interpreter reported that the child did not need his services. The school 
committee, referring to this recommendation, refused to provide an 
interpreter. 
Upon refusal, the Rowleys requested and received a hearing. The 
examiner ruled that the child was achieving educationally, academically, and 
socially without the assistance of an interpreter. The examiner's decision was 
affirmed on appeal by the New York Commissioner of Education. The 
Rowleys then filed suit in the U.S. District Court. At that trial, the school 
system was directed to provide an interpreter for the child. 
The reversal was based upon evidence that while Rowley was 
successfully passing from grade to grade, she was only comprehending 
slightly better than half of what was spoken to her. When total 
communication was used (sign language and lipreading), she was able to 
comprehend 100 percent of conversational speech. 
The rationale for this reversed decision was: 
Anything missed in the classroom early in the learning process will 
have far reaching consequences. As to possible disruption due to an 
interpreter, one could be integrated into the classroom in a way which 
would not disrupt the class or adversely affect Amy's social interaction 
[Rowley. 483 F.Supp. 530, at 533]. 
The disparity between Rowley's achievement and her potential led to 
the court to decide that she was not receiving a "free appropriate public 
education" which the court defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full 
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potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.36 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The Supreme Court then reversed the Appellate Court decision based 
upon the definition of a free appropriate public education. Judge Rehnquist 
concluded that a free appropriate education with special services as intended 
by P.L. 93-132 was one in which the child would benefit from instruction. The 
program design was a "basic floor of opportunity" and did not necessarily 
need to assist the child to reach his "fullest potential."37 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice White explicitly commented on this 
interpretation of "appropriate education": "Amy Rowley comprehends less 
than half of what is said in the classroom— less than half of what normal 
children comprehend. This is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even if 
Amy makes passing grades."38 This perception of quality in special education 
is shared by others, and several states have statutes which require higher 
standards for the concept of "free appropriate public education." 
Smith v. Robinson39 
This case was filed originally to determine whether or not a school 
would be responsible for the educational costs of services needed for Smith, 
who was identified as being seriously emotionally disturbed and in need of 
residential placement. The school was held liable for the educational costs, 
but not for the attorney's fees. Smith filed a complaint that he was denied his 
36B2ffilfiy, 483 F.Supp. 528, at 534. 
37 Rowlev. 102 S.Ct. 3034, at 3048. 
38 Rowlev. 102 S.Ct. 3034, at 3055. 
39 Smith v. Robinson. 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984). 
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procedural safeguards, and asserted that he be awarded attorney's fees. The 
case had been originally filed under P.L. 94-142, which has no stated 
provisions for awarding attorney's fees. The Supreme Court agreed. Judge 
Blackmun stated: 
In light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees 
set out in the EHA and Congress' express efforts to place on local and 
state educational agencies the primary responsibility for developing a 
plan to accommodate the needs of each individual handicapped child, 
we find it difficult to believe that Congress also meant to leave 
undisturbed the ability of a handicapped child to go directly to court 
with an equal protection claim to a free appropriate public education. 
In this case, we think Congress' intent is clear. Allowing a plaintiff to 
circumvent the EHA administrative remedies would be inconsistent 
with Congress' carefully tailored scheme [Smith, at 3469-3470]. 
As a result of this ruling, the Handicapped Children's Protection Act 
(HCPA) was enacted, whose legislation overruled Smith v. Robinson and 
entitled parents to recover attorney's fees under the EHA and Sections 504 
and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro40 
Tatro was an eight year-old child with spina bifida. In 1979, when Tatro 
was 31/2 years old, her mother requested that the Irving Independent School 
District review Tatro's educational needs as an exceptional child. The IEP was 
developed, and while it outlined special education and related services of 
physical therapy and occupational therapy, it did not include clean 
40Ialra 632 F.2d 945 (1980), 483 F.Supp. 530, 632 F.2d 945 (1980), 458 U.S. 176, 102 
S.Ct. 3034 (1982). 
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intermittent catheterization (CIC). The school system maintained that they 
were not obligated to provide such a service. The parents requested that 
catheterization be a part of the child's IEP and, when refused, they filed suit. 
The district court denied the Tatro's claim, indicating CIC was not a 
related service because it had no connection with nor bearing on "education." 
Upon appeal, the court reversed, and held that CIC was a related service. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The Supreme Court also affirmed, stating: 
Without CIC services available, [a] child cannot attend school and 
thereby benefit from special education. Such services are no less 
related to the effort to educate than are services that enable a child to 
reach, enter, or exit a school. ...We hold that CIC services in this case 
qualify as a supportive service [and is] required to assist a 
handicapped children to benefit from special education. We also 
agree...that provision of CIC is not a medical service [Tatroat 3377]. 
The Tatro case has specifically broadened the concept of related services 
to include any health service that an individual with training can perform. 
The fact that clean intermittent catheterization takes so little time persuaded 
the federal court to reverse the lower court decision. While the Supreme 
Court did not approach this question from the standpoint of de minimus, it 
certainly appeared to be a factor in the determination of a related health 
service. 
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Burlington v. Dept. of Education of Massachusetts41 
A child was identified as learning disabled and an IEP was proposed to 
the parents. The parents disagreed with the proposal and withdrew the child 
from school and, on their own, enrolled him in a state-approved private 
school which provided special education. 
Public Law 94-142 states that during the pendency of any proceedings, 
unless with the expressed approval of both school officials and the parents, 
the child is to remain in the "then current educational placement."42 
Upon state level review, it was determined that the original IEP was 
inappropriate and that the private school where the child had enrolled did 
provide appropriate services. The parent was then reimbursed for the costs of 
the current school year, but the school refused to reimburse him for the 
previous year when the parents unilaterally placed the student. 
The Court found: 
A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances 
come a year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has 
passed. In the meantime, the parents who disagree with the proposed 
IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of 
their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they 
consider to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter 
course,... [then] it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them 
several years later that they were right but that these expenditures 
could not... be reimbursed by the school officials. If that were the case, 
the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parents; 
right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the 
procedural safeguards would be less than complete [Burlington. at 2003]. 
4' Burlington School Committee v. Dept. of Education. U.S. 85 L.Ed. 2d 385, 105 
S.Ct. 1996 (1985). 
42 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(3). 
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The Court reasoned that if the lawsuit ultimately favored the school 
system, the parents would be barred automatically from obtaining 
reimbursement during the hearing and judicial review. As such, they 
warned that "parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during 
the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local 
school officials, do so at their own financial risk."43 
While this option is most likely limited to parents who can afford to 
risk the possibility of financial responsibility. Burlington provides an 
opportunity for the quality of their child's program to be enhanced: school 
may be forced to provide a higher degree of "appropriateness" than they 
originally planned in order to avoid a lawsuit. To ignore or deny this level of 
service may cause both parties to undertake financial risks, in addition to the 
educational risks imposed on the child. 
Honig v. Doe44 
Two high school students, located in different high schools but both 
identified as seriously emotionally disturbed under the guidelines of P.L. 94-
142, were suspended indefinitely for their violent and disruptive behavior. 
Each student had displayed aggressive behaviors which placed their teachers, 
their peers, and the students themselves, at risk for injury. 
Smith's misbehavior, which led to the suspension, included stealing, 
extorting money from students, and making sexual comments to female 
students. Doe choked a student, which left bruises on the neck, and then later 
43 Burlington, at 2005. 
44 Honia v. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988). 
52 
kicked out a window. In this "combined" case, school administrators sought 
to waive the "stay put" provision and remove a student considered 
dangerous from school. 
The Supreme Court determined that the behaviors exhibited which led 
to the suspensions were representative of each student's emotional 
disturbance and that there was every likelihood that the behaviors would be 
repeated. The Court reasoned: 
Given the evidence that [Smith] is unable to conform his conduct to 
socially acceptable norms, and the absence of any suggestion that he has 
overcome his behavioral problems, it is reasonable to expect that he 
will again engage in aggressive and disruptive classroom misconduct. 
Moreover, it is unreasonable to suppose that any future educational 
placement will so perfectly suit his emotional and academic needs that 
further disruptions on his part are improbable [Honig. at 595]. 
The Court also found that there are no provision in P.L. 94-142 for 
emergency exceptions to the "stay put" clause. As such, the Court believed 
that this omission was "intentional; we are therefore not at liberty to engraft 
onto the statute an exception Congress chose not to create" [Honig. at 6051. 
A suspension up to 10 days is allowable in a given school year without 
infringing on the student's right to a free appropriate public education. After 
10 days, such suspension or expulsion would trigger the prohibited "change 
in placemenf and mandate the "stay put" clause. 
In severe situations, the 10-day suspension allows for a "cooling down" 
period during which school officials can review the IEP and propose an 
alternative placement. If the parents disagree with the proposal and there is 
53 
the concern about safety, "the 10-day respite gives school officials an 
opportunity to invoke the aid of the courts under §1415 (e)(2), which 
empowers courts to grant any appropriate relief."45 The school-based special 
education committee need not exhaust its administrative remedies and 
initiate a due process hearing for handicapped students whose behavior is 
considered dangerous. This step may be bypassed and the school authorities 
may seek legal assistance through the court system. 
The decisions in Honig v. Doe allow for two quality checks: (1) a 
stipulation that a student will not be deprived of a free appropriate public 
education as outlined in the IEP because of frequent and lengthy suspensions 
(or expulsion); and (2) a review of the IEP must confirm that its components 
are, in fact, comprehensive enough and appropriate to allow a handicapped 
child the opportunity for a public education. 
Dellmuth v. Muth46 
Muth was identified as learning disabled and gifted. Because of 
dissatisfaction in the proposed program by the school system, the parents 
unilaterally placed the child in a private school and initiated due process 
procedures. The hearing officer's decision was challenged by both parties, and 
the hearing was then reviewed by the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education, 
who approved a revised IEP but disallowed the private school placement and 
the parent's request for tuition reimbursement. Muth then filed suit against 
the state, citing that Pennsylvania's hearing system did not include 
""Honia.at 605 
46 Dellmuth v. Muth. 109 S.Ct. 2397 (1989). 
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impartiality provisions. 
Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state cannot be sued in Federal 
court, unless it has waived its immunity or a law expressly allows it. The 
Court found that P.L. 94-142 did not specify an intent to abrogate state 
immunity from lawsuit, even under the HCPA which provided for a 
reduction in attorney's fees if a local or state agency protracts reaching a timely 
agreement or decision. 
Timothy W. v. Rochester47 
A recent federal landmark case has ruled that a handicapped child, no 
matter how severely retarded, may benefit from an education. Public Law 
94-142, by its very title, 'The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, was 
designed to ensure that all children are provided with special education and 
necessary related services. From the outset, P.L. 94-142 directed the states to 
serve children in order of priority: the first priority is to educate those 
children who have previously received no services, and the second priority is 
to provide additional services to children with the most severe handicaps 
who are receiving an inadequate education. At no point has it legally been 
determined that a child is too handicapped to be excluded from some form of 
public education. PARC resolved that belief when it ruled that severely 
retarded children had the right to an education: P.L. 94-142 was written 
directly as a result of the denial of special education (and a free appropriate 
public education) to children thought to be so retarded that they were unable 
to benefit. 
47 Timothy W. v. Rochester N.H. School Dist.. 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir., 1989). 
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Rowley provided "a basic floor of opportunity," and stated that 
standards or opportunities would vary for more severely handicapped. 
Denial would not allow any potential for growth, and denial by exclusion or 
expulsion in Honig v. Doe, has also been ruled illegal. 
Tatro ruled that catheterization was a related health service and should 
be provided for under the guidance of special education. In addition, Tatro 
demonstrated that a child may not require or need a "traditional" special 
education program, but may certainly need a related service in order to 
benefit from public education. 
In Tatro. the student would not have been able to participate in the 
regular classroom without the benefit of CIC. Worse still, the withholding of 
CIC was also life-threatening. 
In Timothy W.. the belief that Timothy would not benefit from an 
education was based upon the facts that he required a tactile stimulation 
program, positioning, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech 
therapy, along with postural drainage and operant conditioning. All of these 
were considered related services and as such, did not include at least one 
component of "special education" in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, to 
dismiss these services would be tantamount to denying Timothy, as a 
handicapped child, a free appropriate public education. If Timothy was found 
to be "so retarded that he would not benefit from an education,"48 and 
therefore was not handicapped under P.L. 94-142, his parents would also be 
denied the due process rights that are guaranteed under the law. 
46 Timothy W.. at 956 
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The Court's decision relied heavily on the interpretation of P.L. 94-142 
and the first landmark cases- Mills and PARC It stated that under the EHA, 
the state must assure that 
"all children residing in the State who are handicapped, regardless of 
the severity of their handicap, and who are in need of special education 
and related services are identified, located, and evaluated." ...Thus, not 
only are severely handicapped children not excluded from the Act, but 
the most severely handicapped are actually given priority under the 
Act fTimothv W.. at 960, citing 20 U.S.C. §1412(2) (A) and (B)]. 
In Mills, the court ruled that the local education agency "shall provide 
to each child of school age a free and suitable publicly-supported education 
regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical, or emotional disability 
or impairment."49 
The Court further relied on previous rulings. In Kruelle v. New 
Castle, it was determined that the "language and the legislative history of the 
Act simply do not entertain the possibility that some children may be 
untrainable."50 Further reference, in the same tone, was quoted from Gladys T. 
v. Pearland Independent School District51 It stated that "the language and 
legislative history of the Act simply do not admit of the possibility that some 
children may be beyond the reach of our educational expertise."52 
49 Mills. 348 F.SUPP. at 878. See also. Vander Malle v. Ambach. 667 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y., 
1987). 
50 Kruelle v. Newcastle 642 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir., 1981) at 695. 
51 Gladys J. v. Peariand Independent School District. 520 F.Supp. 869, (S.D. Tex., 1981). 
52Ml., at 879. 
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In summary, it has been determined that it is inappropriate to rule that 
a child's seemingly insurmountable handicaps should preclude his 
opportunity for a public education. 
The Court has even posed the question of inability to be educated 
under one circumstance- if a child is in a coma. Even this was not answered, 
but it raised the point that there might be a condition under which a child 
would "not benefit." Timothy reacted to stimulus, appeared to have hearing, 
and in some instances, responded to light. If a child is anencephalic, which 
has not been proven with Timothy, the issue may be raised again for the 
courts to determine if special education is necessary for a child who is 
anencephalic and unresponsive. 
Definition of Handicapped 
For educational purposes, P.L. 94-142 is most often used to define the 
term "handicapped children." It was not the intent of P.L. 94-142 to 
permanently limit the definitions to the 11 categories of handicapping 
conditions cited under §300.5. The provisions specifically state the term 
"include" does not name all of the possible items.53 Thus, the definition of 
handicapped could be interpreted as reading, "includes, but is not limited 
to...". This provision allows for the expansion of the original group defined 
as handicapped. For example, legislation was introduced in the 1990 session 
to consider "autism" and "attention deficit disorder" as possible new 
categories of handicapping conditions. 
53 34 CFR §300.6 
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Some state provisions include definitions of handicapped children 
who have been identified by titles other than those listed in section 300.5. 
This has caused some difficulty for students who have transferred out of state. 
No major case has occurred in which a student was previously identified in 
one state as handicapped and then subsequently excluded as non-handicapped 
in another state. However, this is an issue which needs to be addressed and 
precautions taken by state directors.54 
Other questions of "qualified" handicapped have been raised over such 
illnesses as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The courts have 
consistently ruled that children do not automatically qualify as handicapped 
whether they have AIDS or ARC (AIDS Related Complex) under P. L. 94-142, 
yet they most certainly should be allowed access to the same educational 
programs and services as "regular" students under the equal access provisions 
listed in Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.55 
Other health conditions in children have also been challenged to 
determine whether the diagnosis requires the label "handicapped." A child 
with a medically recognized health condition does not necessarily or 
54 See, e.g.. Hiller v. Board of Education of Brunswick Central School District. 743 F.Supp. 
958 (N.D.N.Y., 1990); yet see Louisiana State amendments to include the subcategories of 
Attention Deficit Disorder and Dyslexia under the handicapping condition of Learning Disabilities 
[17 Louisiana Statutes §1943 (1); Act 1072 Louisiana Session Laws, 1990]. 
55 see, e.g., Parents of Child No. 870901 v. Coker. 676 F.Supp. 1071 (E.D. Okla., 1987), 
Phipps v. Saddleback Vallev Unified School District. 251 Cal.Rptr. 720 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 1988), 
Doe v. Belleville Public School Dist.. 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Ill, 1987), Robertson v. Granite Citv 
Community Unit School Dist. No. 9. 684 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D. III., 1988), Martinez v. School Bd. of 
Hillsborough Co.. 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir., 1988), White v. Western School Corp.. IP85-1192-C 
(S.D. Ind. 08/23/85), Raw. Schl. Dist. of Desoto Co. 666 F.Supp. 1524 (N.D. Fla., 1987V District 
27 Comm. School Bd. bv Granirer v. Bd. of Ed. of Citv of N Y. 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Supp., 1986), 
and Doe v. Dolton Elementary School Dist. No. 148. 694 F.Supp. 440 (N.D. III., 1988). See also 
Arline y. School Bd. of Nassau County. 692 F.Supp. 1286 (1988), 48 u.s. 273 ( ), 107 s.ct. 
1123 (1987) for determining "handicapped" statutes based upon knowledge at time of lawsuit. 
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automatically qualify as handicapped under P. L. 94-142 or Section 504. One 
motion for a class action suit was denied where parents of children with 
epilepsy requested that all children with epilepsy be evaluated and provided 
special education programs as a matter of course. In addition, they outlined 
that the programs should be designed in consultation with medical 
professionals who have expertise in all aspects of epilepsy. Neither P. L. 94-142 
nor Section 504 requires affirmative action or special education solely because 
of epilepsy.56 The handicapped as a group are not a suspect class.57 However, 
children with epilepsy are eligible for placement if their educational progress 
would be hindered without special education. 
Other children with medical or health problems may qualify as 
"handicapped" to allow access to regular education even if they do not require 
special education. Three examples of conditions found in children who may 
require related services under the category of "health services" are cystic 
fibrosis, spina bifida with meningomylocele, and paralysis. The related 
services of mucus suctioning or catheterization, without necessarily the need 
for special education, still qualifies these children as "handicapped." It 
entitles them to the necessary related services which provide life-sustaining 
services and allows them to remain in the regular school environment.58 
These related services, however, have broadened the basic definition of 
"handicapped" as addressed here. 
56 Akers v. Bolton. 531 F.Supp. 300 (Kan., 1981). 
57 Citv of Cleburne. Texas v. Cteburn Living Center. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
58 See Hawaii v.Katherine P.. 727 F.2d 809 (1983V Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist.. 665 
F.2d 443, (1981), andTatro v. State of Texaa 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex., 1979), 625 F.2d 557 
(5th. Cir. 1980), 703 F.2d 823 (1983), 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984). 
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In summary, an identifiable medical condition may or may not be 
considered a handicap under P.L. 94-142 or Section 504. If the condition 
interferes with a child's educational progress, the condition more than likely 
will be considered a handicap and the student will qualify as handicapped. 
So, too, will a child with a medical condition qualify as handicapped if the 
denial of service for the condition will result in a lack of educational 
assessability. 
With the advent of P. L. 94-142, most of the litigation involving actual 
definitions of "handicapped" has focused on whether or not children would 
be provided a service within a public school setting or whether they would be 
excluded. When P. L. 94-142 was first enacted, inclusion and/or exclusion 
from public school settings was a major issue, but this basic entitlement was 
eventually realized. This pattern of exclusionary practices has reemerged 
recently as the public grapples with the problems associated with contagious 
and communicable diseases. In some instances, homebound services were 
offered; this also perpetuated segregation and bypassed the concept of least 
restrictive environment (LRE). 
In the late 1970s, handicapped children with communicable diseases 
were excluded from residential settings such as Willowbrook. Over ninety 
percent of the children housed there had been exposed to hepatitis and 
approximately sixty percent of them were hepatitis B carriers.5' As a result, 
although deinstitutionalization attempts had been made to relocate these 
children in their communities for education, they were excluded from school 
for fear that community members and public school staff might contract 
59 NYARCv. Carev. 466 F. SUDD. 479 (1978). 
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hepatitis. The children in this suit were excluded from regular public school 
classes and activities "solely by reason of their handicap," since only mentally 
retarded youngsters who were carriers of the hepatitis B antigen were isolated; 
no effort was made to identify and exclude normal children who were 
carriers.60 
Hepatitis is extremely contagious, and until the 1980s, no 
immunization was available. Although it is easily transmitted and 
occasionally fatal, the general public and school officials reacted similarly 
when AIDS was first discovered in school age children. Methods of AIDS 
transmission are fairly well known and unlikely to occur through normal 
social and physical contact in school settings, but the current state of 
knowledge that AIDS eventually results in 100% mortality rate has certainly 
affected the acceptance of these children in public school and has been 
accompanied by heated discussion. The stigmatization of children with AIDS 
and ARC followed similar exclusionary tactics seen twenty years earlier with 
hepatitis.61 
The procedures for establishment of findings of facts for the court and 
procedures for inquiry were outlined in Arline v. Nassau Board of 
Education.62 Based on an earlier ruling of "otherwise qualified individual," 63 
the Supreme Court enumerated a standard of inquiry: 
61 For a more current ruling, see Comm. High School Dist. #155 v. Denz. 463 N.E.2d 998 (III. 
App., 1984) and Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center. 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir., 1989). 
62 Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County. 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987). 
63 Southeastern Community College v. Davis. 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979). 
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This Court must evaluate the following [findings of] facts, based on 
reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, 
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the 
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity 
of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the 
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause the varying 
degrees of harm (Arline. 107 S. Ct. at 1131). 
This "rule-of-thumb" allows for review of possible discriminatory 
action toward an individual with a communicable disease. It further 
determines if the action taken against the handicapped was reasonable under 
those conditions.64 
Most of the legal issues addressing the rights of children with 
handicaps, except for a few isolated cases, have moved away from 
exclusionary practices to the issue of inclusionary practices. The focus is now 
on the type of rights and degree of practices that are to be included in the 
educational process for the handicapped. The terms "least restrictive 
environment" (LRE) and "regular education initiative" (REI) are closely 
associated with this trend. 
Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act contains a more broad 
definition of a handicap, as mentioned previously. A handicap may result in 
an actual limitation, or if other individuals perceive it as a handicapping 
condition, thus providing non-discriminatory action. If an individual is 
denied employment solely on the basis of the handicap, such as AIDS, the 
individual is considered handicapped under Section 504 and may file suit 
because of discrimination. 
^Arline. at 1291. 
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Non-Discrimination 
Two specific provisions under Section 504 have potential impact for 
handicapped children in relationship to non-discriminatory issues. These 
issues are equal opportunity and equal access to programs, facilities, and 
services.65 These regulations were designed to provide the impetus to 
remove both philosophical and physical barriers that have been faced by the 
handicapped. These non-discriminatory actions have been further defined 
and supported with the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act66 and 
its regulations. Even so, lawsuits which question the lack of equal 
opportunity and accessibility continue to be filed, and most decisions have 
demanded opportunities for access and participation. 
Discrimination has been successfully proven in cases where the state 
did not initially participate in P. L. 94-142 to the degree required by law,67 
which limited financial sources available and in turn resulted in limited 
identification and placement of handicapped children. In another case, a 
school system was determined to be discriminatory for lengthy delays in 
evaluation, and for unavailability of transportation, classrooms, and teachers 
even after students had been identified and assigned placement.68 
In addition to children diagnosed with AIDS, students identified as 
emotionally disturbed have been denied the opportunity to participate in a 
66See §104.4 (b)(1) and §104.21 
86 Americans with Disabilities Act, P.L. 101-336. 
67 NMARCv. State of N.M.. 495 F.Supp. 391 (1980); 678 F.2d 847 (C.A.N.M., 1982). 
68 Jose' P. v. Ambach. 557 F.Supp. 1230 (N.Y., 1983), and Robinson v. Pinderhuahes. 810 
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir., 1987). 
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public education.69 As mentioned previously, children with other health 
problems such as hepatitis and spina bifida have been denied the opportunity 
to be in school.70 For children who require assistance by a trained person to 
carry out a health service, school personnel cannot demand nor force parents 
to care for their child's health needs personally.71 A child who is unable to be 
transported because of a current medical condition cannot be denied access to 
a free appropriate public education, even if special education must be offered 
in a non-traditional setting.72 
Documentation for most non-discriminatory determinants will be 
noted in the individualized education program under the heading of 
"participation in regular education" or in the "continuum of services." Valid 
reasons must be given for selection of the setting, just as sound judgment 
must be evident in alternatives rejected. Of utmost importance is the 
presence of more than one option and that the setting selected is considered 
most appropriate and located in the least restrictive environment. In part, 
the IEP helps define and document the handicap and determine the services 
required. 
Definition of Special Education 
The need for special education is the keystone to the conceptualization 
of the term "handicapped." Unless a child is in need of special education, 
69 See, e.g.. Honiav. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988), and Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School 
EiSL 662 F.Supp. 376 (Cal., 1987). 
70 Comm. School Dist. # 155 v. Denz. 463 N.E.2d 998 (III App., 1984); Tokarcikv. Forest Hills 
School Dist.. 665 F.2d 443 (1980); and Hawaii v. Katherine P.. 727 F.2d 809 (1983). 
71 Hairston v. Drosick. 423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D. W.Va., 1976). 
72 Abnev bv Kantor v. District of Columbia. 849 F.2d 1491 (D.C. Cir., 1988). 
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he/she is not considered handicapped, and in most situations would be 
ineligible to receive related services. 
The term "special education" means specially designed instruction, at 
no cost to the parent, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.73 The 
term may be applied to a variety of locations, such as in a classroom, a 
hospital or an institutional setting. Home instruction may be considered 
"special education." 
An underlying concept is that prior to special education being 
considered for a child, a variety of modifications and adaptations must be 
attempted by the classroom teacher and support staff. The need for a 
"specially designed instruction" should signal that special education is 
necessary to help compensate for a limitation of the child's learning under 
the construct of general education, rather than a limitation of the teacher to 
adapt to the needs of a child. 
Definition of Related Services 
The general provisions in P. L. 94-142 state that the purpose of the law 
is to assure that all handicapped children have available to them a free 
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs.74 The special education 
component is defined as "specially designed instruction,"75 while related 
services are: 
73 20 U.S.C. §1401 (16). 
74 34 CFR §300.1 (a). 
7534 CFR §300.14(a)(1). 
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... transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, 
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, 
and medical and counseling services, except that such medical service 
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be 
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, 
and includes early identification and assessment of handicapping 
conditions in children (20 USC §1401 (17)). 
The initial definition caused confusion among readers who wished to 
determine if some specific activities or needs were included or excluded as a 
related service. In revised guidelines published May 4,1977, an attempt was 
made to further clarify the term "related services." Of particular interest are 
those definitions addressing medical and health services, and psychological 
services and counseling. "Medical services" means services provided by a 
licensed physician to determine a child's medically related handicapped 
condition which results in the child's need for special education and related 
services,76 while "school health services" are defined as services provided by a 
qualified school nurse or other qualified person.77 
With these clarifications, further interpretation may be made to 
determine what legally constitutes a related service. Anything that must be 
performed by a licensed physician is a related service only for diagnostic or 
evaluative purposes and would not be a component of the individualized 
education program. In most states, the licensure component would also 
exclude chiropractors as a provider of diagnostic or evaluative data. This 
legal distinction likely would be applied when schools are requested by 
76 34 CFR §121 a. 13 (b)(4). 
77 34 CFR §121 a.13 (b)(10). 
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parents and their child's chiropractor to furnish homebound services. 
While the modified regulations may have clarified the issue of medical 
services, the definition of a health service remains unclear. A health service 
is possibly any service which maintains a child's physical welfare and is 
provided by a "qualified person." It is through this definition that clean 
intermittent catheterization (CIC) was determined so readily to be a related 
service.78 Generally, health services qualify as a school related service only if 
they are required during school hours. If a necessary health service can be 
satisfactorily performed during another part of the day without jeopardizing a 
child's physical welfare, it does not qualify as a health related service. 
Occasionally, a related service such as CIC is the only service required, and a 
handicapped child may not be in need of special education. Without the 
related health service, though, the child would be unable to attend public 
school. As a result, most health services are often life support services; that 
is, related services which are needed during the school day. As such, these 
related services are to be provided even though other special education may 
not be necessary. To deny these health services would not only be denying the 
child access to an education, but would be risking the child's well-being. 
Another area of related services that has been scrutinized is the 
term "counseling services." "Counseling services" mean services provided 
by qualified social workers, psychologists, guidance counselors, or other 
qualified personnel.79 Psychological services include "planning and 
78See, e.g.. Tokarcikv. Forest Hills School District. 665 F.2d 443 <19811: andTatrov. Irving 
Independent School District. 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984). 
79(34CFR§121a. 13(b) (2)). 
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managing a program of psychological counseling for children and parents."80 
There has been little question that a child with emotional problems 
would benefit from psychological counseling, but two legal issues which 
focused on psychological support as a related service have emerged. 
The majority of litigation cases on this subject have centered on 
alternative placement. School placement committees occasionally 
recommend that children with severe emotional disturbances receive 
services in institutional settings which can provide the 24-hour care that they 
need. Whether psychological service is a related service is not a valid 
question in this instance: if a child requires such service, the contention is 
whether it primarily is a medical service or a special educational service.81 
By definition, a related service is a supportive service that may be required to 
assist a handicapped child in addition to special education. Occasionally, an 
emotional problem is so great that the decision for placement or location to 
carry out the psychological service is the primary issue consideration. As 
such, the least restrictive environment or setting determines the appropriate 
psychological service (special education) rather than the psychological 
services augmenting special education as a related service. 
Psychological services also may be considered a related service. When 
some form of psychological service is required by a handicapped student in 
addition to special education, there is a greater likelihood that the support 
may be determined to be a related service. 
80 (34 CFR §121 a.13(b)(8)(IV)). 
61 McKenzie v. Jefferson. 566 F.Supp. 404 (1983), and Darlene L. Y, Illinois State Board Pf 
Education. 568 F.Supp. 1340 (1983). 
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Counseling services, according to the definition, may be offered by any 
person qualified to "counsel." Counseling can be provided by personnel from 
the school or from an outside agency. If counseling services have been 
recommended in a committee meeting, whether it will be administered at 
school or at another site by a qualified individual who is not a school 
employee, the school may still be held financially responsible for the 
services.82 
The distinction between psychological services and counseling is not as 
explicit as the comparison between a medical and a health service. 
Psychological services are comprised of several components, and may include 
evaluation and interpretation of tests, and conferences with parents and 
teachers, but the most controversial subpart considered for related services is 
psychological counseling. 
Any form of counseling may be considered a related service, and 
counseling as a related service to special education may be conducted by a 
psychologist or a psychiatrist. While a psychiatrist is a licensed physician, the 
fact that the service may be performed by a medical doctor does not 
automatically make the counseling a medical service which is restricted to 
evaluative and diagnostic purposes only. If it is classified as "counseling," the 
services may be performed by a physician. The determinant appears to be the 
type of service required rather than the personnel who ultimately provides it. 
The school system would be obligated to pay only a fee equal to the amount 
customarily charged for "counseling services" rather than the medical 
"psychiatric service." 
82 Max M. v. Thompson. 566 F.SUPD. 1330 (1983). 
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Psychiatric services which are considered educational by the courts will 
usually be confined to (1) previously arranged contractual services between 
the educational unit and the psychiatrist and/or his employer; (2) written 
recommendations by the school-based or administrative-based committee 
indicating a need for psychiatric services; (3) psychiatrists who are school 
employees; or (4) comprehensive services in a residential facility in which 
there can be no clear delineation between the medical and educational needs 
of the child. 
These areas listed are the issues most challenged as potential related 
services. There are other legal issues which have been raised in conjunction 
with special education and the quality of services. The focus shifts away from 
definitions of handicaps, special education, and related services. Rather than 
focusing on categories which may or may not be allowable as special 
education and related services in the IEP, litigation often seeks to clarify the 
quality of services offered in the IEP. 
The Power and Intent of the Individualized Education Program 
In proposing P. L. 94-142, Congress focused their opening statement, or 
mission, on their findings and intent of this legislation: special education 
needs of children were not being fully met, and many children previously 
identified as handicapped were not receiving appropriate educational services 
in order to obtain full equality of opportunity.83 A rigorous procedure is 
delineated in P. L. 94-142 to assure proper identification, location and 
evaluation of handicapped children. These procedures not only offer 
83 20 use §1400 (b)(2); and 20 USC §1400 (b)(3). 
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procedural safeguards for the child and parent, but also establish general 
guidelines for the delivery of special services in the least restrictive 
environment. Timetables specifying these procedural rights are also 
addressed, but the actual working plan to assure that the special needs of an 
exceptional child will be implemented is documented through the 
development of an individualized education program. 
The term "individualized education program" (IEP) means 
a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any 
meeting by a representative of the local education agency or an 
intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or 
supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the 
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or 
guardians of such child, and whenever appropriate, such child. (20 USC 
§1401 (19).) 
At the heart of P. L. 94-142 and its provisions for the individualized 
education program is that each handicapped child's particular needs are 
unique, and thus require a program specifically tailored to this child's 
handicap. The guarantee of proposing and implementing an appropriate 
educational plan is accomplished by including several components described 
in the law's definition of the individualized education program. The IEP 
includes: 
A. a statement of the present levels of education performance of such 
child, 
B. a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional 
objectives, 
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C. a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to 
such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to 
participate in regular educational programs, 
D. the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such 
services, 
E. appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and 
schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether 
instructional objectives are being achieved [20 USC §1401 (19)]. 
The individualized education program is one of the final documents to 
be addressed after all of the evaluation and identification procedures have 
been completed and special education services are needed. It is a 
"culminating" activity of a series of steps that have involved both school 
personnel and the child's parents to determine the special needs of a student; 
however, the responsibilities do not end at that point. The individualized 
education program must be reviewed at least annually, or more frequently if 
the child's progress warrants further scrutiny.84 
In addition to the child's parents, various school staff members meet to 
form a team decision about the needs of a handicapped child. Some IEP and 
eligibility meetings, such as specific learning disabilities, require assurances 
that a multidisciplinary team participated in the formal decision-making 
process of the development and writing of the IEP.85 
Although assurances of efforts to develop an appropriate educational 
program are legally binding, the success of the IEP is not. As long as "good 
faith effort" of educating the student can be documented, neither the LEA nor 
the teacher can be held liable if the student does not achieve the objectives 
84 34 CFR §121 a. 346 (3). 
85 34 CFR §121 a. 349. 
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and goals listed in the IEP. 
The due process and procedural safeguards that are delineated by P. L. 
94-142 is part of the sequence in, and inclusion of, the IEP planning that must 
be strictly followed. If the parents are not involved at all times in the 
development of the IEP and apprised of any suggested changes in programs or 
services, the Local Education Agency (LEA) will be held liable, even if the 
proposed program may, in fact, be appropriate.86 
On the other hand, an LEA must provide well-documented evidence 
through the use of the IEP that all steps have been followed in the planning, 
placement, and programming for a handicapped student. In addition, a 
detailed IEP which indicates the student's strengths and needs, goals and 
objectives to carry out the special education and related services, and criteria 
of evaluation to determine if the IEP is appropriate but be in place. With 
these documented provisions, then accountability and appropriateness of the 
educational services will be upheld by the courts.87 
The IEP, then, can be one of the most important elements that 
determines the education of the handicapped student. It helps monitor 
educational strengths and weaknesses, and then it outlines a plan for 
remediation. The IEP is a safeguard, not only for the child and parents, but 
ultimately for the school, too. This is accomplished by not only requiring 
"6 Lana v. Braintree. 545 F.Supp 1221 (1982); Dubois v. Connecticut. 727 F.2d 44 (1984); 
Board of Ed. of Cabell Co. v. Dienalt 483 F.2d 813 (4th Cir., 1988); McKenzie v.Smith. 771 F.2d 
1527 (C.A.D.C., 1985); and Patsel v. D.C. Board of Education. 522 F.Supp. 535 (D.D.C., 1981). 
87 See, e.g., Colhernv. Mallory, 565 F.Supp. 701 <19831: Muth v. Central Buck School Dist.. 
839 F.2d 113 (3rd Cir., 19881: Rouse v. Wilson. 675 F.Supp. 1012 (W.D. Va., 1987), andHillerv. 
Board of Education of Brunswick Central School District. 743 F.Supp. 958 (N.D.N.Y., 1990). 
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parental involvement, but also requiring group decisions.88 There is an 
accountability factor in the regulations which ensures that a specific sequence 
and criteria are followed in the development of the IEP. If the accountability 
has been correctly documented, the timetables have been followed, and the 
personnel have made a reasonable effort to assist the student to achieve the 
goals, school personnel will not be held liable if the goals have not been 
attained. Since P.L. 94-142 requires that schools invite parents to assist in the 
development of the IEP, the IEP also provides documentation of school efforts 
if a due process hearing is invoked at a later date because of parental 
dissatisfaction. 
Probably of utmost concern in present litigation is the quality and 
quantity of an appropriate educational program as designed by the IEP. The 
judicial interpretation of P. L. 94-142 is beginning to clarify these concerns, and 
the phrases such as "most appropriate" and "maximum or full potential" 
have been replaced by the terms "appropriate," "benefit," and "basic floor of 
opportunity."89 If all other mandates have been adhered to, the quality, 
quantity, and selection of instructional strategies legally may be determined by 
the school. The courts have been warned to be careful of imposing their 
views of preferable educational practices, methods, and materials upon the 
States.90 Further discussion of these components and phrases is presented 
later in this chapter (pp. 96-101 and p. 111). 
M Board of Ed. of Cabell Co."v. Dienalt. 483 F.2d 813 (4th Cir., 1988). 
89See, e.g., Rowley v. Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District. 
102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982); and Rettio v. Kent Citv School District 720 F.2d 463 (1983). 
90 Rowlev. 1982. 
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IEP Quality 
The IEP is the most powerful and critical component of special 
education in the development and assurance of a free appropriate public 
education. As such, it is often scrutinized to determine if, in fact, it is 
providing just that or if it is out of compliance. Even the courts have noted 
that at the center of many complaints is a conflict over the nature and quality 
of services outlined in the IEP." The proper standard for the courts is to 
determine, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 
substance of the proposed individualized educational program is reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.92 In Rowley, the 
Supreme Court determined that there could, in fact, be a limit to the quality 
of special education which was required. The minimal standard includes an 
opportunity for education and a success factor which can be measured as the 
ability of the handicapped child to meet the standards for advancing from 
grade level to grade level.93 
Stated another way, the determination of whether or not an IEP is 
appropriate depends upon how well the program satisfies the recognized 
needs of the individual child.94 Rowley does not limit a state from placing a 
higher standard for "appropriateness," but merely establishes minimal 
standards by which educational progress must be evaluated in the context of 
91 Pinkerton v. Move. 509 F.SUPP. 107 (1981). 
92 Rowlev v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District 102 S.Ct. 3034 
(1982), at 3050-3051. See also Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education. 918 F.2d 816 (6th Cir., 
1990). 
93 BoadSJi. op cit. 
94 Centennial School Dist. v. Dept. of Education. 503 A.2d 1090 (1986), at 1094, and see 
Garland Independent School District v. Wilkes. 657 F.Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y., 1987). 
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the EHA. One court has stressed that even under the limitations spelled out 
in Rowley, the EHA has created not only substantive rights to "access," but 
also to "quality." It acknowledges, though, that "'quality' or programmatic 
issues are less yielding" or open to judicial determination.'5 While specific 
components may be evaluated to determine an IEP's quality, the general rule 
of thumb is that courts are directed to evaluate the IEP in question as a whole 
rather than to scrutinize the individual components in isolation.96 However, 
the student's strengths and needs, goals and objectives developed to assist and 
improve the student's performance levels, and methods to evaluate the 
appropriateness and success of the IEP are all necessary components of any 
IEP.97 
Occasionally, the omission or lack of quality in a component of the IEP 
may be critical enough to deny a handicapped child an appropriate education: 
We by no means suggest that an individual component may not be 
both so important and so deficient that a Rowley finding as to the 
absence of overall educational benefits flowing from an IEP must be 
determined from the combination of offerings rather than the single 
components viewed apart from the whole [Karl, at 877]. 
The minimal standard or quality of the IEP is not as clearly outlined in 
Rowley for more severely handicapped students. Public Law 94-142 requires 
that an appropriate IEP must be developed to the degree that it is "likely to 
95 Jose'P. v. Ambach. 557 F.Supp. 1230 (N.Y., 1983), at 1243. 
96 Karl v. Board of Ed. of Geneseo Cent. School Dist.. 736 F.2d 873 (N.Y., 1984). 
97 Stacev G. v. Pasadena Independent School Dist.. 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir., 1983), and 
Thornock v. Boise Indep. School Dist. 1. 767 P.2d 1241 (Idaho, 1988). 
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produce progress, not regression, or trivial educational advancement."98 
Some courts, after scrutinizing specific children's IEPs, have given 
definitive and detailed opinions about their quality. One court, in ruling 
whether or not proposed changes in a child's IEP were appropriate, defined 
special education quality when it said: 
The existing education is almost ideal: while it does not eliminate 
stigma, it lessens it by maximizing mainstreaming; while it may 
sacrifice some educational quality for social values, it provides expert 
instruction in those substantive areas most crucial to [the child's] 
intellectual development fBonadonna. at 415]. 
School personnel are not held accountable if a handicapped child does 
not achieve all of the goals and objectives in the IEP so long as personnel 
have made a good faith effort." The placement of a child in an environment 
later proven to be too restrictive may be considered allowable if the IEP was 
written in good faith.100 Even a "substantially faulty" IEP may be permissible 
with lack of evidence to document gross misjudgment or bad faith.101 
There is no question that funding can affect the quality of a child's IEP; 
state special education plans must provide funding to ensure that schools can 
offer appropriate programs.'® While the Supreme Court addressed the 
""Hall v Vance County Bd.of Educ.. 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir., 1985), at 636. See also Board of 
Ed. of East Windsor School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (N.J., 1986), at 991. 
"20 U.S.C. §300.226; U.S.C. §300.345 
,0° Rouse v.Wilson. 675 F.Supp. 1012 (W.D.Va., 1987). 
101 Monahan v. State of Nebraska 687 F.Sd 1164 (8th Cir. 1982); and Cain v. Yukon Public 
Schools Dist. 1-27. 775 F.2d 15 (Okla., 1985). 
102 Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles. 842 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir., 1988). 
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possibility of financial constraints in planning special programs in their 
Rowlev decision, an earlier court decision elaborated on this dilemma more 
eloquently: 
It hardly needs to be stated that educational funding is not unlimited. It 
follows, therefore, that competing interests must be balanced to reach a 
reasonable accommodation. On the one hand are the undeniably 
important personal needs of the individual handicapped child; on the 
other, the realities of limited funding and the necessity of assisting in 
the education of all handicapped children. These competing interests 
must be considered. Indeed, failure to consider them would ultimately 
work to circumvent congressional intention to educate all handicapped 
children as best as practicable. Excessive expenditures made to meet the 
needs of one handicapped child ultimately reduce the amount that can 
be spent to meet the needs of other handicapped children. [Pinkerton. 
at 112-113]. 
Prior to the final development of the IEP, several steps must be taken to 
assure that the proposed program will, in fact, have a reasonable opportunity 
for success. Parents play a key role by participating in the development of the 
IEP: they must be given the opportunity to participate and to give input.103 
Notice of an invitation to participate in the planning of the IEP should be 
done in writing. This basic parent entitlement is still overlooked or 
completed with less accuracy and elaboration than is legally required.104 In 
addition to members assembled by the school placement committee, parents 
may make suggestions or invite knowledgeable persons who can contribute 
to the IEP's development. 
103 20 U.S.C. §300.226; 20 U.S.C. §300.345. 
104 McKenzie v. Smith. 771 F.2d 1527 C.A.D.C., 1985), at 1532: Bd. of Educ. of Cabell Co. v. 
Dienalt. 843 F.2d (4th Cir., 1988): and 20 U.S.C. §300.344(b)(2) and 20 U.S.C. §104.35(c). 
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These individuals, then, determined jointly by school personnel and 
parents, form a multidisciplinary team. The team is comprised of individuals 
with knowledge of the strengths and needs of the child, and their objective is 
to work with the parents in designing the IEP.105 With the help of the parents, 
the team should have the expertise to evaluate the potential success and 
'appropriateness' of the IEP, and ultimately its quality.106 No one procedure, 
individual, or evaluation, may be used in and of itself to determine the IEP.107 
The Courts have been cautioned that their role is limited in 
determining the quality of an IEP; it is usually the responsibility of and 
between school personnel and parents. However, there are occasions when 
court decisions have been made which specifically address details or 
components determined crucial to the level of quality of "appropriate" for 
specific children. These details, ordered by the courts, have included the 
length of a school day108 and related services such as physical therapy, 
occupational therapy, and swimming.10' Other components considered 
necessary to provide appropriate services include specialized equipment,110 
student-to-teacher ratio,111 modified testing and evaluation,112 and after 
106 20 U.S.C. §300.344(b)(2) and 20 U.S.C. §104.35(c). 
106 Hollenbeck v. Board of Educ. of Rochelle Township. 699 F.Supp. 658 (N.D.III., 1988), and 
Bd. of Educ.of Cabell County v. Dienalt. 843 F.2d (4th Cir., 1988). 
107 Bonadonna v. Cooperman. 619 F.Supp. 401 (N.J., 1985). 
108 Timms v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Wabash Ctv.. 718 F. 2d 212 (1983), andBd. of 
Educ.of Cabell County v. Dienalt. 843 F.2d (4th Cir., 1988). 
109 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (NJ, 
1986). 
"°Tavlor bv Holbrook v. Board of Education of Cooake-Taconic Hills Central School District 
649 F.Supp. 1253 (N.Y., 1986). 
111 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (NJ, 
1986), and Colin K. v. Schmidt 536 F.Supp. 1375 (R.I., 1982). 
112Beaslev v. School Board of Campbell County. 367 S.E.2d 738 (Va.App., 1988). 
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school day care and extra curricular activities.111 Further requirements by the 
courts have called for provisions for behavior modification and a functional 
curriculum,112 which are designed to increase self-help and independent skills 
of a special student. Counseling, both for the child and the family, may be a 
necessary related service to help assure the appropriateness or quality of the 
IEP.113 Guidelines for allowance of out-of-school and in-school suspension 
have been provided by the courts;114 so, too, have the restrictions, limitations, 
and conditions for use of a "time-out" box.115 
In general, these trends indicate that for mildly to moderately 
handicapped students, declarations by the courts which outline specific goals, 
objectives, and services have decreased since Rowley. For the more severely 
handicapped and low-incident population, however, the quest for detailed, 
precise descriptions of the components in the IEP continues. 
Overall, the request for additional components of the IEP requires 
extensive parental involvement, and any disagreement in the proposal may 
be challenged by the parents under P.L. 94-142's basic parental rights clauses. 
The parental rights listed under the EHA are extensive and comprehensive, 
and the courts do not hesitate to apply these rights in order to assure the 
quality of the IEP. 
111 Hollenbeck v. Board of Educ. of Rochelle Township. 699 F.Supp. 658 (N.D.III., 1988), and 
Rettio v. Kent Citv Schoot Disl. 720 F.2d 463 (1983). 
112 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (NJ, 
1986); Tavlor bv Holbrook v. Board of Education of Cooake-Taconic Hills Central School District 
649 F.Supp. 1253 (N.Y., 1986); and Garland Independent School District v. Wilkes. 657 F.Supp. 
1163 (N.D.Tex., 1987). 
1,3 Gary B. v. Cronin. 542 F.Supp. 102 (N.D.III., 1980), andStacevG. v. Pasadena 
Independent School District. 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir., 1983). 
114 Honia v. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988). 
115 Haves through Haves v. Unified School Dist 377, 669 F.Supp. 1519 (D.Kan., 1987). 
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Parent Rights and Parent Involvement 
Under P. L. 94-142, parents have been given numerous due process 
rights which include permission for evaluations and notice of revaluations, 
notice of any meetings scheduled for the purpose of determining or changing 
a child's status, and the parental right to a due process hearing if the parents 
disagree with a child's placement, program, or service. 
A wide variety of issues has been addressed by the courts involving 
parental rights and their involvement in the development of a special 
education program for their child. Litigation focussing on parent 
involvement has most often questioned the development of the IEP and 
placement decisions. 
Parental rights apply not only to the natural parents, but also to 
guardians, foster parents, and appointed surrogate parents.118 The rights to a 
due process hearing do not extend to interested third parties, as P. L. 94-142 
and parental rights were established for the child and the parents or 
guardians.119 
Other family interests also become interwoven with special education. 
In some courts, rulings have been made in which school personnel have not 
been required to provide expanded services because of poor home situations, 
yet in others, they have been ordered to provide more services because of lack 
""Dept. of Ed. v. Mr. and Mrs. S.. 632 F.Supp. 1268 (D. Hawaii, 1986); Abney by Kantor v. 
District Of Columbia, 849 F.2d 1491 (D.C. Cir., 1988); and Sonia C. bv and through Olivas v. 
Arizona State School for the Deaf and Blind 743 F.Supp. 700 (D. Ariz., 1990). 
119Allstate Insurance Company v. Bethlehem Area School District 678 F.Supp. 1132 (E.D. 
Pa., 19871: Gehman v. Prudential Property and Casualtv Insurance Co.. 702 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D. 
Pa., 1989); and see Susan R.M. v. Northeast Indeo. School Dist.. 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir., 1987). 
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of effort and participation by parents.120 
Many cases in which the courts ultimately might favor the parents are 
dismissed because the parents fail to exhaust the prescribed administrative 
remedies, such as filing for a due process hearing prior to initiating legal 
action.121 The due process procedures can be cumbersome and time-
consuming, but many legal cases will not be settled without it, unless it can be 
shown that the delay would cause irreparable harm to the child. 
Parents have successfully challenged school decisions in which a form 
notice listed proposed changes that had been completed by staff who did 
"...nothing more than fill in a blank...[and] check off a cursory and essentially 
meaningless standardized description" of the proposed program.122 So, too, 
have parents successfully removed a condition placed on a child's 
participation in a special education program only if the mother agreed to 
weekly group psychotherapy sessions.123 Parent counseling can be a related 
service when the parents agree to participate. The success of a child's IEP may 
be improved by the parents' increased knowledge, understanding , and 
support in managing a handicapped child.124 What is improper is the practice 
of making the placement of a child in special education contingent on 
parental participation in counseling. 
120 See Abrahamson v. Hershman. 701 F.2d 223 (Mass, 1983); yet seeSprinadale v. Grace. 
494 F.Supp. 266 (1980). 
121 Ezrattv v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 648 F.2d 770 (1st Cir., 1981), and Doe v. 
Belleville Public School Dist.. 672 F.Supp. 342 (S.D.III., 1987). 
122 McKenzie v. Jefferson. 566 F.Supp. 404 (1983). 
123 Teresa Diane P. Through Marilvn J.P. v. Alief Independent School Dist.. 744 F.2d 484 (Tex., 
1984). 
124 Stacev G. v. Pasadena Independent School District 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir., 1983). 
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Where expenses will be high, some states have attempted to access 
additional funds by requesting parents declare their child as a ward of the 
state. This practice, overturned by most courts, denied the parents their basic 
rights.125 
Surrogate and Foster Parent Rights 
Another area of parental rights which is clarified under P.L. 94-142 is 
the general definition of who qualifies as a 'parent.' If a handicapped child 
does not have access to an adult who will fill that role and protect the child's 
interests, there are procedures for appointing a surrogate parent. 
Cases which further clarify parental rights have also been addressed by 
several courts. One such case involved a child who was raised in a foster 
home in one state while the legal, natural parents lived in another state. The 
question of financial responsibility for education was resolved in terms of 
who has to serve the child. The courts have clearly stated that the child's 
residency determines the jurisdiction and fiscal responsibility of local 
education agencies.126 Reimbursement procedures may vary among state and 
local agreements, yet fiscal responsibility typically remains with the local 
school system where the child currently resides. 
School systems have been found at fault for failure to notify and 
adequately involve a surrogate parent in the decision-making process of the 
125 See Kiuss v. Campbell. 431 F.Supp. 180 (Va., 1971); Christopher T. bv Broona v. San 
Francisco Unified School Dist.. 553 F.Supp. 1107 (Cat, 1982); yet see Susan R.M. v. Northeast 
tndep. School Dist.. 818 F.2d 455 (5th Cir., 1987). 
126 Rabinowitz vs. NJ State Board of Education. 550 F.Supp. 481 (D.C.N.J., 1982), and Sonja 
C. by and through Qlivas v. Arizona Slate School for the Deaf and Blind, 743 F.Supp. 700 (D. 
Ariz., 1990). 
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IEP which resulted in a change in services.127 So, too, are school personnel 
required to involve both parents in the IEP and placement meetings, even if 
the parents are not living together, unless there is a court restraining order on 
file.128 If one parent is financially responsible for a child, e^en if the child is 
living with the other parent, both parents must be guaranteed all special 
education parental rights and due process procedures. 
Change in Placement 
One of the primary parent rights outlined under P. L. 94-142 is the right 
to prior notice of any proposed changes in placement and services. Change 
from one classification to another is not that rare although, as state guidelines 
have been clarified, fewer students are being "re-labeled." Disciplinary 
suspension and expulsion continues to be the change in placement most 
frequently cited in special education litigation.129 A multidisciplinary team 
must gather to review the child's special education records and the events 
prior to the time that the misconduct took place; then the team determines 
what, if any, relationship exists between the child's handicapped condition 
and the infraction. 
In Honig. the Supreme Court stated: 
\ M  
Abnev bv Kantor v. District of Columbia. 849 F.2d 1491 (O.C. Cir., 1988), and Mrs. C v. 
Wbflaian, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir., 1990) 
128 Doe v. Anrio. 651 F.Supp. 424 (D.Mass., 1987). 
129 Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dept. 479 F.Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y., 1979);3l£ 
Turlington. 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir., 19811: Lamont X. v. Quisenberrv. 606 F.Supp. 809 (S.D. Ohio, 
1984); Victoria L. v. School Bd. ot Lee County. Florida. 741 F.2d 369 (11th Cir., 1984); and Honio 
v. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988). 
85 
The EHA nowhere defines the phrase "change in placement," nor does 
the statute's structure or legislative history provide any guidance as to 
how the term applies to fixed supension. [The District Court in] 
Mills... recognized that school officials could suspend disabled children 
on a short-term, temporary basis.... A suspension in excess of 10 days 
does constitute a prohibited "change in placement..." [Honig v. Doe. 108 
S.Ct. 592 (1988), at 605]. 
The courts have ruled that indefinite or long term suspension and 
expulsion results in a change of placement. In actuality, expulsion entails an 
even more devastating limitation: it results in the cessation of a free 
appropriate public education and ultimately denies due process rights since 
the child is denied access to any education. A child who is expelled is not 
going to have an IEP; the likelihood is that the parents will no longer receive 
an invitation to a conference, and neither the child nor the parent will 
receive the guaranteed due process rights available to them as participants 
under P. L. 94-142. 
Another actual cessation of service, rather than change, is that of 
graduation, although it certainly is appropriate if all IEP goals have been 
met.130 Graduation or completion of high school with a diploma or certificate 
signals the end of free, appropriate public education. As such, the student is 
considered to have mastered some minimal competencies to be completed as 
a minimal standard for high school graduation. Upon completion of the 
program, whether it is a certificate or actual diploma, the special student is no 
longer enrolled in public education and therefore is no longer eligible as a 
student under P. L. 94-142. 
130 Cronan v. Bd. of Educ. of"East Ramaoo Cent. School Dist.. 689 F.Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y., 
1988). 
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As with graduation, declassification also can result in a cessation of 
rights, since the change results in the student's no longer being considered 
handicapped. Declassification, which results in the student's return to regular 
education on a full-time basis, is also a legitimate action, but the team must 
document thoroughly its reasons for the decision.13' Many states have 
statutes of limitations for litigation which specifically involves 
declassification, and the deadline for filing from time of dismissal from 
special education varies from state-to-state. 
Parents must always be notified of proposed changes prior to their 
occurrence. By law, students are to participate, too, when it is considered 
appropriate. However, some students who have reached the age of majority 
according to state statutes may not be capable of effectively representing 
themselves and their interests as handicapped individuals. Even when a 
handicapped student is considered an adult, it may still be appropriate to 
involve not only the student in the development of the IEP, but also the 
parents, surrogate parent, or a guardian ad litem. The appointment of an 
individual who can legally represent a handicapped person's best interests 
may also be in the best interest of school personnel if the proposed plan is 
ever challenged.132 
Changes in placement proposed by school personnel may be allowed 
because of demonstrated need for more restrictive placement in order for the 
Blazeiewski v. Board of Ed. of Alleoanv Central School District 560 F.Supp. 701 (N.Y., 
1983). 
132 Stock v. Massachusetts. 467 N.E.2d 448 (1984); Abnev bv Kantor v. District of Columbia 
849 F.2d 1491 (D.C.Cir., 1988); and Mrs. C. v. Wheaton. 916 F.2d 69 ( 2d. Cir., 1990). 
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student to show progress;133 changes to similar facilities or slightly less 
restrictive ones are also proper if the IEP appears to be appropriate.134 This is 
particularly true if there are legitimate school closings and the children 
affected by the closings are offered new programs which are similar to those 
proposed previously by each IEP.135 
Like expulsion, an indefinite suspension is considered a change 
in placement and as such, is not allowable. Discontinuation of special 
education services in the least restrictive environment, even for such reasons 
as medical injury, disease, or self-inflicted injury, may not be assumed.136 
Suspension from the regular setting for special education for more than 10 
days in a school year is also considered a change in placement. 
Some special education students and their families are transient: they 
move often or seek migratory employment. Temporary withdrawal from one 
special education program with subsequent re-enrollment at a later date does 
not constitute a change in placement, even if the interim placement was 
different. The "stay put" clause could be enacted to enable a school district to 
allow the student to remain in the original setting pending a review.137 
Johnston bv Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools. 569 F.Supp. 1502 <19831: Victoria L. 
v. Dist. School Bd of Lee County. Florida. 741 F.2d 369 (11th Cir., 1984). 
134 Lunceford v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ.. 745 F.2d 1577 (D.C. Cir., 1984) and Doe v. 
Lawson. 579 F.Supp. 1314 (D.Mass., 1984). 
135 Cohen v. School Board of Dade Co.. Fla.. 450 S.2d 1238 (Fla.App.3 Dist., 1984); 
Concerned Parents of N.Y. Citv Board of Education 629 F.2d 751, 449 U.S. 1078, 101 S.Ct. 
858, 66 L.Ed.2d 801 (1989). 
136 See AIDS case references ( f .  55); Abnev bv Kantor v. District of Columbia. 849 F.2d 1491 
(D.C.Ct., 1988); and Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dept.. 479 F.Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.Y., 1979). 
137Piare v. Roseville Schools Indep. Dist. No. 623. 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir., 1988). 
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Generally, the party who wishes the change must prove that it is in the 
best interest of the child,138 and usually the proposed change must meet the 
two-pronged test outlined in Rowley: the student must be provided a "basic 
floor of opportunity," and demonstrate that the educational progress will 
allow him to successfully pass from grade to grade.13' 
The "Stay Put" Provision 
The phrase "stay put" has been used by the Courts to describe the 
stipulation that a child's placement is to remain constant when a 
disagreement occurs. During a review and hearing, P.L. 94-142 directs 
...during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to 
[§1415], unless the state or local educational agency and the parents or 
guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current 
educational placement of such child...[20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(3)] 
A proposed transfer is usually disallowed if it might disrupt the 
learning progress. If one party can show that the student performed well in 
the original setting, a proposed change may not only be considered 
unnecessary, but also inappropriate. "Once a student is making good progress 
in a particular program, a change must be viewed with a great degree of 
138 Burger v. Murray Co. School Dist.. 612 F.Supp. 434 (N.D.Ga., 19841: Visco bv Viscov. 
School Dist. of Pittsburgh. 684 F.Supp. 1310 (W.D. Pa., 1988); and Gikman bv Grkman v. 
Scanlon. 528 F.Supp. 1032 (1981), 563 F.Supp. 793 (Pa., 1983). 
139 Rowlev v. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson School District. 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), 
73 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1982). 
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caution."140 "The risks of change outweigh the possible benefits."141 
If a hearing officer finds that a change of placement is necessary to meet 
the guidelines for a free and appropriate education and that the change in 
placement coincides with the relief sought by parents, the "stay put" rule is 
invalid in these cases.142 
In a few cases, parents have sought to use the "stay put" clause where 
residential facilities were scheduled to close. In these cases, the parents were 
quite satisfied with their child's "current" placement, and they did not wish 
for their child to be transferred. When facilities are closed because they do not 
meet state safety and management codes, or because of financial constraints 
an appropriate but alternative placement is arranged, the courts have ruled 
that the "stay put" clause is not in effect. Placement of children in these 
facilities may be discontinued, and the transfer of these students to another 
location is not considered a true change in placement.143 
The overwhelming number of cases referring to "stay put" or status 
quo involves situations in which parents unilaterally enroll children in 
private schools and later seek reimbursement for the educational costs. 
Parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency 
of proceedings do so at their own financial risk. If the courts ultimately 
140 Visco bv Visco v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh. 684 F.Supp. 1310 (W.D.Pa., 1988), at 1315. 
141 Grkman bv Grkman v. Scanlon. 528 F.Supp. 1032 (1981) at 1037. 
142 See, e.g., Deot. of Ed. v. Mr. & Mrs. S.. 632 F.Supp. 1268 (D. Hawaii, 1986), andMuth v. 
Central Bucks School Dist.. 839 F.2d 322 (8th Cir., 1986). 
143 See Cohen v. School Board of Dade Co.. Fla.. 450 So.2d 1238 (Fla.App.3 Dist., 1984); 
Corbett v. Regional Center of the East Bav. Inc.. 699 F.Supp. 230 (N.D.Cal. 1988l:Tilton. bv 
Richards v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Ed.. 705 F.2d 800 (C.A.Ky., 19831: ARC of Alabama v. Teaoue. 
830 F.2d 158 (11th Cir., 1987); White v. State. 240 Cal.Rptr. 732 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1987); and 
Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles. 842 F.2d 290 (7th Cir., 1988). 
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determine that a child's proposed IEP was appropriate, the parents are barred 
from obtaining reimbursement for an unauthorized private school 
placement."'4 
The option for the "stay put" clause was described by Justice Rehnquist 
when he noted: 
Where as in [Burlington! the...review of a contested IEP takes years to 
run its course...years critical to the child's development...important 
practical questions arise concerning interim placement of the child and 
financial responsibility for that placement [Burlington at 1998]. 
In Honig. Justice Brennan supported the "stay put" clause, and upheld 
that indefinite or lengthy suspension and expulsion constitutes a "change in 
placement." However, the Court declared that when a handicapped child 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of others, school officials may initiate 
suspensions for up to 10 days without causing a "change in placement."145 
The "stay put" clause, then, must be used if either the parents or the 
school personnel agree with the proposed change of placement. School 
personnel may not change the placement if due process procedures are filed. 
Temporary suspension is allowed, but limited to a maximum of 10 days. The 
parents, though, may choose to remove a child from a setting during 
pendency of a trial, with the understanding that in the case of unilateral 
placement to another location, they may be responsible for the educational 
costs unless the previous setting subsequently is found to have been 
144 Burlington School Committee v. Dept. of Educ. of Massachusetts. 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985). 
146 Honia v. Doe. 108 S.Ct. 592 (1988), and Victoria L.v. Dist. School Bd. of Lee County. 




Since the passage of P. L. 94-142, the frequency of litigation which 
challenges the use of proper and unbiased tests has decreased. Timeliness of 
evaluations remains a contested issue,146 as do single procedures for 
determining appropriateness of placement.147 Most school evaluation 
committees use a variety of evaluative data to identify and verify a 
handicapping condition. A combination of evaluative procedures, whether 
norm or criterion-referenced, may be best, as courts have ruled for and against 
the sole use of standardized tests. The primary limitation in the use of 
standardized tests for placement decisions appears to arise if their use results 
in discrimination based upon racial or ethnic origins.148 
Evaluations are considered discriminatory if the children identified as 
handicapped form groups which vary greatly in proportion to the distribution 
pattern of the school population as a whole. If the evaluation results in a 
misrepresentation of children from varying racial or ethnic origins, the 
evaluation is considered discriminatory. 
Graduation is sometimes considered a factor in determining whether 
or not a child has completed special education. Since a student is eligible to 
146 Jose'P. v. Ambach. 557 F.SUDD. 1230 (N.Y., 1983), and Frankel v. Commissioner of 
Education. 480 F.Supp. 1156 (S.D. N.Y., 1979). 
147 Bonadonna v. Coooerman. 619 F.Supp. 401 (NJ, 1985), andHealeyv. Ambach. 481 
N.Y.S.2d 809 (A.D.3d Dept., 1984). 
148 See, e.g., Larrv P. V Riles 343 F.Supp. 1306 (1972), 495 F.Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); 
but also Rettio v. Kent Citv School Dist.. 720 F.2d 463 (1983), andGeomia State Contflrence of 
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia. 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir., 1985). 
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attend special education until the age of 21 or graduation, the graduation of a 
handicapped student, whether with a certificate of attendance or a diploma, 
may be questioned. Whether a student has completed his schooling may not 
be determined by a single "evaluative procedure," such as passing a minimal 
competency test, but must be derived from a number of evaluative 
procedures.149 
Least Restrictive Environment 
The concept of the least restrictive environment (LRE) is designed to 
allow students with handicaps to be educated in settings which provide the 
greatest degree of "normalization." This normalization process is designed to 
prevent discrimination and to allow handicapped children to be educated to 
the maximum extent possible in a setting that also allows the student to 
succeed. Associated with LRE is the process in which a committee considers 
several possible settings prior to making a final selection of the most 
appropriate and least restrictive option, and then listing the reasons for the 
determination in the student's IEP. 
The law directs a committee to consider the following: 
...to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children...are [to be] 
educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special 
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children 
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the 
nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular 
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily [20 U.S.C. §1412 (5)(B)]. 
148 Brookhart v Illinois State*3d. of Education. 697 F.2d 179 (C.A. III., 1983), andBUffbY Burr 
v. Ambach 863 F.2d 1071 (2nd Cir., 1988). 
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Several courts rulings have included lengthy opinions about the 
concept of LRE, even when there were other contested issues. For mildly to 
moderately handicapped children, the courts often look to determine if more 
than one option has been considered. Too often, school personnel have 
offered only one setting or type of service, whether it is special education or a 
related service.150 For example, in many school systems, children who are 
trainable mentally retarded are located in a separate special classroom. 
Similarly, children who are severely/profoundly handicapped may all attend 
a separate school, and children who are deaf are placed in a classroom with 
other deaf children. In these instances, the 'label' or handicap triggers one 
specific location for service, and other options are not considered. This does 
not suggest that the traditional placements are inappropriate, but rather that 
the label is triggering the placement of the child instead of the child's needs 
determining the options considered. Without this practice of considering 
each child's individual needs, handicapped students often get "tracked" in 
their placement, and school personnel are unable to demonstrate that 
variation in location of services exists.151 A variation of services must be 
considered, and then all but one rejected as being less appropriate than the 
actual setting and service recommended. 
150 Sea, e.g.. Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist.. 251 Cal.Rptr. 720 (Cal.App. 4 
Dist., 1988), and Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County. Fla.. 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir., 
1988); and Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16. 853 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir., 1988). 
151 Stacev G.v. Pasadena Public Independent School District 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir., 1983), 
and Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ.. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir., 1989); yet see DeVries bv 
DeBlaav v. Fairfax County School Board. 674 F.Supp. 1219 (E.D.Va., 1987), 882 F.2d 587 
(1987). 
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The minimal standards for determining both appropriate services and 
the least restrictive environment for mild to moderately handicapped 
children have been discussed in Rowley. The individual involved in 
proposing an "appropriate" program must be able to assure two factors: 1) 
that a basic floor of opportunity must be provided; that is, "access to 
specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed 
to provide educational benefit..."152 and 2) that educational progress can be 
seen and monitored through a public school "grading and advancement 
system."153 
For more severely handicapped children, the concept of least restrictive 
environment may vary and is still unclear. Congress has "recognized that 
regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for... many 
handicapped children."154 
The measure of "passing from grade to grade" is not possible nor 
practicable for severely and profoundly handicapped students. For these 
children, least restrictive environment may mean "the least restrictive 
environment in which educational progress rather than educational 
regression can take place."155 Most courts recognize that least restrictive 
settings may vary for more severely handicapped children, and that least 
restrictive may, in fact, involve little or no time in "regular educational" 
152 See Rowlev v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District 102 S.Ct. 3034, 
at 3048 (1982), S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 9, and H.R. Rep. No. 94-332 at 11. 
153 Rowlev. at 3049. 
154 Rowlev. 102 S.Ct. 3034 at 3038 n. 4 (citing 20 U.S.C. §1412(5)). 
155 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (N.J., 
1986) at 992. 
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facilities.156 As the concept of regular education initiative (REI) accelerates for 
all handicapped children, including those who are severely or multiply 
handicapped, it is predicted that litigation will also increase to determine how 
"appropriate" and "least restrictive environment" are defined. 
The term "regular education initiative" (REI) closely matches the 
general definition of mainstreaming. "Mainstreaming" is not mentioned in 
P. L. 94-142; it typically refers to the placement of a handicapped child in a 
regular classroom setting for at least a part of the school day. As such, 
"mainstreaming" or REI and "LRE" are not synonymous terms, since 
mainstreaming possibly could be "inappropriate" if such a setting would 
prevent a child from completing goals listed in the IEP. There are efforts 
being made to demonstrate that the integration of severely handicapped 
students in the regular classroom is, indeed, appropriate and beneficial to all 
students. Further litigation which addresses the quality of such an education 
program for the handicapped and non-handicapped is anticipated. 
One court has discussed the purpose of mainstreaming as 
to prepare a handicapped individual to function as a normal adult in 
society: it is nfit a goal in and of itself. ...Congress certainly did not 
intend to place handicapped children in a least restrictive environment 
and thereby deny them an appropriate education. A fair reading of this 
regulation [300.552(d)] makes the least restrictive environment a 
function of potential harmful effect at the quality of services fViscoat 
1314-1315]. 
156 Kruelle v. New Castle. 642 F.2d 687 M9810:Geiss v. Ed. of Parsippanv-Trov Hills. Morris 
Co.. 589 F.Supp. 269, affirmed (1984), 105 S.Ct. 1228 (1985); and Board of Ed. of East 
Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (N.J., 1986). See also A W. v. 
Northwest R-1 School Dist.. 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir., 1987V St. Louis Developmental Disabilities v. 
Mallorv. 767 F.2d 518 (1985): DeVries v. Fairfax County School Bd.. 674 F.Supp. 1219 (E.D. Va., 
1987); Ronckeron Behalf of Ronckerv. Walter. 700 F.2d 1058 (Ohio, 1983); and Lachman v. 
Illinois State Board of Education. 852 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir., 1988). 
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In this instance, integration of a child for the sake of considering the 
least restrictive environment was unsuccessful. 
The Concept of "Appropriate" and "To Maximize Potential" 
There is little disagreement among experts in the field that the 
decisions reached under Rowley restricted or limited the legal mandates of 
"quality" in special education. According to Rowley, if an IEP has been 
formulated in accordance with the requirements under P. L. 94-142, and the 
child is able to participate in the regular classroom, if possible, a free 
appropriate public education has been provided. To measure the IEP's 
appropriateness, the IEP should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.157 
While narrow in scope, the definition must be balanced by the 
requirement of "appropriateness." The Court stated, "We do not hold today 
that every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to grade in a 
regular public school system is automatically receiving a 'free appropriate 
public education.'"158 The Court further analyzed the term "appropriate:" 
Whatever Congress meant by an 'appropriate' education, it is clear that 
it did not mean a potential maximizing education....The use of 
'appropriate' in the language of the Act... suggests that Congress used 
the word as much to describe the settings in which handicapped 
children should be educated as to prescribe the substantive content or 
supportive services of their education. For example, §1412(5) requires 
157 Rowley v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, 102 s.ct. 3034, at 
3049 (1982). 
158 Ibid., at 3049, n.25. 
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that handicapped children be educated in classrooms with 
nonhandicapped children "to the maximum extent appropriate." 
Similarly, §1401(19) provides that, "whenever appropriate," 
handicapped children should attend and participate in the meeting at 
which their IEP is drafted. In addition, the definition of "free 
appropriate public education" itself states that instruction given 
handicapped children should be at an "appropriate preschool, 
elementary, or secondary school" level [§1401(18)(C)]. The Act's use of 
the word "appropriate" thus seems to reflect Congress' recognition that 
some settings simply are not suitable environments for the 
participation of some handicapped children [Rowlev. at 3046, n. 21]. 
The Court documented that the phrase "achievement of maximum 
potential" was found only in isolated statements in the legislative history of 
P.L. 94-142. As a result, it noted that "passing references and isolated phrases 
are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history."159 In Rowley, the 
Court confirmed this: "even were we to agree that these statements evince a 
Congressional intent to maximize each child's potential, we could not hold 
that Congress had successfully imposed that burden upon the States."1® 
Some governing state laws were written which clearly imposed higher 
standards than Rowley.161 For example, the statute in Michigan is to "develop 
the maximum potential of every handicapped person."162 A similar state 
statute reads, "each school district must provide each handicapped pupil a 
special education program and services according to how the pupil can best 
159 Dept. of State v. The Washington Post Co 456 U.S.595 (1982) in Rowlev. at 3049, n. 26. 
160 Rowlev v. Bd. of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District. 102 S.Ct. at 3050, n. 
26. 
161 See Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (N.J., 
1986); Geis v. Bd. of Ed. of Parsippanv-Trov Hills. Morris Co.. 589 F.Supp. 269, affirmed (1984); 
774 F.2d 575 (N.J., 19851 David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm.106 S.Ct. 1790 (1986), andEinli 
bv Crinder v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist.. 738 F.Supp. 345 (N.D.Cal., 1990). 
162 Woolcott v. State Bd. of Ed.. 351 N.W.2d601 (Mich.App. 1984), at 605. 
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achieve educational success.163 In addition to Michigan and New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania courts also have addressed the Rowley criteria: "Rowley, of 
course, does not limit [a state's] authority but merely establishes minimum 
standards by which educational programs must be evaluated in the context of 
[the EHA]."164 Thus, some of the state's statutes still follow Rowley, and also 
do not prescribe by law that each student receive "a particular level or quality 
of education.165 
A variation of the definition for maximizing educational potential was 
described in which a child "has probably reached a point of diminishing 
marginal return and [will] not be able to learn much more/"66 This concept 
referred to a child who was thought to have reached his/her "full potential" 
and that only maintenance of learned skills would be needed. 
Some courts have leaned more toward evaluating "appropriate" based 
upon the setting selected, and have determined that entitlement of a 
particular setting or location is not guaranteed or required, even if it "would 
more nearly enable the child to reach his or her full potential."167 This 
restriction of "appropriateness" follows the guidelines established by Rowley. 
Post-Rowlev cases have also generalized that a decrease in appropriate 
services may still benefit a child; that is, "less appropriate" cannot be equated 
to inappropriate.168 At the same time, though, some courts have concluded 
16J Geis v. Bd. of Ed. of Parsipoanv-Trov Hills. Morris Co.. 774 F.2d 575 (N.J., 1985), at 272. 
164 School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Dept. of Education. 547 A.2d 520 (Pa.CmwIth., 1988), at 
522-523. 
165 Lisa H. v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Education. 447 A.2d 669 (1982). 
166 Matthews bv Matthews v. Davis. 742 F.2d 825 (Va., 1984), at 830. 
167 Abrahamsonv. Hershman 701 F.2d 223 (Mass., 1983), at 227. 
168 Hessler bv Britt v. State Bd. of Ed. of Md.. 700 F.2d 566 (Fla.App. 2d Dist., 1986). 
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that "if an appropriate program, incidentally, does in fact 'maximize' [a child's] 
potential, so much the better."169 
Thus, an appropriate education is not synonymous with the best 
possible education.170 In most states, it is not an education which enables a 
child to achieve his full potential: "even the best public schools lack the 
resources to enable every child to achieve his full potential."171 Cost may 
certainly be a factor in determining what is appropriate education. "No 
language in a state or federal law can properly be read as mandating that costs 
may not be considered in determining what education is appropriate for a 
child—handicapped or non-handicapped."172 However, less cost does not 
equate automatically to an inappropriate education, whether it is the cost of 
educational services or the salary received by teachers.173 Lower salary does 
not necessarily diminish the quality of education. It does, however, raise the 
question of quality if the turnover rate and vacancies caused by low salaries 
result in the lack of services for students. 
Some confusion still exists, as noted in varying rulings since Rowley, 
of what constitutes "appropriate." How then, may school personnel 
determine when a program or setting is appropriate? If two options are 
appropriate, does one become inappropriate? The question becomes one of 
quality, then, and the concept "appropriate" shifts to "best" and maximizing 
Board of Education of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 
(N.Y., 1986), at 992. 
170 Sprinadale School District v. Grace. 494 F.Supp. 266 (1980, 102 S.Ct. 3504 (1982). See 
also Rouse v. Wilson. 675 F.Supp. 1012 (W.D.Va., 1987). 
171 Rowlev v. Bd of Ed. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District. 483 F.Supp. 528, 
(1982) at 534. 
172 Bales v. Clarke. 523 F.Supp. 1366 (Va., 1981), at 1371. 
173 Council for Hearing Impaired Long Island. Inc. v. Ambach. 610 F.Supp. 1051 (N.Y., 1985). 
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is not mandated in most states. 
When a party, usually a school system, proposes a change in placement, 
it is sometimes difficult to convince all interested parties that the transfer, 
particularly if it decreases the contact in special education settings, is still 
appropriate. 
[A] court's unspoken premise has often been that since [a child] was 
making progress at [a particular setting] it followed that any inferior 
placement was not appropriate. Appealing as that view must be, it is 
inconsistent with the 'some educational benefit' standard of Rowley 
and is strongly suggestive of reliance on the potential-maximizing 
standard that Rowley forbids. [Kerkham. at 889]. 
Still, school personnel remain concerned with court decisions which 
determine "appropriate," and until there is less variation among the courts, 
schools may not be able to affirm that they have, indeed, met the Rowley 
standards in presenting a free appropriate public education. 
There will always be a private program somewhere that for some 
increased amount of tuition can offer more facilities, more 
instructional personnel and more services than a given public school 
district can offer. It is even possible that there presently exists another 
private school which would offer more programs and more-
instruction for [the child] than the [current private school placement], 
another school which would, therefore, better permit [the student] to 
achieve educational success. Would this mean that [the child] must be 
sent to that school even though the [current, and challenged 
placement] would be appropriate? [Geis. at 583]. 
According to Rowley, it does not. 
101  
A similar stance to Kerkham on "appropriate" is found in a Maryland 
court decision: "Because a given educational placement is allegedly more 
appropriate than another, it does not follow that the less appropriate program 
is not 'appropriate' within the meaning of the Act." 100 
Further determinants of 'appropriate' have included the amount of 
regression,101 the possibility of illiteracy and the degree of 'basic survival 
skills' mastered,102 and the development of social and psychological needs.103 
An appropriate program is one in which "educational progress rather than 
educational regression can take place.104 
The development of the IEP determines an appropriate program, and 
documentation which addresses how a committee considered options and 
how the final selection for placement was reached is critical in litigation 
which challenges the "appropriateness" of a proposed program. Other issues 
that emerge from "appropriateness" and a "child's potential" center on the 
determination of the appropriate location and preferences recommended by 
parents and school personnel. The locations preferred by these two groups are 
often dissimilar. 
100 Hessler bv Britt v. State Bd. of Ed. of Man/land. 700 F.2d (C.A.Md., 1983), at 139. 
101 Ahern v. Keene. 593 F.Supp. 902 (Del., 1984). 
102 Blazeiewski v. Board of Ed. of Alleoanv Central School District 560 F.Supp. 701 (N.Y., 
1983). 
103 Bonadonna v. Cooperman. 619 F.Supp. 401 (N.J., 1985). 
104 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School District v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (N.J., 
1986). 
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Preference of Location 
Probably the greatest number of court cases involves disagreement 
between parents and school personnel over the location of a service described 
in the IEP. Preferences vary more according to philosophical differences. 
Most parents desire services that will enable their child to reach his greatest 
potential. On the other hand, school personnel often try to best serve the 
child with whatever programs are currently available, even if they need to be 
modified. This task is further complicated by limited local, state, and federal 
funding, yet the school personnel are required to provide services in which 
the student will show progress. Occasionally, a school committee may 
recommend a more comprehensive or highly specialized program than that 
wished by the parents. The majority of these children often display a physical 
disability, such as blindness, deafness, or orthopedic problems. Many of these 
handicapping conditions are considered "low-incident;" that is, they occur 
less frequently and often specialized programs and centers may not be offered 
in the neighborhood, town, or even county where the child's natural 
residence and school is located. Because of the lower incident rate, personnel 
may suggest out-of-neighborhood school placement based upon the child's 
needs. 
The determination, or proper placement, for these populations must be 
accomplished in a similar manner to other handicapped children—through 
the development of an IEP which will provide a free appropriate public 
education. A little more flexibility by the courts may be allowed with low-
incident populations, since the prevalence of program options may be limited 
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somewhat because of fewer students, and financial constraints may narrow 
the number of alternatives available. In two separate states, litigation was 
initiated because state allotted funds for institutions were insufficient. The 
ultimate responsibility of educational costs remains with state and local 
governance even if there is the possibility of other financial assistance.17' 
However, if a state facility needs to close for budgetary reasons, the closing and 
transfer of a student is considered a change of placement, but the "stay put" 
provision was waived where a court ruled that it did not make good sense to 
force the continued spending for the one child that "might well deprive other 
handicapped children of needed resources."180 
On the other hand, while the transfer of students from one facility to 
another because of financial constraints is allowed, the denial of special 
education and the exclusion from a state facility is not, even if funds are not 
readily available. In this case, compensatory time was granted to remediate 
the loss of special education services.181 Generally, financial responsibility and 
a free appropriate public education must be a balanced proposition. The 
Courts are aware of fiscal restraints on school systems which seek to provide 
appropriate education programs for the handicapped; they note that "it seems 
clear that 'appropriate' cannot mean the best possible education that a school 
could provide given access to unlimited funds."182 
The least restrictive environment and the issue of separate programs 
versus integration may emerge, too. Nevertheless, alternatives must be 
179 William S. v. GilL 572 F.SUPD. 509 (III, 1983), 591 F.Supp. 422 (III., 1984). 
180Tilton bv Richards v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Ed.. 705 F.2d 800 (C.A. Ky„ 1983), at 805. 
181 White v. State. 240 Cal.Rptr. 732 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1987). 
182 Pinkerton v. Move. 509 F.Supp. 107 (1981). 
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considered prior to selection of recommended locations. Each school district 
must insure that a variety of placements is available.183 
When parents seek a high "quality" setting, several factors are usually 
involved, and the evidence available and the rationale for preference often 
determine the decision reached by the courts. 
Some parents have definite ideas about the type of children who 
should be allowed to be educated with their child. The sexual composition 
has been questioned where all children currently enrolled in a separate 
special class were male. Conversely, based upon religious convictions, 
parents have also demanded that handicapped children be segregated by sex.184 
Parental requests for homogeneous grouping by handicapping condition has 
also been denied where an IEP has been shown to be appropriate:185 Cross-
categorical settings comprised of heterogeneous groups of handicapped 
students are certainly allowable under the determinants of a least restrictive 
environment. 
Since the passage of P.L. 94-142, a variety of special education programs 
and settings have been established nationwide. Most children who are 
identified as handicapped, particularly those with mild to moderate 
disabilities, are able to be placed appropriately in existing programs and 
services which are then modified, if necessary, to meet the child's needs. 
Occasionally, however, school personnel must create a new program 
altogether to meet the needs of a handicapped student. If a school placement 
183 20 U.S.C. §1415 (5)(B). 
164 Bales v. Clarke. 523 F.Supp. 1366 (Va., 1981): Board of Education v. Wieder. 527 N.E.2d 
767 (N.Y., 1988). 
185 Garrick B. bv Gary B. v. Cuiwensville Area School Dist.. 669 F.Supp. 705 (Pa., 1987). 
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committee has proposed a new program, the teacher does not have to be 
hired already to demonstrate "good faith effort" of the proposed IEP. It would 
be difficult to offer a teacher contract and then rescind it if the parents fail to 
approve a new program designed especially for their child.186 Parents cannot 
demand that appropriate services be taught by the teacher of their choice187 any 
more than they can choose a particular curriculum methodology. A teacher 
does not have to be certified in one particular area of special education to 
serve a specific child: lack of certification does not automatically disqualify an 
option from being potentially an appropriate one. Occasionally, though, one 
teacher's credentials and program may be superior to another teacher's 
program. Whether or not it is most appropriate, though, may be another 
matter.188 For a change of placement to be acceptable, particularly if it is 
proposed by school personnel, there must be strong evidence that the current 
program is detrimental to the child and that the newly proposed program is 
essential.189 This can be an extremely arduous task, made even more difficult 
if the parents are satisfied with the "old" program. 
If school personnel and parents have agreed to placement in a private 
school and the child has been accepted, the child can remain there 
indefinitely so long as both parties continue to agree with the placement, 
even if the private school later determines that they wish to discontinue the 
186 Cain v. Yukon Public School Dist. 1-27. 775 F.2d 15 (Okla., 1985). 
187 Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist. 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir., 1987). 
188 Wilson v. Marana Unified School District #6 of Pima County. 735 F.2d 1178 (Ariz., 1984); 
but see Bonadonna v. Cooperman. 619 F.Supp. 401 (N.J., 1985). 
189 Soringdale School District v. Grace. 494 F.Supp. 266 (1980), 102 S.Ct. 3504 (1982), and 
Geis v. Bd. of Ed. of Parsippanv-Trov Hills. Morris Co.. 589 F.Supp. 269, affirmed (1984), 774 
F.2d 575 (N.J., 1985). See also Doe v. Lawson. 579 F.Sup. 1314 (D. Mass., 1984). 
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special education services. Under the "stay put" provision in P. L. 94-142, 
pending possible relocation, a child is to remain in the private school 
setting.190 
As mentioned previously, school systems often have limited selection 
of services available locally for low-incident handicapped children. A school 
committee cannot totally ignore the possibility of separate schools or 
specialized settings for financial reasons. The key component is that the 
program and setting proposed for the child must be appropriate: it meets the 
needs of the child.1" Several patterns have emerged, though, in determining 
whether the locations and programs offered are considered appropriate or 
whether alternative placements, particularly those which provide integration 
with regular education, must be developed. 
Separate school and specialized settings may be appropriate if there is 
clear documentation that the school placement committee has carefully 
considered the least restrictive environment.192 Integration with non-
handicapped children is not absolutely essential for all handicapped 
children,193 but children cannot be sent automatically to a separate program or 
facility because of a specific "label" or handicapping condition.194 
At the same time, a school district is not required to establish a special 
program to be located in each local school, or even within the jurisdiction of 
190 Woods Schools v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 514 A.2d 686 (Pa.CmwIth., 1986), 
and 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(3). 
191 Stacev G. v. Pasadena Independent School District. 695 F.2d 949 (5th Cir., 1983). 
192 St. Louis Developmental Disabilities v. Mallorv- 591 F.Supp. 1416(1985). 
193 Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency. 795 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986), certiorari denied, 
107 S.Ct. 1579, 94 L.Ed. 2d 769 (1986). 
194 Roncker on Behalf ot Roncker v. Walter. 700 F.2d 1058 (Ohio, 1983), and St, LOUiS 
Developmental Disabilities v. Mallorv. 591 F.Supp. 1416 (1985). 
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their own school district. If a school system can offer a program which is 
located in an adjoining district, yet is still within commuting distance, the 
system can show cause that it has "reached a reasonable accommodation of 
competing financial limitations and interests of the child in obtaining 
placement" in an appropriate program at a school located outside of the 
district."5 Therefore, transporting a child to an appropriate program in 
another nearby school system is certainly allowable. Occasionally, specialized 
programs are found only in settings which are more removed from nearby 
locales. School personnel are obligated to seek appropriate services even if 
they are located apart from the child's natural place of residence.196 While a 
school system or state may not have an appropriate program, "certainly one 
should not need to traverse the Pacific Ocean" to find an adequate one.'97 
Parents who seek out-of-state placement are often mandated by the courts to 
accept educational services nearby, even if they are not as extensive, but still 
found to be appropriate under the guidelines of P.L. 94-142. 
Overall, a child's special needs must be met, and while financial 
constraints can be considered, a school system must offer an appropriate 
program. In one case, a school system did not offer an alternative program to 
one proposed by the parents. The only program considered by the school-and 
an expensive one at that— refused to accept the child and so was 
inappropriate. Because no other options were considered the court ruled for 
Pinkerton v. Move. 509 F SUDD. 107 (1981), at 107. 
196 See Lester H. bv Octavia P. v. Gilhool. 916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir., 1990), yet see Brown v. 
Wilson County School Board. 747 F.Supp. 346 (F.D. Tenn., 1990). 
197 Drew P. v. Clarke County School Dist- 676 F.Supp. 1559 (M.D.Ga., 1987). 
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the parents' proposal: 
It would be disingenuous at best to find that placing [an exceptional 
child] in an institution that does not want him and which claims to be 
unsuitable for him will meet his unique educational needs. It would 
be wiser to spend [$88,000 annually] on a program that has a chance to 
work rather than [$55,000 annually] on one that has no chance at all. 
[Clevenger,at5i7] 
Parents often wish for their handicapped child to be placed in a 
residential setting which provides around-the-clock care. In a reverse pattern, 
trainable mentally handicapped children, for example, historically were 
routinely placed in state residential settings, and school school systems now 
offer services in their own community, thus allowing these children to reside 
in their own home. Some parents of children who are trainable mentally 
retarded have sought residential placement, many times as an attempt to be 
relieved of the need to supervise their child for an indefinite number of 
years. While deinstitutionalization and the resulting community-based 
service is more common, the responsibilities of maintaining care for a 
handicapped child who potentially will remain dependent has caused 
families to seek placement outside of the home. If school systems can 
demonstrate that they can offer appropriate programs, the courts will usually 
allow the child to participate in day programs and return home at night, thus 
providing for the least restrictive environment and opportunities for 
integration with non-handicapped persons."8 Unfortunately, some families 
19a Ahern v. Keene. 593 F~Supp 902 (Del., 1984) , andCothemv. Mallorv. 565 F.Supp. 701 
(Mo., 1983). 
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are unable to adequately cope with the responsibilities of these children. 
Cases where parents seek residential placement occur less frequently where 
community group homes have been established as alternatives to natural 
home placement. In such settings, residents have the opportunity to interact 
with peers, develop self-help skills, attend local school programs, participate 
in normal community activities where appropriate, and still be separate from, 
yet near, their family. 
Parents of children who exhibit emotional difficulties, or a 
combination of learning and emotional problems, often seek residential 
placement as opposed to requesting programs offered locally by school 
systems. Rowley has curtailed to some extent the rate of litigation which is 
filed to demand separate, private, and residential treatment which may 
'maximize' a handicapped child's potential. Parents may not propose services 
which "they should have known could not reasonably be implemented."199 
Neither the courts, hearing officer, nor parents can name or specify a 
particular school or facility.200 During a due process hearing or trial, the duty 
of the hearing officer or court is to determine whether the program and 
services offered by the school are appropriate, and if not, to determine (or 
redirect the school) to establish what modifications are necessary to meet the 
child's needs. If, in the process, an alternative program is found to be 
appropriate and school personnel are unable to present any other options, a 
parent's choice might be considered, but only after the school has failed to do 
iaB Bales v. Clarke. 523 F.SUPP. 1366 (Va., 1981) at 1369. 
200 Antowiak v. Ambach. 653 F.Supp. 1405 (W.D.N.Y. 1987l.Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School 
Board. 573 F.Supp. 349 (1983), reversed 744 F.2d 514 (Tenn., 1984), and Hendrev Co. School 
Bd. v. Kuiawski. 498 So.2d 566 (Fla.App. 2d Dist., 1986). 
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so. While parents may "craft a better program" than the ones offered by a 
school system, it "does not, alone, entitle them to prevail" under P. L. 94-
142.20' 
Typically, then, parent preference for location or setting is not allowed if 
the school is able to offer an appropriate program or service.202 If parents 
choose to unilaterally place their child in the location of their choice and 
refuse an offered appropriate service, schools are not required to provide 
transportation by virtue of the fact that the child is exceptional.203 The 
parental decision to refuse the public special education offered and the 
subsequent placement of the child in a private school limits the duties of the 
public officials. Once appropriate services have been offered and refused, the 
placement committee has met the criteria of P. L. 94-142. 
At the time of annual review of the student's individualized 
educational program, or sooner, if indicated, school officials must determine 
whether the current location and setting is still appropriate and, if not, revise 
the IEP. What is needed or desirable at one point in time may be unsuitable 
later,204 and a cursory "renewing" of the IEP by school personnel may prove to 
be costly. 
201 Kerkham v. McKenzie. 862 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir., 1988), at 886. 
202 Manual R. V. Ambacti 635 F.Supp. 791 (N.Y., 1986): Smrcka bv Smrcka v. Ambach. 555 
F.Supp. 1227 (1983): Schimmfil v Soillanfl. 630 F.Supp. 159 (E.D.Va., 1986); and Wilson v. 
Marana Unified School District # 6 of Pima County. 735 F.2d 1178 (Ariz., 1984). 
203 McNairv. Cardimona. 676 F.Supp. 1361 (S.D. Ohio, 19871: Work v. McKenzie. 661 
F.Supp. 225 (D.C., 1987). 
204 Grkman bv Grkman v. Scanlnn 563 F.Supp. 793 (Pa., 1983), at 796. 
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Curriculum and Methodology Preferences 
Some parents have filed suit to challenge the curriculum or teaching 
style used in their child's school. One of the most prevalent challenges for 
"appropriate services" is in the proposed methodologies of instruction for 
children with impaired hearing. Teaching communication and language 
skills to deaf students historically has created controversy among various 
experts in the field over which method is considered superior. The oral 
approach; signing exact English or total communication; American sign 
language; and more recently, the addition of cued speech have all been 
presented in court for rulings to support their specific use. 
For the most part, school personnel have been allowed to select their 
own methodology as opposed to the parents' preference, so long as the 
student is able to make progress.205 In one surprise post-Rowley decision, and 
in contrast to Barwacz.206 a school was ordered to provide a cued speech 
interpreter. A review of the case shows that the court was unable to 
determine whether the IEP developed was calculated to assure a reasonable 
opinion of "success" and that the Michigan state standard called for a free 
appropriate public education which would "maximize the potential' of a 
handicapped student, thus requiring higher state standards than the federal 
guidelines provided under Rowley. State mandates which are more 
stringent have precedent over federal guidelines and statutes.207 
205 See Age v. Bullitt Co. Schools. 673 F.2d 141 (C.A. Ky., 1982). Barwacz v. Michigan Dept. 
of Education. 681 F.Supp. 427 (W.D. Mich., 1988), and Lachman v. Illinois State Board of 
Education. 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir., 1988). 
206 Barwacz v. Michigan Dept. of Ed.. 681 F.Supp. 427 (W.D.Mich., 1988). 
207 Woolcott v. State Bd. of Education. 351 N.W.2d 601 (Mich.App., 1984), and see VisCQ &V 
Visco v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh. 684 F.Supp. 1310 (W.D.Pa., 1988). 
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Regression and Recoupment 
One of the primary issues raised to support extended school year is the 
potential for regression as a result of lengthy school breaks such as summer 
vacation and the length of time required for recoupment to occur. Regression 
is the loss of skills previously mastered, while recoupment is the time 
required to relearn the previously mastered (and subsequently lost) skills. All 
individuals experience some regression or loss of skill knowledge when 
information is not used for a considerable period of time. The legal issue has 
been to determine when the regression results in an extensive loss of ability 
which is significantly different from "normal" regression in regular 
education, or the amount of mastery time it has taken to learn a relatively 
simple skill which is quickly forgotten if it is not reinforced on at least an 
intermittent basis. 
One of the first cases to explore the issue of regression and recoupment 
did so as it pertained to state administrative policy which set a limit of 180 
school days for all children, both handicapped and non-handicapped.208 It has 
remained as one of the most cited cases and appears to have set a precedent 
for more recent issues. Of interest is that the court ruling cited two specific 
handicapping conditions which would most likely cause children to 
demonstrate setbacks as a result of limited school year terms: severe/ 
profound mentally retarded (with or without additional handicapping 
conditions) and severely emotionally disturbed.209 These students were cited 
Battle v. Com, of Pa.. 629 F.2d 269 (1980). 
209 Armstrong v. Kline. 476 F. Supp. 583 at 588 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
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as part of a class whose regression-recoupment syndrome is so severe that the 
traditional summer vacation period brings their overall progress for the year 
to a virtual standstill.210 Mississippi state policy211 was basically the same as 
Pennsylvania's, and both states since have passed revised legislative acts for 
compliance purposes. Each court noted that a student's needs, including an 
extended school year, must be determined through the development of the 
student's IEP. Crawford v. Pittman was ruled after the Rowley decision, and 
other post-Rowlev decisions have upheld the banishment of the automatic 
180 day school year.212 A more recent Pennsylvania case further defined the 
type of child who should be considered for an extended school year: 
A handicapped student is entitled to an educational program in excess 
of 180 days per year if regression caused an interruption in educational 
programming, together with the student's limited recoupment 
capacity, renders it impossible or unlikely that the student will attain 
the level of self-sufficiency and independence from caretakers that the 
student would otherwise have expected to reach in view of his/her 
handicapping condition feucks County. 529 A.2d 1201 at 1203]. 
In another case, a handicapped child was determined to be in need of 
only physical therapy during the summer months in order to prevent 
regression and the estimated 4 to 5 months of retraining to recoup this loss. 
*1U Battle v. Com, of Pa.. 629 F.2d 269 at 282. 
211 Crawford v. Pittman. 708 F.2d 1028 (Miss., 1983); see also Georgia ARC v. McDaniet 740 
F.2d 902 (11th Cir., 1984). 
212 See also Yaris v. Special School District of St. Louis County. 558 F.Supp. 545 (1983), 728 
F.2d. 1055 (1984), 604 F.Supp. 914 (1985V. Phipps v. New Hanover Co. Board of Education. 
551 F.Supp. 732 (N.C., 1982); and Bucks County Public School Intermediate Unit No. 22 v. Pa-
Commonwealth. Dept. of Ed.. 529 A.2d 1201 (Pa., 1987). 
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There were enough academic-directed goals and objectives which required 
motor activity, such as use of a keyboard, writing, and holding a book to 
demonstrate that the need for motor ability was an integral factor for his 
success in the regular classroom. Of utmost interest, though, was the fact that 
he had received summer physical therapy for 10 years prior to the court 
hearing. The physical therapy had been paid in previous years by a charitable 
organization, and the denial for P.T. was more a result of new administrative 
policies for processing and financing summer P.T. requests than an actual 
change in his specific needs.213 
In another post-Rowlev case, a previously agreed upon placement in a 
private residential setting by both school personnel and parents was later 
found to be no longer appropriate because the child was regressing.214 While 
the school board proposed a non-residential day setting, a more restrictive 
residential setting was determined to be appropriate. The rationale for 
continued placement in a more restrictive setting and subsequent dismissal of 
the schools' proposed day program cited: 
the inadequacies of..its student/teacher ratio, lack of individualized 
behavioral reinforcements, inadequate consequence density, inability to 
chart and modify behaviors, and the inability to provide the constant, 
consistent, professionally administered behavior modification program 
daily, throughout all of Andrew's waking hours, that his condition 
requires...If, incidentally, that program does in fact "maximize his 
potential," so much the better. [Diamond. 808 F. 2d 987 at 992] 
213 Phipps v. Saddleback Vaiiev Unified School Dist.. 251 Cal.Rptr. 720 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 
1988). See also, Holmes bv Holmes v. Sobol. 690 F.Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y., 1988). 
214 Board of Ed. of East Windsor Regional School Dist. v. Diamond. 808 F.2d 987 (NJ, 1986). 
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In some instances, then, the courts have been allowed to specify the 
content of the IEP as it pertains to the decision of appropriate placement, 
while in general specific recommendations as to the curriculum selected is 
left up to school personnel to decide. 
Related Services 
Earlier in the chapter, related services as defined as part of special 
education were discussed in detail. Other issues pertaining to related services 
have also been addressed by the courts. Individualized education programs 
(IEPs) which prescribed therapy, whether it is physical therapy, speech therapy, 
occupational therapy, or other less common related services, should be 
designed just as the special education components are to be addressed; that is, 
the individual needs of each child should be reviewed and the frequency, 
kind, and duration of the therapy should vary according to need. School 
systems which automatically provide only the consultation model of therapy 
to all students, for example, have not offered a continuum of services. 
Related services should also show a continuum, similar to special education, 
and children's IEPs should reflect a variety of services and number of weekly 
contacts based on the severity and need.215 Waiting lists for related services 
are prohibited, and to deny a child therapy, even if the majority of special 
education services are in place, can result in alternative placement at no cost 
to the parents.216 As with all school liability, overt negligence is not tolerated, 
215 Polk v. Central Susauahanna Intermediate Unit 16. 853 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir., 1988). 
2,6 Kattan bv Thomas v. District of Columbia. 691 F.Supp. 1539 (D.D.C., 1988), and Rapid Citv 
School District 51-4 v. Vahle 723 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D., 1990). 
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and therapists who work with school children must take care in assigning 
duties to teachers and assistants.216 The use of support personnel as primary 
caregivers or to augment services is certainly permissible, but detailed 
training is necessary, not only for the sake of the child, but for the caregiver as 
well. 
Demands by school personnel for parents to attend psychotherapy 
sessions as a requirement for a child's special education placement are not 
allowed.217 In most cases, it is the parent rather than an educator who seeks 
unilateral "placement" of the related service of family counseling and then 
subsequently requests reimbursement. 
The relationship of after-school day care to special education and free 
appropriate public education has also been challenged. This will increasingly 
become an issue as school systems seek to offer these services in their own 
facilities so that "latch key" children remain under adult supervision. After-
school programs are relatively inexpensive in comparison to privately-run 
day care programs. Unfortunately, these programs are often denied to more 
severely mentally handicapped, physically handicapped, and emotionally 
handicapped students who require extra attention and personal assistance. 
The low fees that after-school programs charge do not cover the costs of 
additional aides needed by some handicapped children. Since these programs 
have traditionally remained separate from school, although sometimes 
housed in classrooms after hours, most have not involved an IEP, so 
exclusion has not been addressed as quickly as it might otherwise occur. In 
216 Greening v. School Pist. of Millard. NB. 393 N.w.2d 51 (Neb., 1986). 
217 Teresa Diane P. Through Marilvn J.P. v. Alief Independent School Dist.. 744 F.2d 484 (Tex. 
1984). 
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one case, though, a minor modification in a child's after-school program was 
allowed, and the court ruled that this minimal change in the related service 
did not require that the "stay put" clause be enacted.218 This might suggest 
that there is a little more flexibility to allow minor changes in the IEP for 
related services, and less formal procedures between school personnel and 
parents may be allowable when compared with special education procedures. 
Medical Services vs. Related Health Services 
The greatest number of cases which have sought legal rulings involved 
related services which centered on the issue of psychotherapy for emotionally 
handicapped children. A few cases still address whether or not children with 
severe mental retardation require 24-hour residential programs,2" but this is 
no longer as frequently debated as issues involving children with emotional 
problems. Most of these court cases have involved children who have 
required residential facility settings, and how a child's medical needs, such as 
care in a psychiatric hospital, can be separated from the educational needs of a 
student who is seriously emotionally disturbed. 
AJfi 
Brookline School Committee v. Golden 628 F.Supp. (D.Mass., 1986). 
219 William S. v. Gill 572 F.Supp. 509 (1983), 591 F.Supp. 422 (III., 1984), and Abrahamson v. 
Hershman. 701 F.2d 223 (Mass., 1983). 
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Beginning with the earliest decisions, the separation between 
educational and medical needs has been difficult at best.220 School personnel 
have consistently stated that the major reason parents have sought placement 
of their child in a residential facility is for psychiatric, psychological, and 
medical support and supervision. In many instances, school personnel have 
refused to approve placement and parents have consequently placed them 
unilaterally. 
The courts have tried to separate the issue, but several found that "one 
line of analysis is to deem a placement required for educational reasons when 
the case is so complex that it is not possible to segregate educational from 
non-educational" needs.221 Other courts have looked directly to whether 
placement was necessary in order for the child to learn.222 
A clarification of payment for psychotherapy services performed by a 
psychiatrist has provided a "rule of thumb" for determining responsibility. 
The definition comes from one of the most litigated cases in the history of 
P. L. 94-142.223 In Max M. "3". so referred to in the court records,224 the court 
reasoned: 
Papacoda v. State of Connecticut. 528 F.Supp. 68 (D.Conn., 1981: Gary B. v. Cronin. 542 
F.Supp. 102 (N.D. III., 1980); McKenzie v. Jefferson. 566 F.Supp. 404 M9831: Darlene L. v. 
Illinois State Bd. Of Ed., 568 F.Supp. 1340 <19831: TO. V. Bd. of Ed. of Piscatawav. NJ. 576 
F.Supp. 420, affirmed 738 F.2d 420, 105 S.Ct. 592, (1983), 83 L.Ed.2d 701, (1983); 
Metropolitan Govt, v. Dept. of Educ.. 771 S.W. 2d 427 (Tenn.App., 1989); and Doe v. Anria. 651 
F.Supp. 424 (D.Mass., 1987). 
221 North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Ed.. 471 F.Supp. 136 (1979). 
222 Papacoda v. State of Connecticut. 528 F.Supp. 68 (D.Conn., 1981). 
223 Max M. v. Thompson. 566 F.Supp. 1330 (1983), 585 F.Supp. 317, amended 592 F.Supp. 
1450 (III., 1984), 592 F.Supp. 1437 (III., 1984), 629 F.Supp. 1504 (III., 1986). 
224 With each appeal, the courts have distinguished between each one by referring to them in 
numeric and chronologic sequence. 
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...that Congress intended to limit the nature of the services required 
rather than the personnel who provided the service. In that line of 
reasoning...the school district would be liable...for the cost..., even if a 
physician provided the services. ...Specifically, the school district 
could be held liable for no more than the cost of the service as provided 
by the minimum health care provider recognized as competent to 
perform the related service. (MaxM. (1986) at 1514] 
The limitation of payment resembles other cases, one which notably 
determined that psychotherapy, while supervised by a psychiatrist, was 
provided by a social worker.225 
The question of medical services versus related services was addressed 
most clearly in Tatro.226 where clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) was 
determined to be a related service. The Supreme Court ruled that it was a 
related service because, without such service, the child would be unable to 
attend school and, therefore, would not be able to benefit or be offered special 
education and the due process rights that accompany it. The Court stated that 
"services like CIC that permit a child to remain at school during the day are 
no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the child to 
reach, enter, and exit the school."227 
The Court also distinguished between a school health service and a 
medical service. The distinction made was whether the service could be 
225 T.G. v. Board of Ed. of Piscatawav. NJ. 576 F.Supp. 420, affirmed 738 F.2d 420, 105 S.Ct. 
592,(1983), 83 L.Ed.2d 701, (1983). 
226 Tatro v. State of Texa& 481 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D.Tex., 1979), 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir., 1980), 
703 F.2d 823 (1983), 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984). 
227 Tatro v. State of Taxaa 104 S.Ct. 3371, (1984) at 3377. 
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provided by a school nurse or other qualified person, or if the service had to 
be provided only by a physician. 
In another case involving CIC which was decided prior to Tatro, and 
one in which the school was also directed to perform CIC as a related service, 
a different standard was used to determine the need for such a service or 
whether catheterization was a medical service. While Tokarcik228 
determined that the absence of CIC would prevent the child from 
participating in a regular school program (as did Tatro). it also addressed the 
question from the standpoint of de minimus. 
These two cases broadened the concept of related services to include 
any health service that an individual with training can perform. The fact that 
clean intermittent catheterization takes so little time certainly appears to be a 
factor in the determination of a related health service. Exclusion because of 
lack of bladder or bowel control was found to be discriminatory in a case 
which was presented shortly after the passage of P. L. 94-142,229 yet school 
officials continue to resist providing toileting assistance in settings less 
familiar with diaper-changing and assisting with other personal bodily needs. 
Teachers of traditionally self-contained programs are accustomed to assisting 
with a wide variety of personal skills, such as toileting, bathing, and other 
hygiene activities which are an integral part of the curriculum. The 
difference is that many of the children who have spina bifida require 
minimal service for special education other than catheterization, unless other 
medical complications are associated with their disability. As a result, most 
Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist.. 665 F.2d 443 (1981). 
229 Hairston v. Drosick. 423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va., 1976). 
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can remain in their neighborhood school with the provision of support 
services. 
The concept of de minimus, along with the distinction of a health 
caregiver (a layperson or a nurse), has affected other rulings. Periodic mucus 
suctioning can be a required educational related service,230 yet full-time 
constant monitoring of child with respiratory problems and the threat of 
phlegm which requires constant vigilance is considered a medical need. The 
key components appear to be that if the service is time-consuming, expensive, 
intensive, and life-threatening, which therefore requires the constant 
vigilance,231 it is a medical service and not a related health service. In one 
case the child required "a full-time person trained to monitor her respiratory 
status 'constantly7 and that the service must be provided by 'at least a 
licensed practical nurse' and 'cannot be adequately provided by a regular 
school nurse who must care for other children."232 This type of care is 
constant, not intermittent, and requires expertise not to be provided by a "lay 
person" such as with Katherine D. 
The minimal length of time required to perform the service does not 
apply if it does not absolutely have to be done at school. If the service could 
be withheld and/or scheduled to be provided only at hours other than during 
the school day, then a school is not required to provide it. 
See Hawaii v. Katherine P.. 727 F.2d 809 (1983), and Hvmes v. Harnett County. 664 F.2d 
410 (1981). 
231 See Detsel v. Board of Ed. of Auburn Enlarged Citv School Dist.. 637 F.Supp. 1022, 
affirmed, 820 F.2d 587, certiorari denied, 108 S.Ct. 495 (N.Y., 1987), andBevin H. bv Michael H. 
v. Wright, 666 F.Supp. 71 (Pa., 1987). See also. Allstate Insurance Company v. Bethlehem Area 
School District, 678 F.Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa., 1987), and Gehman v. Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance Co.. 702 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa., 1989). 
232 Detsel v. Board of Ed. of Auburn Enlarged Citv School Dist.. 820 F.2d 587, at 588. 
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The court decision for Tatro also stated that no equipment 
reimbursement, such as catheters, was sought by the parents. This notation 
might directly relate back to an earlier court comment which noted that the 
'medical services' exclusion might have been "designed to spare schools from 
an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive 
and beyond the range of their competence."233 
In an earlier case, a child required that the room be maintained at a 
fairly constant temperature range since the child's condition prevented him 
from regulating his own body temperature.234 This issue focused more on the 
concept of least restrictive environment and discrimination, though, in 
which a plexiglass 5' x 5' enclosure was air-conditioned. The court ruled that 
the classroom should be furnished with a window air-conditioner. In a 
broader sense, the cost of the air-conditioner might be considered a related 
medical equipment expenditure, but more realistically could be determined 
more so as an item which allows accessibility and acts more as a modification. 
Either way, the cost of the air conditioner and electricity are not unreasonable, 
and their presence allowed the child to interact fully with his classmates and, 
most importantly, remedied a life-threatening situation. 
The issue of costs has still not been resolved. Almost all of the claims 
for reimbursement for psychotherapy have resulted from exorbitant costs 
which were initially billed to the parents and whose insurance either does not 
cover such costs or results in a decrease or exhaustion of a child's lifetime 
medical insurance benefits. Until other remedies are found, whether it is 
233 Tatro v. State of Texaa 104 S.Ct. 3371 (1984), at 3378. 
234 Espino v. Besteiro. 520 F.Supp. 905 (1981), 520 F.Supp. 701 (1983). 
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federal or state sponsored medical assistance, joint funding and shared 
financial responsibility among agencies, or until Congress passes a national 
social health plan, the cost of treatment, and particularly placement of a 
handicapped child in a private residential facility, will continue to be 
challenged in court. 
Transportation 
One of the related services offered under P. L. 94-142 included the 
provision for transportation. At the time of the filing of Mills and PARC the 
precursors of P. L. 94-142, a lawsuit was also filed which challenged public 
school systems to provide free transportation for the handicapped.235 Issues 
involving transportation of handicapped students continue to arise. 
Some children who are physically handicapped may or may not be in 
need of special education. Without special transportation vehicles to 
accommodate wheelchairs, some students would be unable to attend public 
school. 
The bus route should be designed to transport children as efficiently as 
possible. Transportation to specialized facilities and transfers to and from the 
bus to school and home may require additional time, but the schedule should 
be designed so that bussing does not interfere significantly with the normal 
class time allotted during the school day. Minor variations and adjustments 
to the bus schedule and length of bus route for each child to accommodate 
changes needed during the school year are allowed.236 
— i 
Maryland ARC, et al. v. State of Maryland Equity No. 100/182/77676 (Circuit Court, 
Baltimore County, 1975). 
236 DeLeon v. Susquehanna Comm. School District 747 F.2d 149 (Pa., 1984). 
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The courts have been fairly consistent in their decisions: schools 
provide transportation and other modifications necessary to make 
transportation available and at no cost.238 When school personnel offer 
handicapped children a free appropriate public education, yet the parents 
choose to unilaterally enroll them in a private school which may or may not 
provide special education, school personnel are usually not responsible at all 
for transporting them if they have offered a free appropriate public education. 
If a school committee is found to be liable for the education at a private 
school, they are responsible only for the transportation cost equal to what 
expenditure would have occurred if the child had remained enrolled in the 
local school.239 
Transportation to and from state and private residential facilities may 
be limited to allow a reasonable number of visitations of the child to his 
home. The number of visits is often regulated by state provisions, and an 
educational agency is only responsible for the cost of transporting the child to 
and from school.240 
In a slightly different case, a child was awarded a scholarship for a 
related therapy service and the school was held responsible for the 
transportation between the school site and the center. The variation in ruling 
might be attributed to the fact that the court found that the therapy service 
^ Maryland ARC et al. v. State of Maryland. Equity No. 100/182/77676 (Circuit Court, 
Baltimore County, 1975). 
239 McNairv. Cardimone. 676 F.Supp. 1361 (S.D. Ohio, 1987); WOfKV. McKenzie. 661 
F.Supp. 225 (D.C. 1987): School Bd. of Pinellas Co. v. Smith. 537 So.2d 168 (Fla.App. 2 Dist., 
1989); A A. v. Cooperman. 526 A.2d 1103 (N.J. Super. D.D. 1987); and Woodland Hills School 
District v. Commonwealth of Penn.. 516 A.2d 686 (Pa.CmwIth., 1986). 
240 Cohen v. School Board of Dade Co.. Fla.. 450 So.2d 1238 (Fla.App. 3 Dist., 1984). 
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was necessary and, even without the tuition grant, it held that the school 
would be required to pay for the service. In case the grant was not available in 
future years and the child still required the service, the responsibility for 
payment will remain as a school obligation. The second reason for the ruling 
might be that the child had a progressive hearing loss and that there is "an 
element of urgency in... [that the child's] residual hearing can only be 
enhanced while he retains that capability."241 Thus, transportation 
responsibility is only invoked when a special service is deemed urgent and 
necessary. 
The actual act of providing transportation goes far beyond offering a 
vehicle which can load and transport a handicapped child. Obstacles, such as 
those found in inaccessible homes, driveways, and even roads, must be 
removed or overcome by school personnel.242 This responsibility even 
extends to assisting a child to be prepared for the school bus in lifting, 
toileting, and dressing the child if the parent is unable to do so. Transporting 
a student to an out-of-district day care center may be required from a local 
educational agency where a working mother is unable to supervise her child 
at home immediately after school, and where the day care center is a 
"reasonable" distance over the district line.243 Thus, the child is provided an 
opportunity for a free appropriate public education with the assistance of the 
related transportation services. 
*" School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Dept. of Education. 547 A.2d 520 (Pa.CmwIth., 1988), at 
522. 
242 Kennedy v. Bd. of Ed. of McDowell County. 337 S.E. 2d 905 (W. Va., 1985), and hurry Y, 
Jones. 560 F.Supp. 500 (R.I., 1983), 734 F.2d 879 (1984). 
243 Alamo Heights Independent Schl. Dist. v. Texas State Board of Education 790 F.2d 1153 
(5th Cir., 1986). 
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Compensatory Time 
Under P.L. 94-142, damages have not been allowed in the form of 
monetary awards. Instead, in some instances, compensatory time has been 
awarded when the courts have found overwhelming evidence that the 
school system has purposefully delayed or refused to provide services needed. 
Because of these actions and the lengthy process associated with even 
successful litigation, the child has been denied a free appropriate public 
education. 
Compensatory time has been awarded when school committees have 
given inadequate notice of requirements for graduation,244 245 provided 
minimal or lack of special education and related services in local schools and 
state residential facilities,246 and have delayed timely placement of special 
students in proper settings.247 Compensatory time has been denied for time 
spent in special education prior to declassification,248 and for scheduling a 
shortened school day only for handicapped children.249 In most cases, 
compensatory time is not retroactive to the passage of P.L. 94-142250 or after a 
244 Brookhart v. Illinois State"3d. of Education. 697 F.2d 179 (C.A.III, 1983). SeeDebraP. v. 
Turlinoton. 564 F.Supp. 177 (5th Cir., 1983), and 730 F.2d 1405 (1984). 
245 Use of competency tests is allowable, as long as the requirements for graduation involve 
more than one method of evaluation. See Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Education, and 
§300.532(d). 
246 Campbell v. Talladega Bd. of Education. 518 F.Supp. 47 (N.D.Ala., 19811: White v. State. 
240 Cal.Rptr. 732 (Cal.App. 3 Dist., 19871: Counsel v. Dow. 849 F.2d 731 (2nd Cir., 19881: Board 
of Ed. v. Commonwealth Dept. of Ed.. 581 A.2d 681 (Pa. Cmwlth., 1990); and Lester H. bv 
Octavia P. v. Gilhool. 916 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir., 1990). 
247 Robinson V. Pinderhuqhes. 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir., 19871: Jefferson County Bd. of 
Education v. Breen. 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir., 1988); and Burr bv Burr v. Ambach. 863 F.2d 1071 
(2nd Cir., 1988). 
248 Powell v. Defore. 699 F.2d 1078 (C.A.Ga., 1983). 
249 Timms v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Wabash Ctv.. 718 F.2d (1983). 
250 Alexopulos bv Alexooulos v. Riles. 784 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir., 1986). 
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student has completed a special education program.251 
The courts have noted several opinions in the right to compensatory 
education: "We do not believe that Congress intended to create a right 
without a remedy." 252 In regard to financial compensation, a court has ruled 
that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal 
moneys, it must do so unambiguously."253 
In amending the EHA by enacting the Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act, Congress explicitly provided the availability of attorney's fees 
for successful EHA plaintiffs and specified expressly its intent that this 
condition should apply retroactively to the identifiable two-year period 
during which awards of attorney's fee had been precluded by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson.254 
Tort damages are available under the EHA 1) when an administrator 
refuses to initiate a procedural remedy and therefore acts in bad faith, and 2) 
when a child's physical health has been endangered by a denial of services.255 
In Anderson, the court held that, with these twq exceptions, monetary 
damages are not available under the EHA: 
251 Agnostine v. School Dist. of Philadelphia 527 A.2d 193 (Pa. Commonwealth, 1987). 
252 Burr bv Burr v.Ambach. 863 F.2d 1071 (2nd Cir., 1988), at 1078. 
253 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman. 101 S.Ct., at 1540. 
254 Hvmes v. Harnett Co.. 664 F.2d 410 /19811: Moore v. Warwick Public School Dist.. 794 
F.2d 322 (8th Cir..19861: Silano v. Tirozzi. 651 F.Supp. 1021 (D.Conn., 1987); Gary B. v. Cronin. 
542 F.Supp. 102 (N.D.III., 1980); Moore v. District of Columbia. 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir., 1990); 
yet see Dodds v. Simpson. 676 F.Supp. 1045 (D.Or., 1987). 
255 Anderson v. Thompson. 658 F.2d 1205 (Cal. 7th, 1981): Hawaii v. Katherine P.. 727 F.2d 
809 (1983); Timms v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Wabash Ctv.. 718 F.2d (1983); Powell V. PefQre, 
699 F.2d 1078 (C.A. Ga., 1983); and Miener v. Special School District of St. Louis Co.. 580 
F.Supp. 562 (1984). 
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[A] damage remedy is not... generally consistent with the goals of this 
statute. When a school district makes a good faith effort to provide a 
child with an appropriate education, we do not believe that as a general 
rule it is a good policy to require that a school district pay money 
damages if it later turns out that a different programming decision 
should have been made fAnderson v. Thompson. 658 F.2d 1205 (Cal. 7th, 1981), 
at 1213]. 
The limitations were further clarified in a statement which affirmed that the 
EHA "was intended in most cases to provide only injunctive relief as a final 
procedural safeguard that would ensure an appropriate educational program 
for a handicapped child."256 
The avoidance of damages remedy (beyond the awarding of attorney's 
fees) is consistent with Congress' intent to allow the limited financial 
resources of states to be spent on the education of handicapped children 
rather than on damages.257 This will remain an issue with those parents who 
feel that the quality of their child's education was significantly affected by the 
decision-making errors of school personnel. 
Ordinarily, there is no duty under the EHA to furnish a free appropriate 
public education to a student over the age of 21.2S8 However in Burlington. 
the Supreme Court held that local authorities could be made to reimburse 
parents for costs of special education, paid by the parents, that should have 
been furnished under the EHA.25' Another court stated: 
256 Anderson v. ThompsorT658 F.2d 1205 (Cal. 7th, 1981) at 1210. 
257 Smith v. Robinson 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984) at 3472. 
258 Timms v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Wabash Ctv- 718 F.2d (1983) and Georgia ARC v 
McDaniel. 740 F.2d 902 (11th Cir.. 1984) 105 S.Ct. 1228 (1985). 
259 Georgia ARC v. McDaniet 105 S.Ct. at 2003. 
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We cannot believe EHA-eligible children may obtain relief only if the 
parents have the financial resources to pay initially for services 
wrongfully denied under the EHA. Rather, we conclude that [children] 
are entitled to be provided with compensatory educational services, 
funded with state monies, if necessary, to "compensate" them for any 
services wrongfully denied under the EHA fWhite v. State. 240 Cal.Rptr. 732 
(Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1987), at 742]. 
Compensation 
When the provisions for a free appropriate public education have been 
denied to a handicapped child, reimbursement or compensation may be 
awarded. Parents who wish reimbursement must request it in a timely 
fashion, although P. L. 94-142 does not expressly place a time limit for the 
filing of such petitions.260 
When school personnel recommend placement in a facility outside of 
the local education agency's region, the costs are usually handled between the 
school system and agency. However, the system is liable for costs when the 
parents' unilateral placement of their child is proven to be appropriate and 
necessary. The parents may receive reimbursement for initial and subsequent 
costs to educate their child in that facility.261 
States must fund programs to ensure a free appropriate public 
education, even when annual state and federal appropriations are considered 
inadequate.262 If a local or state agency agrees that the placement is 
appropriate, the parents, or their insurance agency, cannot be obliged to bear 
260 in the Matter of Savio, 537 N.Y.s.2d 262 (A.D.2 Dept., 1989). 
261S-1 and S-2 v. Spanaler. 650 F.Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C., 1986), 
262 Kerr Center Parents Association v. Charles. 842 F.2d 1052 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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part of the cost.2" This is critical with a child who will require extensive 
and/or expensive services where insurance policies may have a maximum 
ceiling of expenses allowed during the lifetime of an individual. In many 
cases, these policies can be quickly exhausted before a child reaches his/her 
first decade. Some states have attempted to utilize a "sliding scale" for excess 
costs based upon parental income. This concept of "relative responsibility" 
denies parents their right to a free appropriate public education.264 Still other 
states have requested parents to relinquish custody of children to the state 
welfare department in order for the children to qualify and receive state 
tuition grants and other federal aid. This practice allowed states access to 
other funding, thus decreasing the cost for placing students in private 
programs when no public education programs were available.265 This practice 
is no longer allowed. 
By the same token, if parents and school personnel have agreed to an 
IEP which includes a medical service to be covered by insurance, an insurance 
company, as a third party, lacks the standing to file suit, as P. L. 94-142 was 
designed to provide guidelines for parents, school personnel, and 
handicapped children.266 
The educational costs of serving a handicapped child must be 
presumed to be the responsibility of the local education agency unless proven 
263 Seals v. Loftis. 614 F.Supp. 302 (D.C. Tenn., 1985) and Laura v. Providence School 
Board. 680 F.Supp. 66 (D.R.I., 1988). 
264 Parks v. Pavkovic. 557 F.Supp. 1280 (1983). 
265 Kruse v.Campbell. 431 F.Supp. 180 (Va., 1971), and Christopher T. bv Broana v. San 
Francisco Unified School Dist.. 553 F.Supp. 1107 (Cal, 1982). 
266 Gehman v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co.. 702 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa., 
1989), and Allstate Insurance Company v. Bethlehem Area School District 678 F.Supp. 1132 
(E.D. Pa., 1987). 
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otherwise, since special education is to be of no cost to the parent. Jurisdiction 
conflicts between agencies cannot be used as a reason to block a handicapped 
child's right to a free appropriate public education.267 The educational service 
to the handicapped child must take precedence over any disagreement about 
responsibility. 
Summary of the Tudicial Rulings 
Based on an analysis of these cases, the trends suggest that the courts 
support schools if litigation centers on methodology and, for the most part, 
the amount of special education services to be provided. The higher judicial 
courts have expressed reluctance to interpret school policies and procedures 
in which school boards have authority. However, when constitutional issues 
of the handicapped are in question, the judiciary have not hesitated to 
become involved.268 
Until recently, a parent had to "exhaust all administrative remedies," 
including the request of a due process hearing prior to initiating litigative 
action. The child, too, could not be unilaterally placed in a school selected by 
the parent without following these procedures unless 1) the child's physical 
health was endangered or 2) there was proof that the school had acted in bad 
faith. However, this "stay put" interpretation upon which school systems 
often relied, even to the extent of forestalling final discussions, is no longer 
the rule. The Supreme Court found that unilateral placement is permissible 
267 Rabinowitz v. N.J. State Board of Education. 550 F.Supp. 481 (D.C. N.J., 1982): Parks v. 
Pavkovic. 557 F.Supp. 1280 (1983): and Catlin bv Catlin v. Sobol. 553 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (A.D. 3d 
Dept., 1990). 
Z68Bryson and Bentley (1980), p. 134. 
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if such transfers are later determined to be in the child's best interest, and 
parents can receive reimbursement for tuition costs.269 
The judicial courts will always rule in favor of the parents if not all 
procedural and due process rights have been followed by the schools. Some 
of the most glaring oversights by school systems that have caused the courts 
to automatically support parents have centered on the individualized 
education program. Parent involvement in the development of the IEP is 
essential at all times; parents are not to be handed a final finished document 
to sign without opportunity for comment, additions, modifications, or 
discussion of the IEP. All documents must be dated, so that at any point in 
time there is evidence as to when a document was written and then added to 
the exceptional child's confidential file. If the parents are dissatisfied with the 
preferred proposed placement by the school, an alternative placement 
proposal must be made in writing, even if school personnel have evidence or 
feelings that the alternative proposal is not as suitable to meet the student's 
special education needs. Exploring alternatives and reasons for reaching this 
decision is part of the IEP committee's decision-making process. 
If there is a legitimate question as to whether or not a child's 
discrepancies in academic or behavioral performance are of the intensity, 
frequency, or duration to be considered "exceptional," it is best to identify the 
student as exceptional if it is at all possible and if the guidelines for 
qualification are being met. The rationale for this is that if, through litigation, 
the child is later found to be an exceptional child, the parents will be able to 
269 School Committee of theTown of Burlington v. Department of Education of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. #84-433. 
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claim denial of access to due process rights available only to exceptional 
children. This may result not only in legal obligations by school officials to 
provide educational services dating back to the original request for a hearing, 
but also in financial obligations for payment of tuition and attorney's fees. 
When witnesses are used to support documents, findings, and committee 
decisions, the courts seem to lean more toward testimony given by physicians 
and teachers in reaching their decisions. Testimony by school administrators, 
including special education directors, principals and superintendents, and 
support witnesses consisting of psychologists and psychiatrists, are least likely 
to be considered. 
Related services have expanded in scope, and require school personnel to 
provide special environmental conditions, such as air-conditioning, and 
health care, which includes suctioning and catheterization. The basic rulings 
have been that related services which may be carried out by an individual 
other than a physician can be considered a related health service. Most of the 
services may be performed by a school nurse or "otherwise qualified person." 
This still leaves the door open to further interpretation. Other services that 
may require litigation could include the administration of insulin or even 
dialysis treatment at school. Related services necessary for a child to benefit 
from an education and that require little time to perform will probably be part 
of a special education program. 
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Summary 
Historically, children's rights, including the rights for the handicapped, 
were severely limited until recent times. The judicial system first had to 
establish determinants which described basic rights for minors. Subsequently, 
the rights of students have expanded through new laws. The creation of two 
legislative acts, P. L. 94-142 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, has most 
greatly formed special education today. The subsequent judicial 
interpretations of these laws have shaped the definition of quality of special 
education. 
When the laws were first passed, the issue cited in subsequent filings 
on behalf of handicapped children was to prevent the denial of and exclusion 
from receiving any form of special education in the public schools. A single 
determinant for defining quality of special education was measured by the 
presence or absence of an educational program. During the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the litigation changed as more and more parents and school 
personnel disagreed oyer interpretations of what constituted a "free and 
appropriate public education." 
The majority of cases being litigated in the courts today focus on the 
IEP. It is through the IEP that parents and school personnel jointly plan a 
working document which is designed to meet the needs of the exceptional 
child. Topics which are most actively addressed in litigation include more 
detailed definitions of what constitutes quality in special education programs 
and services. Curriculum and methodology of teaching have been 
challenged. These issues are usually left to local school boards to ultimately 
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decide what is appropriate. 
The amount and type of services are also highly debated. Rowley has 
placed some limitations on the quality of services parents can expect for their 
handicapped child. One measurement is to determine if the child has been 
offered an opportunity to learn; the appropriateness of the program can be 
measured legally if the child is able to show improvement. 
The Rowley ruling has also reshaped the concept of quality special 
education nationwide. The phrase, "to maximize a child's potential/' is a 
higher quality standard than required by federal law. Several states, though, 
have statutes which specifically demand this higher level of a "free 
appropriate public education." 
Parents and educators often disagree with the setting or location of the 
special education program offered. Conflicts arise over the variety and 
amount of services offered; the composition of class membership and teacher-
pupil ratio; the length of the school day and school year; and the least 
restrictive environment. The issue of regression and recoupment needs to be 
carefully addressed when planning an IEP, particularly if special services are 
only offered during the length of a traditional school year. There appears to 
be a direct relationship between the need for an extended school year and the 
severity of the child's handicapping condition. 
While Rowley narrowed the legal obligation, or definition, of 
providing quality special education services, the component of related 
services has continued to expand through judicial rulings. The list of 
supportive services that may be defined as a related service continues to grow. 
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A related service may be any supportive activity that is necessary in 
order to allow a handicapped child to benefit from public education. 
Typically, it is related to the special education needs of the child, but related 
services may be offered alone if, in doing so, it allows the child to participate 
in public education. Another acceptable interpretation is that the denial of 
the related service would cause the handicapped child harm or prevent him 
from receiving a free and appropriate public education. The primary 
restriction for obtaining a related service is that it must not be a service which 
can only be provided by a physician. Thus, there is an interesting pattern 
which is occurring as a result of these rulings. While "quality" in special 
education is being more narrowly defined in many ways, it is being balanced 
in part by the expansion of the definitions of related services. 
Generally, if the special education committee can demonstrate that all 
due process procedures were followed, and show that the IEP is a workable 
plan which contains all of the components required by law to enable the child 
to make progress in the least restrictive environment, the quality of the 





In the Review of the Literature, it was discussed how both legislative 
actions and judicial rulings define and determine what constitutes quality in 
special education programs and services. Other forces which significantly 
impact on developing and refining a philosophical, political, and sociological 
framework and organization of what is considered quality special education 
are the opinions of acknowledged experts on special education in higher 
education settings and special education administrators in public schools. 
These populations assume key roles in forming concepts, processes, and 
procedures that affect the quality of special education services, and then 
overseeing the application of these skills and procedures in the field. One of 
the initial steps which eventually leads to a resulting change in the quality of 
a program or service is the acknowledgement that the quality needs to be 
improved. 
The foundations to reshape social inequity, and in this case, education 
for the handicapped, are developed by individuals who then propose some 
standards, or policies. From these policies, which are intended to support 
social beliefs, legislation is drafted. 
Through legislation and the subsequent litigation, a framework for a 
working definition of quality in special education can be analyzed. After the 
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policies and supportive law have been written, another group must carry out 
these laws: these are practitioners in the field. 
Three groups of individuals were selected to determine how they 
perceive the design of special education programs and its definition of quality. 
The groups are represented by their contribution to the development of (1) 
policies and procedures in special education; (2) legislation and judicial 
interpretation of special education law; and (3) practices which help 
implement quality services in special education. 
Subjects 
Group 1: Policy Group 
The first group was primarily comprised of professors of special 
education at institutions of higher education who were chosen on the basis of 
their national reputations and interests. These individuals have 
demonstrated an interest in subjects which address special education policy 
and procedures in relationship to defining issues of quality special education. 
A list of authors of published articles since 1983 was compiled from the 
following journals: Exceptional Children, Exceptional Education Quarterly. 
the Journal of Special Education, and Teacher Education and Special 
Education. Authors were selected based upon the relevance of the published 
article to this dissertation study. In addition to professors, this group included 
leading authorities in professional and governmental special education 
organizations who help formulate and implement policy. 
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Additional members of this group were suggested by three nationally 
recognized leaders .in special education policy. Altogether, 48 individuals, 
recognized as leaders in the development of special education policies and 
procedures, were selected from this compilation. The draft of names selected 
was reviewed by two professors at institutions of higher education who were 
familiar with the purpose of this study. Recommendations for further 
additions, deletions, or other modifications of this first list of proposed 
participants were solicited, and no changes were suggested. A participation 
rate of 30 was sought for this group. 
Group 2: Law Group 
The second group in this study was comprised of participants who have 
demonstrated an expertise in legal issues of special education. Participants 
selected are established university personnel with a law degree and/or 
individuals who have a specific interest in legislation and litigation 
pertaining to children and the rights of the handicapped. Attorneys who 
specialize in special education litigation and are employed as consultants to 
educational organizations or adjunct professors of institutions of higher 
education also are included in this group. 
The participants in this group were selected using the same procedures 
as the first group. A search was conducted using special education literature 
to identify authors of published articles that relate to this study. In addition to 
special education journals, a review of authors of articles on legal issues in 
special education published in West's Education Law Reporter was completed 
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to form the initial group membership. Additional names were added based 
upon the recommendations of two nationally recognized lawyers who 
specialize in special education law. This proposed list, along with the list of 
policy members, was submitted for review by the two professors who were 
familiar with the purpose of this study. A list of 44 names was submitted for 
this group. Four additional names were suggested and approved by both 
reviewers. Of the 48 names, a participant rate of 30 was desired. 
An additional list of 74 chairpersons from universities that offer 
doctoral degree programs in special education was available for alternate 
participants for both the policy and law groups, but it was not needed. 
Group 3: Directors Group 
The third group was selected to represent practitioners in the field. 
Forty Program Administrators for Exceptional Children in North Carolina 
were chosen. This group of special education directors was comprised of 
individuals who have participated in North Carolina's Program Quality 
Evaluation (PQE) review. This self-monitoring instrument assists special 
education directors and support staff to analyze the quality of special 
education programs in their local school administrative units. 
This third group of participants, then, had chosen previously to become 
more knowledgeable and to gain expertise in analyzing quality in special 
education. These special education directors have attempted to develop plans 
to enhance and improve their school system's current level of quality of 
special education services. As such, they have indicated an interest and desire 
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in reviewing issues of quality in special education, and as practitioners, they 
have studied special education and issues of quality in a public school setting. 
While this group was representative of a state and the other two groups were 
composed of individuals drawn from a national population, the directors 
demonstrated expertise and experience with issues of quality of special 
education and could be considered as representing the practitioners in the 
field. 
As of January, 1990, the North Carolina Department of Education 
reported 134 school administrative units. Since 1983, when the Program 
Quality Evaluation instrument was first developed, a total of 49 special 
education directors have participated in reviews. 
The North Carolina Education Directory (1989-90) showed that 40 of the 
special education directors who conducted their on-site PQE between 1983 and 
1989 were still employed in the same school system. A participant rate of 30 
was sought for this group. 
In summary, three groups of participants were selected: 1) a policy 
group; 2) a law group; and 3) a special education directors' group. A 
participation rate of 30 for each group was sought, with a desired total number 
of subjects equaling 90. 
Questionnaire Development 
In a review of the literature on special education and the quality of its 
scope and services, the fundamental analysis of its identity was found in the 
three legislative enactments of Public Law 94-142, Section 504 of the 
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Vocational Rehabilitation Act, and Public Law 99-457. The statutes in each 
provide the foundation from which special education quality is defined. A 
major focus of the Rehabilitation Act is to define the term "handicapped," 
while P. L. 94-142 classifies children by handicapping categories; describes 
special education and related services; the process by which children are 
identified and served; and the due process and procedural safeguards which 
are available to protect the rights of these children. Public Law 99-457 expands 
the educational rights of handicapped children to include those who are 
infants and preschoolers. 
An initial review of the three laws and cross-referencing of £ach 
section and subsection yielded a pool in excess of 100 components which were 
selected because they represent a value or quality issue. At the same time, a 
review was made of more than 225 cases which were litigated based upon 
issues concerning special education services and their quality. These cases 
have been reported in the Review of the Literature. 
The statutes pertaining to quality were then cross-matched to the 
statutes identified through the review of the litigated cases, and 73 
components were identified by statute reference. 
Public Law 94-142 is the most comprehensive of the three laws, and it 
was used as a framework to organize the preliminary questionnaire. Public 
Law 94-142 is organized by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) into seven 
subparts (Part 300 of 34 CFR). The Rehabilitation Act is similarly codified 
under Part 104 of 34 CFR into seven subparts. Since the primary function of 
Public Law 99-457 is to address the expansion of services to infants and 
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preschoolers, references to its scope was condensed into the language of the 
other two acts, which simplified the questionnaire's construction. 
A total of eight general headings based upon the actual subparts of the 
CFR were identified as topics which address special education quality and 
have been through judicial review. They are: (a) general provisions; (b) 
content; (c) individualized education programs; (d) private schools; (e) due 
process; (f) evaluation procedures; (g) least restrictive environment; and (h) 
non-discrimination. 
From these eight headings, 19 subheadings were identified based on the 
CFR codes. These subheadings are: 
(1) Purpose 
(2) Free Appropriate Public Education 
(3) Handicapped Children 
(4) Related Services 
(5) Participation in Regular Education Programs 
(6) Timeliness 
(7) Participants in Meetings 
(8) Parent Participation 
(9) Content of the IEP 
(10) Accountability 
(11) Placement by Parents 
(12) LEA Responsibility 
(13) Prior Notice 
(14) Parent Consent 
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(15) Evaluation Procedures 
(16) Continuum of Alternative Placements 
(17) Placements 
(18) Equal Opportunity 
(19) Accessibility 
By reviewing each of the 73 components and the 19 subheadings, it was 
found that some of the requirements cited shared similar language. As a 
result, those components with similar references were collapsed into singular 
statements; the citation code was retained for cross-referencing purposes. 
These citations were then combined, allowing the total number of statements 
to be reduced to 39. 
In summary, an initial comparison of the statute references in special 
education cases which have been reviewed by the courts yielded 73 items 
which relate to issues of quality of special education. Many of the 73 items 
contained similar language or components from the three major acts. As a 
result of their similarities, several statutes were paired with one another to 
form single statements. Multiple references, then, were noted after each 
statement, and show each citation code. This process of compiling and 
regrouping allowed the questionnaire design to be more manageable, more 
simple, and less time-consuming for the participants, yet it contained all of 
the relevant statute citations. The statements were placed under the 8 
headings and their 19 corresponding subheadings drawn from the Code of 
Federal Regulations. The 39 statements formed the basic framework of the 
questionnaire (See Appendix A). 
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This draft was reviewed by two professors and two officials from a state 
education agency. The four individuals selected were familiar with special 
education legislation and the purpose and intent of this study. Based on their 
recommendations, the actual items to be included, the general design, and 
demographic data collected were completed as a final draft. 
Content and Construct Validity 
A thorough and systematic review of both the statutes cited in legal 
cases and the actual content of the three legislative acts was completed, as 
described previously in this chapter. An informal grid revealed a pattern for 
representation, which led to the groupings by headings and subheadings. 
Each item classified was based on its ability to be a factor which addresses 
quality in special education and whose presence or lack of presence at a 
particular value level in a child's special education services has resulted in 
litigation. The outcome of these reviews generated a preliminary 
questionnaire, which in turn was inspected by four reviewers. The design of 
the questionnaire was then validated by a pilot study, to be discussed later. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was comprised of three parts (see Appendix A). The 
first section contained the 39 referenced quality statements. The statements 
have been organized to allow the participants to rate each item based upon 
the following questions: 
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1) To what degree is this item currently used as an indicator of quality 
special education services? 
2) How important is this item now in defining quality special 
education services? 
3) To what degree will this item be used in the future in defining 
what is quality special education? 
4) How important will this item be in the future in defining quality 
special education? 
The four questions comprised a grid which allowed the participants to 
respond to these components for each item, thus ranking the item for its 
value based upon (1) current use, (2) current importance, (3) future use, and 
(4) future importance. 
The participants were asked to rank each item, using a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 0 to 4, with a score of zero indicating no value or use, and a 
score of 4 showing the item is of very high value or use. The individuals 
then scored each item statement four times, thus recording a) its current use 
as an indicator of quality; b) its current importance as an indicator of quality; 
c) its future use as an indicator; and d) its future importance in defining 
quality special education services. 
The second section of the questionnaire asked the participants to 
review the 39 items and then select the five statements perceived to be the 
most important from the list in defining quality special education. The 
function of this second section was to further clarify and rank the participants' 
choices of these indicators of quality in special education. 
147 
After the five statements were selected, the participants were asked to 
rank the items and assign a comparative weighted value to the five chosen 
statements. The weighted score allowed for the five statements should total 
100. 
The final section of the questionnaire included demographic data from 
the participants, which requested their (1) number of years of experience, 
(2) sex, and (3) highest degree achieved. 
Pilot Study Procedure 
Four regional coordinators for exceptional child programs in North 
Carolina were selected to review the preliminary questionnaire form. A 
sample survey form was mailed to them, along with a cover letter and 
comment sheet. The regional coordinators were requested to review the 
survey instrument, complete it, and note if any directions or statements were 
unclear. They were also asked to indicate the time required to complete Part 
A and Part B of the survey, and to make any suggestions for modifications of 
the instrument as a whole. Three of the four coordinators participated and 
returned the preliminary survey. No statements were reported to be unclear, 
and no modifications were suggested. 
A preliminary survey sample was then conducted to provide a study to 
improve the instrument and to assist with its validation. Directors of special 
education in western North Carolina public schools were selected for the 
sample group. 
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At a fall regional meeting of directors of special education, held on 
September 20, 1989,16 participants were given a copy of the survey 
instrument and instructed to note the length of time needed to complete it. 
A cover sheet was also provided to the participants to comment about the 
design and to make suggestions for improvement. From their suggestions, 
the questionnaire was renamed Special Education Quality Survey. 
All 16 completed the initial form at the meeting. They were also given 
a second copy of the survey form and asked to complete and return it within 
one week. At the end of one week, only 5 survey forms (posttests) had been 
returned. A follow-up letter was then mailed, and from Day 10 to Day 17, an 
additional 9 surveys were received. After 30 days, a 100% return rate was 
attained. 
Data Analysis of the Sample Survey Study 
During the pretest, the time required to complete the initial survey 
ranged from 11 minutes to 55 minutes. The mean and mode were both 20 
minutes. The time required for the posttest was not calculated. 
In Part A, all 39 items were reviewed, and a pre/post correlation of .772 
was found (see Table 1), indicating a reasonable degree of test-retest reliability. 
Part B asks the participant to select five indicators from the survey that 
are most important in defining quality in special education. The purpose of 
Part B is to further clarify the participants' perception of ranked importance of 
the statements. A rank order correlation of .784 was obtained for the Part B 
pretest and part B posttest scores. 
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Table 1 
Pre/Post Analysis of Sample Survey Study 
Item #* Covariance Correlation R-squared 
1 1A .589 .853 .727 
2 IB .28 .878 .771 
3 1C .309 .801 .642 
4 2A .555 .804 .647 
5 2B .516 .748 .56 
6 2C .36 .786 .618 
7 2D .67 .789 .623 
8 2E .457 .767 .588 
9 2F .499 .761 .578 
10 3A 1.047 .89 .792 
11 4A .913 .81 .656 
12 4B .421 .776 .602 
13 4C .378 .779 .607 
14 4D .346 .113' .598 
15 4E .297 .775 .601 
16 SA .398 .81 .657 
17 6A .213 .797 .634 
18 6B .264 .79 .624 
19 7A .123 .907 .822 
20 7B .242 .813 .662 
21 8A .291 .818 .668 
22 9A .391 .803 .645 
23 9B .398 .867 .751 
24 10A .889 .819 .67 
25 10B .572 .85 .723 
26 11A .898 .804 .647 
27 12A 1.012 .871 .758 
28 13A .285 .769 .591 
29 14A .887 .871 .759 
30 15A .12 .751 .564 
31 15B .026 .349 .122 
32 16A .258 .758 .59 
33 16B .308 .848 .72 
34 16C .333 .783 .613 
35 17A .109 .508 .258 
36 17B .236 .754 .568 
37 17C .066 .297 .088 
38 18A .31 .722 .596 
39 19A .245 .762 .58 
* Items are listed both in numerical order and by survey name sequence 
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Further inspection was desired. For simplification, the item responses 
were divided into 3 groups: the items which were in the top 13 for high 
frequency and high values were assigned a score of H (H= high); those items 
which fell in the 2nd group (ranked 14-26) were given a score of M 
(M=medium)/ and those ranked in the bottom third (27 -39) received a score 
of L (L=low). A comparison between pre and post rankings was then made. 
Of the 39 items, only 2 items changed group rankings between the pre and 
post test scores. The other 37 items remained the same; that is, an item that 
was ranked High in the pretest was also ranked High in the posttest, and an 
item that was ranked Medium in the pretest was also ranked Medium in the 
posttest (See Table 2). 
In summary, the sample survey indicated that there was both content 
and construct validity of the instrument. In addition, the instrument was 
sensitive enough to identify those items felt to be of high, moderate, or little 
importance in determining quality of special education. Within the range of 
responses, the instrument best reflected indicators of issues of quality at both 
ends (high and low value) and was less sensitive in the moderate range. 
Distribution of the Survey 
The surveys and an accompanying cover letter explaining the purpose 
of the study were mailed to selected participants on February 20,1990. By May 
20,1990, the minimal participation rate desired for each group (N = 30) was 
achieved. As of June 1,1990, a final participation rate of 94 was reached 
(Directors Group: N=33; Policy Group: N = 31; and Law Group: N = 30). 
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Table 2 
Comoarative Rankings:* Part A and Pre/Post Part B 
PartB: Mean Rank- Part B: Mean Rank-
Item # Section # Part A: Mean Rank Pretest Posttest 
1 1A 26 M 26 M 25 M 
2 IB 1 7 H 5 H 6 H 
3 1C 21 M 20 M 16 M 
4 2A 33 L 28 L 27 L 
5 2B 30 L 33 L 36 L 
6 2C .17 M 16 M 21 M 
7 2D 32 L 23 M 26 M 
8 2E 25 M 22 M 23 M 
9 2F 29 L 32 L 33 L 
10 3A 3 39 L 39 L 39 L 
11 4A 37 L 38 L 35 L 
12 4B 28 L 21 M 19 M 
13 4C 4 24 M 31 L 29 L 
14 4D 27 L 27 L 34 L 
15 4E 31 L 34 L 30 L 
16 5A 5 23 M 14 M 20 M 
17 6A 15 M 19 M 14 M 
18 6B 
0 
4 H 3 H 4 H 
19 7A 1 H 2 H 2 H 
20 7B 
/ 
6 H 10 H 5 H 
21 8A 8 14 M 13 H 11 H 
22 9A Q 19 M 15 M 15 M 
23 9B 18 M 17 M 22 M 
24 10A i n 38 L 30 L 32 L 
25 10B 
1U 
22 M 25 M 17 M 
26 11A n 34 L 35 L 31 L 
27 12A 12 35 L 36 L 37 L 
28 13A 13 16 M 29 L 24 M 
29 14A 14 36 L 37 L 38 L 
30 15A t s 3 H 4 H 3 H 
31 15B 
1J 
2 H 1 H 1 H 
32 16A 11 H 8 H 8 H 
33 16B 16 13 H 18 M 18 M 
34 16C 8 H 7 H 9 H 
35 17A 10 H 12 H 7 H 
36 17B 17 20 M 24 M 28 L 
37 17C 5 H 9 H 12 H 
38 18A 18 12 H 6 H 10 H 
39 19A 19 9 H 11 H 13 H 
•Rankings: 1-13 = High 14-26 = Medium 27-39 = Low 
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Data Analysis of the Survey 
For each group, data were collected for each item and the four fields of 
response. They were then placed in a statistical database computer system. 
The program Statview II was used to compute an analysis of variance for the 
three groups. For results that showed a significant difference in variance, the 
data for the three respondent groups were analyzed by the t test. ANOVA was 
then completed for each of the item responses among the three groups and 
four fields to determine if (a) the current use and importance were 
significantly related; (b) the future use and importance were significantly 
related; (c) the relationships between current use and future use; and (d) the 
relationship between current importance and future importance. 
ANOVA was then applied to the data and fields to determine if there 
were any relationships between the mean scores of each item within the 19 
subheadings or 39 statements. The three group scores for these statements 
were then compared to determine if there was any significant variance 
among the group responses. 
In Part B, an inspection was made of the project's responses of the 
rankings by item name for frequency and distribution patterns among the 
items both within each group and between each group selection. 
The final data analysis was computed based on the weighted scores of 
each of the 5 items selected for importance. A mean weighted for each group 
member and each item was calculated to determine its significant rank of 
importance. 
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In summary, the purpose of these procedures was to determine: (a) 
how each of the three groups defined quality in special education; (b) how 
they ranked the current and future use and its valued importance; (c) the 
relationship and significance of the items among one another and in clusters; 
(d) the identity and importance by priority of key items which were perceived 
to best measure quality in special education; and (e) the relationship and 
variance of responses and perceptions of quality in special education among 
the three groups who help formulate, design, and implement the policies and 
procedures or programs and services for special education students. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Overview 
In the introductory chapter, the relationship between the perceived 
need for educational change and educational quality was discussed. The 
process for implementing changes in special education to improve its quality 
shares some commonalities with regular education. What complicates the 
process of enacting special education reform is that there is a lack of definition 
of what constitutes quality special education. The difficult task of improving 
the quality of special education may be enhanced by determining what is 
perceived to be in need of change. By determining if there are some agreed-
upon central purposes and definitions of value, the process of achieving 
desired change to improve the quality of special education may be facilitated. 
One avenue for directing proposed reform is through the development 
of laws. Special education reform was initiated through a combination of 
legislative and judicial action, and the shape and refinement of its basic 
framework continues to be influenced by these forces. 
Other forces help shape and change the quality of special education. 
These include the opinions of acknowledged experts on special education in 
higher education settings and special education directors in public schools. 
Through their roles and responsibilities, they often help form concepts, 
processes, and procedures which affect the quality of special education and 
then oversee the application of this framework in the field. 
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In order to analyze how these forces influence the quality of special 
education, the following questions were posed: 
1. What is considered "quality special education?" 
A. How has legislation helped define quality special education? 
B. How have judicial rulings interpreted and further defined what is 
quality special education? 
C. How do nationally recognized experts in the field of special 
education define quality special education? 
D. How do special education directors in local administrative units 
define quality special education? 
2. - Are there any significant differences among legislative, judicial, and 
experts' definitions? 
3. Are there any significant differences between the current use of indicators 
of quality in special education and the predicted future use of these same 
indicators within each group? 
4. Are there any significant differences between the current use of indicators 
of quality in special education and the predicted future use of these same 
indicators among the three groups? 
5. Are there any significant differences between the current importance of 
indicators in defining quality and the predicted future importance of these 
same indicators within each group? 
6. Are there any significant differences between the current importance of 
indicators in defining quality and the predicted future importance of these 
same indicators among the three groups? 
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This chapter will describe and analyze the results of the review of the 
literature and the statistical tests applied to the collected data from the survey. 
Special Education Laws and their Influence on Quality of Special Education 
In the Review of the Literature, it was discussed how the various laws 
provided the foundation for special education and related services for the 
handicapped. The first of these laws to be passed, the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, prohibited discrimination. Almost immediately 
following it was P.L. 94-142, which provided funding and detailed descriptions 
of the requirements for establishing a free and appropriate public education. 
One of the components which monitors the quality of these services is 
provided to the parents of a handicapped child. Through due process, the 
parents have the right to challenge the proposed quality of service 
recommended by an educational committee. 
Until the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, parents were 
financially limited in challenging the special education services because 
attorney fees were not recoverable through P.L. 94-142. Following this 
enactment, the parental rights were extended conceptually, too, through the 
presence of the possibility of costs to schools for legal assistance. It appears 
that school personnel have been more willing to offer more services to avoid 
the expense of litigation. 
The range in the age of educational services to be provided to the 
handicapped was extended to include those children from birth to age five. 
The Education Handicapped Amendment, P.L. 99-457, covers all handicapped 
157 
infants and preschoolers, and mandates that assistance will be available 
beginning with the 1991-92 school year. 
The most recent law passed also expands the quality of services to the 
handicapped. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act required nondiscrimination 
of the handicapped in facilities which received federal monies. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act extends the requirement for non­
discriminatory practices to the private business sector. 
From these legislative acts, the possibility for improving the quality of 
life, including education, was greatly enhanced. The definition of quality in 
special education is interwoven with the framework that these laws provide. 
Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, which defines its version of 
"handicapped," is a companion to P.L. 94-142's definition, and the 
comprehensive details of educational services required and outlined in P.L. 
94-142 and P.L. 99-457 provide a necessary framework for determining the 
level of quality of special education. Because of these laws, educators are 
bound to comply with their components, so by their existence, legislation has 
helped define quality special education. Further details of the legislative 
components may be found in Chapter II. 
Tudicial Interpretations of Special Education Laws and Quality 
In addition to ensuring that handicapped children are provided the 
opportunity to receive special education services, the laws and the courts' 
subsequent rulings helped interpret and shape quality of special education. 
When the initial legislation was passed as a result of PARC and Mills, which 
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created some basic educational rights for the handicapped, the primary 
determinant for defining quality of special education was measured by the 
presence or absence of a special education program. The last decade has 
brought a significant change in the type of cases which is filed as the 
interpretation moves to more exacting and detailed clarifications of the 
components of these legislative acts. 
The majority of cases litigated in the courts today focus on components 
in the child's IEP. Whether the issue of disagreement relates to the location, 
the amount, or type of service proposed, the quality of the service more than 
iikely is being challenged. There are fewer and fewer cases being litigated 
which challenge compliance issues, such as procedures, parent participation, 
and due process rights. Most school personnel are aware of their 
responsibilities to ensure that they are in compliance with the regulations. 
A major exception to these compliance issues is time. School 
personnel continue to have difficulty with the timeliness of completing 
necessary evaluations for placement consideration. 
Another related issue to time is that a variation in the length of the 
school year needs to be considered in placement decisions, particularly for the 
more severely handicapped. Educational time missed because of suspensions 
or expulsion also impacts on the quality of special education, and it is not 
correctly practiced in many school units. 
A continuum of services must be offered, especially for the 
severely/profoundly handicapped and multihandicapped populations. A 
variety of related services is needed by handicapped students as they can affect 
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the quality of special education. Both of these services assist in the 
availability of special education in the least restrictive environment. 
Other issues which affect the quality of special education are more 
debatable, and the prevailing party is often determined by the specific needs of 
the handicapped child rather than by procedural issues. Additional 
components which have a direct bearing on quality have been addressed in 
the Review of the Literature. 
The rest of the questions posed by this study are addressed by an 
analysis of the survey answers. An overview of the demographics of the 
participants is provided first. It is followed by an analysis of the data from the 
surveys which addresses the remainder of the questions posed in this study. 
Each topic will be responded to in the order of sequence listed earlier. 
Demographic Traits of the Returns 
The survey requested demographic information from the respondents. 
This information included items pertaining to: 
(1) The number of years the participant has been actively associated 
with special education, 
(2) Sex, and 
(3) The highest academic degree received. 
A summary of the data may be found in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Demographics of Participants 
Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
(N = 33) (N = 31) (N = 30) 
Experience 
0-5 Yrs. 1 0 2 
6-10 Yrs. 7 1 3 
11-15 Yrs. 6 • 4 5 
15+Yrs. 19 26 20 
Sex 
Male 14 21 22 
Female 19 10 8 
Degree 
M.A. 0 5 1 
6th Yr. 25 0 0 
EdD/PhD 8 26 19 
JD or JD/PhD 0 0 10 
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Number of Years of Experience 
The data for number of years were itemized and clustered into groups 
covering a five-year span of experience. The responses indicated that 25%, 
84%, and 66% of the Directors group, Policy group, and Law group, 
respectively, have been actively associated with special education more than 
15 years, and only 3 of 94 participants reported that they have worked in some 
capacity with special education 5 years or less. 
Sexual Composition of the Groups 
The division between male and female participants was similar in the 
Policy and Law groups, with two-thirds of the participants in each group 
identified as male. The Directors group varied from the other two, with 42% 
male and 58% female. The total combined groups yielded a 60-40% ratio, 
male to female. 
Educational Levels 
The educational levels of the participants varied somewhat between 
groups, with twenty- four percent (24%) of the Directors group indicating 
doctoral degrees. All directors reported that they had obtained at least a 6th 
year or specialists degree (MA + 30), as required of special education directors 
by North Carolina regulations. Eighty-four percent (84%) of the Policy group 
and ninety-seven percent (97%) of the Law group reported doctoral level 
degrees. One-third (1/3) of the Law group listed that they had obtained a JD or 
both a PhD and and JD degree. 
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While the respondents were selected primarily for their interest in the 
concept of quality in special education, either through participation in 
program quality evaluation (Directors group) or published work which 
focuses on issues of quality in special education (Policy group and Law group 
participants), the demographic data verified that the participants who 
responded to the survey demonstrated the experience and training desired as 
survey participants. They represent the educational training levels and 
experience sought which supported their inclusion as knowledgeable 
individuals in the field of special education. 
Definition of Quality : Directors Group 
In Part A of the survey, the Directors group responded to the 39 
statements and assigned a value to each statement. The value range allotted 
was between 0 and 4, with "0" representing a statement perceived to be of no 
value and "4" perceived to be of highest value. The participants responded to 
each statement four times, indicating its value based upon (1) current use, (2) 
current importance, (3) future use, and (4) future importance. The statements 
are listed by item number (see Appendix A), and a summary of the mean 
scores for the three groups is listed in Table 4. 
In analyzing the mean scores by item for the Directors group, only four 
items received scores less than 2.0 when asked their value of current use in 
defining quality of special education. These indicators were: (1) item 7: free 
and appropriate public education for preschoolers; (2) item 10: current 
categorical definitions of "handicapped"; (3) item 24: accountability by staff 
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for IEP progress; and (4) item 26: availability of private school participation 
in public school special education. Twenty-five, or 64 % of the statements 
were assigned scores greater than 3.0 on their current use as indicators of 
quality. 
The mean values assigned to the statements' current importance as 
indicators ranged from 1.9 to 3.87. In addition to item 10 (categorical 
definitions of handicapped), which again received a mean score below 2.0, 
only 8 statements were given scores whose mean fell in the 2.0 to 2.9 range. 
Only 23% of the statements received mean scores less than 3.0. 
For future use, none of the items was given a value whose average 
yielded a score below 2.0, and 32 of the 39 items (82%), received mean scores 
equal to or above 3.0. Seven items received mean scores ranging from 2.1 to 
2.9, which indicated moderate assigned values. These items covered issues 
relating to free appropriate public education with special education and 
related services; the categorical definition of "handicapped"; cooperative 
services with personnel and handicapped children in private schools; and 
parent consent for anticipated changes in special education services. 
The items whose mean scores ranged from 2.0-2.9 as indicators of 
future use also received similar scores for the future importance in 




Means of Mean Scores 
Current Current Future Future 
Group Use Importance Use Importance 
Directors 2.984 3.317 3.355 3.348 
Policy 2.392 2.935 2.808 2.98 
Law 2.422 3.156 3.093 3.258 
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Table 5 
Directors Group Mean Scores 
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Definition of Quality : Policy Group 
In current use as an indicator of quality, only five items received a 
mean score of 3.0 or greater from the Policy Group. They were items 2,3,4,6, 
and 35. These items were considered by the group to be of most use in 
defining quality describe the general provisions outlined in P.L. 94-142: the 
right to special education and related services, the guarantee of a free, 
appropriate public education in a variety of settings, and evidence of 
procedures in place which insure these basic rights. 
Six items received mean scores below 2.0. With scores ranging from 
1.32 to 1.9, the topics reported to be of minimal use included: (1) nonacademic 
and extracurricular services (item 9); (2) the population that qualifies as 
handicapped (item 10); (3) provisions for medical related services (item 13); 
(4) IEP accountability (item 24); (5) the availability of private school 
participation with the public school special education plan (item 26); and (6) 
parental consent for changes in services (item 29). 
In contrast to whether these items are currently used as indicators of 
quality, the perception of value of the statements as currently important in 
defining special education quality varied. Twenty of the items, or slightly 
more than 50 %, received assigned values of 3.0 or greater, while only 4 items 
had mean scores below 2.0. The four items ranked lowest in value for current 
importance in defining quality were items 10, 24, 26, and 29, which were also 
assigned low values for current use. 
The two items which were marked low on current use, yet received 
higher scores on current importance, were items 9 (extracurricular activities) 
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and 13 (medical evaluative services). Item 9 received one of the highest 
mean scores on current importance. 
Column 3 asked the opinion of the statement's value based upon its 
future use as an indicator of quality. The same items which received low 
mean scores on current use and current importance also received low scores 
on future use of item's value in defining quality. Item 9, which discussed 
provisions for nonacademic and extracurricular activities, continued to 
receive a high mean score in this column, too. Only 28 percent of the 
statements received mean score values equal to or greater than 3.0, while only 
13% of the items received mean scores below 2.0. 
The final column of the survey asked the Policy group members to 
indicate each statement's value based upon its future importance. Over 50% 
received mean scores in excess of 3.0, while only 3 items were given values, 
when averaged, that yielded mean scores of less than 2.0. These were items 
10, 26, and 29. All 3 items were consistently appointed low values on all four 
columns. 
In summary, the Policy group perceived most of the items to be of 
moderate to high value in defining quality, and only three statements, item 
10: definition of handicapped children; item 26: private school participation; 
and 29: parental consent for changes in placement, received mean scores that 
consistently remained below 2.0 (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Policy Group Mean Scores 
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Definition of Quality: Law Group 
The mean scores of the Law group on the statements' current use as 
indicators of quality ranged from 1.7 to 3.23. Six items received mean scores 
of less than 2.0, while only 4 items received scores equal or greater than 3.0. 
The six items that received low values included issues relating to (1) 
extracurricular activities (item 9); (2) the definition of "handicapped"; (3) IEP 
accountability (item 24); (4) private school services (items 26 and 27); and 
(5) parent consent for changes in services (item 29). 
The items valued highest in current use for defining quality included 
issues relating to (1) free appropriate public education in grades K-12; (2) 
timeliness of IEP development; (3) parent participation in IEP meetings; and 
(4) written prior notice provided to parents of proposed services or changes in 
services. 
The perceptions of these statements' current importance increased 
when compared to the mean scores for current use. Only item number 24 
(IEP accountability) received a mean score of less than 2.0. Almost 75 percent 
of the statements' current importance received mean scores equal to or 
greater than 3.0. 
In assigning a value to each statement to indicate its future use, the law 
group again listed only item 24 (IEP accountability) with a mean score of less 
than 2.0. Twenty-five of the 39 statements (64%), received mean scores equal 
to or greater than 3.0 (Table 7), and 31 items were rated high (> 3.0) as 
important indicators in the future. 
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For a summary of how each group defined quality of special education 
based upon the values assigned to each statement and the four variables 
(current use; current importance; future use; and future importance), each 
mean score was assigned a descriptor based upon its numerical value. Items 
receiving a mean score of less than 2.0 were "low;" items with mean scores 
between 2.0 and 2.9 were "medium;" and items was a mean score of 3.0 or 
greater was given a "high." Tables 8A - 8D show how each group defined 
quality of special education based upon their ranked values of high (H), 
medium (M) and low (L) mean scores. 
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Table 7 
Law Group Mean Scores 
Item# Mean Item # Mean Item# Mean Item# Mean 
1.1 2.10 11.1 2.33 21.1 3.23 31.1 2.9 
1.2 3.51 11.2 2.86 21.2 3.66 31.2 3.7 
1.3 3.34 11.3 2.66 21.3 3.8 31.3 3.63 
1.4 3.58 11.4 2.93 21.4 3.86 31.4 3.76 
2.1 2.96 12.1 1.7 22.1 2.46 32.1 2.53 
2.2 3.46 12.2 2.93 22.2 3.23 32.2 3.6 
2.3 3.36 12.3 2.96 22.3 3.1 32.3 3.23 
2.4 3.46 12.4 3.33 22.4 3.23 32.4 3.46 
3.1 2.63 13.1 2.16 23.1 2.26 33.1 2.26 
3.2 3.2 13.2 2.73 23.2 3.2 33.2 3.43 
3.3 3.06 13.3 2.8 23.3 3.23 33.3 3.3 
3.4 3.06 13.4 2.73 23.4 3.46 33.4 3.63 
4.1 2.86 14.1 2.83 24.1 1.89 34.1 2.4 
4.2 2.66 14.2 3.03 24.2 1.61 34.2 3.53 
4.3 2.76 14.3 3.16 24.3 1.48 34.2 3.36 
4.4 2.7 14.4 3.03 24.4 1.66 34.4 3.66 
5.1 2.53 15.1 2.43 25.1 2.83 35.1 2.62 
5.2 2.8 15.2 3.1 25.2 3.63 35.2 3.72 
5.3 2.9 15.3 2.93 25.3 3.56 35.3 3.51 
5.4 2.8 15.4 3.13 25.4 3.73 35.4 3.82 
6.1 3.23 16.1 2.63 26.1 1.96 36.1 2.20 
6.2 3.33 16.2 3.4 26.2 2.64 36.2 3.41 
6.3 3.4 16.3 3.4 26.3 2.60 36.3 3.27 
6.4 3.3 16.4 3.6 26.4 2.75 36.4 3.55 
7.1 2.45 17.1 2.9 27.1 1.8 37.1 2.43 
7.2 3.16 17.2 3.1 27.2 2.7 37.2 3.33 
7.3 3.12 17.3 3.43 27.3 2.73 37.3 3.26 
7.4 3.29 17.4 3.26 27.4 3.0 37.4 3.46 
8.1 2.1 18.1 3.0 28.1 3.1 38.1 2.3 
8.2 3.16 18.2 3.33 28.2 3.4 38.2 3.56 
8.3 2.83 18.3 3.4 28.3 3.46 38.3 3.36 
8.4 3.26 18.4 3.36 28.4 3.43 38.4 3.76 
9.1 1.67 19.1 2.63 29.1 1.93 39.1 2.33 
9.2 3.13 19.2 3.23 29.2 2.13 39.2 3.5 
9.3 2.76 19.3 3.2 29.3 2.20 39.3 3.36 
9.4 3.16 19.4 3.33 29.4 2.31 39.4 3.76 
10.1 1.36 20.1 2.13 30.1 2.4. 
10.2 2.33 20.2 3.16 30.2 3.5 
10.3 2.53 . 20.3 2.96 30.3 3.26 
10.4 2.63 20.4 3.26 30.4 3.6 
. 1 = Current Use .2 = Current Importance .3 = Future Use .4 = Future Importance 
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Table 8A 
Ratings of Items by Current Use 
Item Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
1 H M M 
2 H H M 
3 H H M 
4 H H M 
5 M M M 
6 H H H 
7 L M M 
8 M M M 
9 M L L 
10 L L L 
11 M M M 
12 M M L 
13 M L M 
14 H M M 
15 H M M 
16 M M M 
17 H M M 
18 H M H 
19 H M M 
20 H M M 
21 H M H 
22 H M M 
23 H M M 
24 L L L 
25 H M M 
26 L L L 
27 M M L 
28 H M H 
29 M L L 
30 H M M 
31 M M M 
32 H M M 
33 H M M 
34 H M M 
35 H H M 
36 M M M 
37 H M M 
38 H M M 
39 M M M 
H = High (X >3.0) M = Medium (X = 2.0-2.9) L = Low (X <2.0) 
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Table 8B 
Ratings of Items by Current Importance 
Item Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
1 H H H 
2 H H H 
3 H H H 
4 H M M 
5 M M M 
6 H H H 
7 M H H 
8 H H H 
9 M H H 
10 L L M 
11 M M M 
12 H H M 
13 H M M 
14 H M H 
15 H H H 
16 H H H 
17 H M H 
18 H M H 
19 H M H 
20 H M H 
21 H H H 
22 H M H 
23 H M H 
24 M L L 
25 H H H 
26 M L M 
27 M M M 
28 H H H 
29 M L M 
30 H H H 
31 H H H 
32 H H H 
33 H H H 
34 H H H 
35 H M H 
36 H M H 
37 H M H 
38 H H H 
39 H H H 
H = High (X >3.0) M = Medium (X = 2.0-2.9) L = Low (X <2.0) 
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Table 8C 
Ratings of Items by Future Use 
Item Directors Group Policy Group * Law Group 
1 H M H 
2 H H H 
3 H H H 
4 M M M 
5 M M M 
6 H H H 
7 H H H 
8 H H M 
9 H M M 
10 M L M 
11 H M M 
12 H M M 
13 H L M 
14 H M H 
15 H M M 
16 H H H 
17 H M H 
18 H M H 
19 H M H 
20 H M M 
21 H H H 
22 H M H 
23 H M H 
24 M L L 
25 H M H 
26 M L M 
27 M M M 
28 H M H 
29 M L M 
30 H H H 
31 H H H 
32 H M H 
33 H M H 
34 H M H 
35 H H H 
36 H M H 
37 H M H 
38 H H H 
39 H H H 
H = High (X >3.0) M = Medium (X = 2.0-2.9) L = Low (X <2.0) 
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Table 8D 
Ratings of Items by Future Importance 
Item Dii'ectors Group Policy Group Law Group 
1 H H H 
2 H H H 
3 H H H 
4 M M M 
5 M M M 
6 H H H 
7 H H H 
8 H H H 
9 H H H 
10 M L M 
11 H M M 
12 H H H 
13 H M M 
14 H H H 
15 H H H 
16 H H H 
17 H M H 
18 H M H 
19 H M H 
20 H M H 
21 H H H 
22 H M H 
23 H H H 
24 M M L 
25 H H H 
26 M L M 
27 M M H 
28 H M H 
29 M L M 
30 H H H 
31 H H H 
32 H M H 
33 H H H 
34 H H H 
35 M M H 
36 H M H 
37 H M H 
38 H H H 
39 H H H 
= High (X >3.0) M = Medium (X = 2.0-2.9) L = Low (X <2.0) 
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Weighted Mean Scores 
In Part B of the survey, the participants were asked to select up to 5 
statements perceived to be of the highest value in defining quality special 
education and then assign a weighted point value to each, so that the total 
equaled 100. A summary of the results is listed in Tables 9 A - 9C. 
Directors Group 
Of the 39 items, each item was selected at least once by a participant, 
except for items 11,13, 24, and 27. The first two items addressed medical and 
health services, and item 24 defined IEP accountability; item 27 described LEA 
responsibility to private school. Four participants did not complete Part B. 
Item 16— participation in regular education; item 32— a continuum of 
alternative placements; and item 2 - free appropriate public education, were 
cited most frequently, and only item 2 received a mean score which far 
exceeded those assigned to the other items. 
Ml 
Table 9 A 
Summary of Part B: Weighted Importance of Indicators of Quality-Directors Group 
Frequency of 
Item # Weighted Point Value Response Mean 
1 145 7 20.71 
2 370 9 41.11 
3 50 3 16.16 
4 30 2 15.0 
5 40 2 20 
6 85 5 17 
7 30 2 15 
8 40 3 13.3 
9 20 1 20 
10 20 1 20 
11 * * — 
12 0 1 0 
13 * * -
14 20 1 20 
15 25 1 25 
16 260 12 21.66 
17 140 7 20 
18 30 2 15 
19 95 6 15.83 
20 10 1 10 
21 135 7 19.28 
22 110 4 27.5 
23 135 5 27 
24 * * -
25 175 8 21.87 
26 15 1 15 
27 * * --
28 30 3 10 
29 15 1 15 
30 145 8 18.12 
31 130 5 26 
32 245 12 20.41 
33 20 1 20 
34 50 3 16.6 
35 70 4 17.5 
36 100 4 25 
37 15 1 15 
38 60 3 20 
39 20 1 20 
* = Not Selected 
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Policy Group 
Eleven of the items were not selected at least once. They are as follows: 
Items 5,11,13 -15, and 36 all discussed aspects of related services. Items 19 and 
20 defined membership of IEP meetings, and items 26 and 27 discussed the 
rights of private school participation. The remaining item involved parent 
permission for evaluation. 
Items 16- regular education participation; 21-- parent participation; 
25- good faith efforts; and 38-- equal opportunity, were selected most 
frequently by this group. Items 8 and 9, which covered provisions for an 
equal opportunity to participate in a variety of educational and extra 
curricular activities, had the highest mean scores, but they were selected by 













Table 9 B 
Summary of Part B: Weighted Importance of Indicators of Oualitv-Policv Group 
Frequency of 
Item # Weighted Point Value Response Mean 
1 190 7 27.14 
2 165 7 23.57 
3 55 3 18.33 
4 65 3 21.66 
5 * * — 
6 140 6 23.33 
7 50 3 16.66 
8 65 2 32.5 
9 100 3 33.3 
10 25 2 12.5 
11 * * — 
12 85 5 17 
13 * * — 
14 * * — 
15 * * — 
16 175 9 19.44 
17 85 4 21.25 
18 20 1 20 
19 * * ~ 
20 * * — 
21 135 9 15 
22 114 6 19 
23 105 5 21 
24 20 1 20 
25 163 8 20.37 
26 * * — 
27 * * — 
28 50 3 16.66 
29 * * ~ 
30 35 2 17.5 
31 40 2 20 
32 110 6 18.3 
33 43 3 14.3 
34 30 2 15 
35 130 7 18.57 
36 * * — 
37 25 2 12.5 
38 175 8 21.87 
39 100 4 25 
* = Not Selected 
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Law Group 
The Law group had a similar number of items not selected by at least 
one participant. They were as follows: 
The items not chosen by any member of this group covered issues of related 
services; private school participation; due process rights; evaluation 
procedures; alternative placements for related services; and accessibility. 
Two items, statements # 2 (free appropriate public education) and # 21 (parent 
participation), were selected 12 times, although their mean point values for 
Part B were 26.91 and 18.75, respectively. Only one mean score exceeded item 
2— Item 28 (due process), but it was selected by only one individual. 
The Law group had the widest variability in scores for any one 
statement. Most statements had a weighted mean score range between 5 and 
15 points from its actual mean. Item 25 (good faith efforts) was the only item 
whose variability reported by any group exceeded this range. The participanf s 












Table 9 C 
Summary of Part B: Weighted Importance of Indicators of Oualitv-Law Group 
Frequency of 















































































* = Not Selected 
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Significant Differences Among Group Values 
In order to determine if there were any significant differences among 
groups for each item and the four variables (current use; current importance; 
future use; and future importance), an analysis of variance was conducted. 
The mean score, F, and P values were computed and recorded (Appendix B.l). 
Scheffe"s F test was then applied to the variance of the group means that 
were significantly different. See Table 10 for a summary of these differences. 
The total frequency of variance possible per group by statements and 
variables is 156 (39 statements X 4 variables). Based upon the mean scores of 
the 156 items, the following pattern was observed: 
1) The Directors group and Policy group showed significant differences 
of opinions from one another on 54 items. By column, the differences were 
as follows: 
Current Use 16 
Current Importance 6 
Future Use 17 
Future Importance 5 
Of the 54 items, only one item— current use of the availability of preschool 
programs- received a higher mean score from the Policy group than the 
Directors group. The Directors group consistently rated the other 53 items to 
be of greater value than those scores reported by the Policy group. 
2) The Directors group and the Law group showed significant differences of 
opinions on 16 items. Fifteen of these items showed differences in values for 
current use, while only 1 item varied for future use. Fourteen of the items in 
current use were rated higher by the Directors group. The Law group rated 
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the provision for preschool programs higher in current value than the 
Directors group. The other item, the accountability by professional for the 
child's progress on the IEP, was assigned a lower value by the Law group on its 
future use as an indicator of quality. 
3) The Policy group and Law group showed significant differences of 
opinions on 20 items. The differences were as follows: 
Current Use 1 
Current Importance 4 
Future Use 10 
Future Importance 5 
For reported values of current use, current importance, and future use, the 
Policy group indicated significant differences for the item that defines 
accountability based on the IEP. Another area that had significantly different 
responses was the future use and importance of medical services as indicators 
of quality. One complete subsection, that of the availability of alternative 
placements for both future use and importance, was consistently valued 
lower by the Policy group. The Policy group scores on these three items 
ranged from 2.54 - 2.80, though the Law group scores ranged from 3.26 - 3.82. 
Although there were significant differences of opinions for 90 of the 
156 possible responses, the differences of opinions of one group did not 
always indicate a similarity of opinions from the other two groups. The 
following pattern was noted based upon Table 10: 
1) If the item response for the Directors group was significantly 
different, the number of times the response was significantly different from 
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both groups was 12. Of the 12 items, 11 were differences in the rated value of 
their current use. The Directors group consistently gave higher value to 
survey items which described IEP components as possible quality indicators: 
timeliness in its development; the use of qualified participants; parent 
participation; content of the IEP; and accountability issues. The group also 
valued the current use of evaluation procedures at a higher rate than either 
group. 
2) If the item response for the Policy group was significantly different, 
the number of times the response was significantly different from both the 
Directors group and the Law group was 20. The Policy group consistently 
assigned lower values for the current use, current importance, and future use 
of the "good faith effort" component of the statutes. The future use and 
importance of medical services were also ranked lower when compared to 
both groups, and one subsection— the availability of alternative placements-
was assigned lower values for future use and future importance. 
3) If the item response for the Law group was significantly different, 
there were no items whose mean score values were significantly different 
from both groups. 
In summary, the Directors group consistently assigned higher values 
for all items (except preschool programs), whether the items' current use or 
importance or future use or importance was reported. In general, the Policy 
group ranked the items lowest among the three groups, and the Law group 
scored each item approximately mid-range in value from the other two 
groups. 
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The topics which received the most varied responses were the use of 
the IEP process, from the point of evaluation to placement meetings, and the 
use of the IEP to determine the effectiveness of services. The Directors group 
assigned the highest values of the three groups to statements which described 
components of the IEP, and the Policy group saw less importance and use of 
the IEP to measure effectiveness. The Policy group also perceived the current 
use and importance of the availability of a continuum of services with 
similar, but slightly lower value than the other two groups. However, they 
rated that its use and importance would decrease in the future. 
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Table 10 
Significant Differences Between Grouns for Item Response 
X1 to 1 E K la 1 F 2£ to X E 
1.1A 1.1B 5.301 21.3A 21.3B 6.803 32.2A 32.2B 6.15 
I.I A 1.1C 6.9887 21.3B 21.3C 4.544 32.2B 32.2C 3.766 
3.1A 3.1C 5.629 22.1A 22. IB 4.65 32.3A 32.3B 8.823 
22.1A 22.1C 7.266 
7.1A 7.1B 8.995 32.4A 32.4B 8.126 
7.1A 7.1C 4.816 22.2A 22.2B 5.3 32.4B 32.4C 3.982 
12.1 A 12.1C 5.46 22.3A 22.2B 5.271 33.3A 33.3B 8.755 
33.3B 33.3C 3.471 
13.1A 13.IB 5.307 23.1 A 23.IB 3.868 
23.1 A 23.1C 4.197 34.1 A 34. IB 8.219 
13.2A 13.2B 5.245 34.1 A 34.1C 4.444 
23.3A 23.3B 7.022 
13.3A 13.3B 11.794 34.3A 34.3B 9.53 
13.3B 13.3C 5.954 24.3A 24.3 B 4.769 
24.3A 24.3C 3.46 35.1A 35.1C 5.265 
13.4A 13.4B 11.321 , 
13.4B 13.4C 4.075 25.1A 25.IB 10.863 35.2 A 35.2B 7.586 
25. IB 25.1C 3.841 35.2B 35.2C 6.504 
17.1A 17.IB 4.686 
17.1A 17.1C 3.966 25.2A 25.2B 8.291 35.3A 35.3B 7.622 
25.2B 25.2C 3.881 35.3B 35.3C 4.402 
17.3A 17.3B 5.15 
25.3A 25.3B 16.629 35.4 A 35.4B 9.928 
18.1A 18.IB 13.629 25.3B 25.3C 9.724 35.4B 35.4C 9.928 
18.1A 18.1C 4.45 
28.1 A 28.1B 6.021 36.2A 36.2B 4.537 
18.3A 18.3B 13.181 36.2B 36.2C 4.167 
18.3B 18.3C 6.972 28.3A 28.3B 5.734 
28.3B 28.3C 4.739 36.3A 36.3B 6.75 
19.1 A 19.IB 7.916 36.3B 36.3C 4.083 
19.1A 19.1C 5.744 30.1 A 30. IB 8.767 
30.1 A 30.1C 10.746 3 6.4 A 36.4B 6.721 
19.2A 19.2B 5.922 36.4B 36.4C 6.721 
30.3A 30.3B 6.976 
19.3A 19.3B 7.308 37.1A 37.1C 6.219 
31.1A 31.IB 6.962 
I9.4A 19.4B 4.987 31.1A 31.1C 4.984 37.3A 37.3B 8.254 
37.3B 37.3C 3.411 
20.1 A 20. IB 4.045 31.3 A 31.3B 5.036 
20.1 A 20.1C 13.843 31.3B 31.3C 3.139 37.4A 37.4B 9.763 
37.4B 37.4C 6.703 
21.1A 21.IB 6.803 
1  X & Y  =  S u r v e y  I t e m #  ( 1 - 3 9 ) ;  . 1  =  C u r r r e n t U s e  . 2 =  C u r r e n t  I m p o r t a n c e  . 3 =  F u t u r e  U s e  . 4 =  F u t u r e  I m p o r t a n c e ;  
A= Directors Group B= Policy Group C= Law Group 
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Differences of Opinions Within Groups: Current Use and Future Use 
The respondents were asked to indicate a value for each statement 
based upon its current use as an indicator and also for its future use as an 
indicator of quality in special education. An analysis of variance revealed 
that there were differences of opinions within groups (See Appendix B.2) on 
several of the matched statements for current use and future use as indicators 
of quality. Further analysis was computed for each item based upon Scheffe"s 
F test for each group (Appendix B.3-B.5). 
The Directors group opinions varied on 21 of the 39 statements. That 
is, they reported that 21 of the statements which indicate quality in special 
education will change in value and will be of greater use in the future as 
indicators of quality special education. Except for 3 statements (3,4, and 17), 
all items were perceived to become more useful in the future, although the 
anticipated changes may have shown only minimal increases in value. 
These three statements involved free and appropriate education, and 
timeliness of writing the IEP. Although they were the only items that were 
assigned lower values, the decrease reported was minimal (c.Ol). 
An analysis of the Policy group responses showed that there was a 
significant increase in value assigned to a statement's current use as an 
indicator and its future use in 19 of the 39 statements, although 5 items— 4, 5, 
6,17, and 37— showed that they perceived a decrease in their value. The items 
were similar to the ones reporting decreases by the Directors group (items 4-6: 
free appropriate public education; and item 17: timeliness of IEP 
implementation), with the addition of a decrease reported in value for the 
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future use of alternative placements options, such as hospital and 
homebound services (item # 37). 
The Law group reported that 32 of the statements will be of greater use 
in the future in defining quality of special education. The variability of their 
scores based on current use and future use showed the widest range among 
the 3 groups. Only two items were perceived to decrease in importance: 
items 4 (FAPE) and 24. The value assigned to the issue of accountability of 
progress, as measured by the IEP, showed a moderate decrease (.04) between its 
current use and future use. 
Thus, the Directors group and Policy group indicate that there will be a 
significant difference between the current use and the future use of 54% and 
49%, respectively, of the statements. The Law group, however, indicated that 
82% of the statements will be more useful as indicators of quality in the 
future in comparison with their current use. A summary of the Differences 
Within Groups by item on their current use and future use for each item is 
found in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Significant Differences Within Groups for Current Use and Future Use By Item 







7 X X X 
8 X X X 
9 X X X 
10 X X X 
11 X X X 
12 X X X 
13 X X 
14 
15 X X 





21 X X 
22 X 
23 X X X 
24 X X 
25 X X X 
26 X 
27 X X 
28 X 
29 X 
30 X X X 
31 X X 
32 X X 
33 X X X 
34 X X X 
35 X X 
36 X X 
37 X X 
38 X X X 
39 X X X 
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Significant Differences Between Current Use and Future Use Among the 
Three Groups 
For an analysis of significant differences among group responses, the 19 
subsections, rather than a specific item statements were analyzed. In 
reviewing the significant differences among the groups on paired responses to 
current use and future use, an analysis of variance indicated that the Directors 
group varied on 9 of the 19 sections. The Policy group responses also varied 
significantly on 9 of the 19 responses, while the Law group showed significant 
differences on 5 of the 19 section responses (Appendix B.6). A summary of 
the pattern of section responses that indicate differences for current use and 
future use is shown in Table 12. 
A review of the section responses showed a variation among each 
other for 5 of the sections. The combined sections yielded significant 
variations in three areas: (1) private schools; (2) due process procedures; and 
(3) equal opportunity for the handicapped to participate in all programs, 
facilities, and services offered to the non-handicapped. Each group indicated 
that the availability of services to be of low to moderate value in current use 
for defining quality, but that the use of this indicator in the future would 
increase slightly in value. 
One factor for the significant differences among groups might be 
because of the values assigned to Item 29, which described the mandate to 
obtain parent permission only for an initial evaluation and placement. The 
wording of the statement may have cause some confusion: this item 
significantly contributed to the variation among groups. The results from the 
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section on equal opportunity are more meaningful: within and among each 
group, the scores reported a significant increase in this item's current use and 
future use. 
Both the Directors group and the Policy group shared similar opinions 
for Section 19, which addressed non-discrimination assurances. The two 
groups reported almost a full point increase in their use. The Directors Group 
viewed changes in use of the indicators from Sections 1 and 3 (General 
Purpose, and Definition of Handicapped). The Policy Group perceived an 
increase in the future use of Section 5, Participation in Regular Education 
Programs but unlike the other groups, reported little change in the timely 
development of the IEP to measure quality. The analysis of variance with the 
Law group showed no other significant differences that were not shared by 
both groups. 
Table 12 
Significant Differences Between Current Use and Future Use By Section 
Among the Groups 








8 X X 
9 
10 
11 X X X 
12 X X X 
13 X X X 




18 X X X 
19 X X 
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Differences in Opinions for Current Importance and Future Importance 
Within the Groups 
An analysis of variance was computed, and Scheffe"s F test was applied 
to the paired values assigned to the current importance and future 
importance of each item statement to determine if there were any statistically 
significant differences (Appendix B.7-B.10). 
Directors Group 
Of the 39 statements, only items 7,10,13,38, and 39 showed a 
significant difference of opinion between the statement's current importance 
as an indicator of quality and its future importance. For each of the items, it 
was reported that there will be an increase in their importance as an indicator 
of quality in the future. The issues that these four statements addressed were 
(1) increased importance of preschool programs; (2) the expansion of the 
definition of "handicapped," medical services; and (3) and equal opportunity 
for participation in all programs. 
The Directors group reported that 13 of the items will decrease slightly 












The topics predicted to decrease in importance included (1) general 
provisions; (2) regular education participation; and (3) timeliness of IEP 
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development. The remaining items involved accountability; provisions for 
private school participation; parental consent; and alternative placements. 
Policy Group 
The Policy Group indicated a significant difference between the current 
importance and future importance of 7 statements. The seven items were 11, 
12,16, 25, 31, 38, and 39, which covered health and community services; 
regular education participation; good faith efforts of personnel; evaluation 
procedures; and non-discrimination practices. Each of these items were 
assigned higher values for their future importance. 
The group reported that 27 of the items will increase in importance, 
while 12 will not. Although the reported changes reflect only minor 
decreases, the following items were cited as becoming less important: 
These decreases included free appropriate public education; medical services; 
timeliness of IEP development and qualified representatives; due process 
procedures; and alternative placement provisions. 
Law Group 
The Law group reported significant differences in the current 
importance versus the future importance of only 4 statements. These items 














Scheffe"s F test, were item 12-- use of school and community resources, item 
23—evaluation of IEP effectiveness; item 27--LEA responsibilities for private 
school participation; and item 39-- accessibility. 
The group reported the least number of items to decrease in 
importance. They were: 
5 13 17 
6 14 18 
28 
Those items given lesser values for future importance addressed issues of free 
appropriate public education; related services; timeliness of IEP development; 
and written notice procedures. 
A summary of these significant differences within groups for current 
importance and future importance is found in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Significant Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
By Item Within the Groups 




















































Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance Among the 
Three Groups 
In reviewing the differences among the groups on paired responses to 
current importance and future importance, the 19 sections were analyzed. 
The F and P values indicated that the Directors group varied on 14 of the 19 
sections. The Policy group varied on 12 of the 19 responses, while the Law 
group also showed significant differences on 12 of the 19 section responses 
(Appendix B.ll). 
By sections, the statistically significant differences of responses for the 
Law group matched the differences of the Directors group except for Section 
17. The Law group reported a slight increase in the future importance of the 
availability of a continuum of services. 
The Directors group responses varied significantly on their perception 
of current and future importance of the availability of qualified individuals to 
evaluate and represent a handicapped child for placement decisions. Both the 
current importance and future importance were ranked high, with little 
variation from within the group, but among the other two groups the weight 
of their value was significantly higher. 
The Policy group reported only one section that was determined to be 
statistically significantly different from among both groups. This section, 
which discussed related services, was probably statistically different for the 
Policy group among the other two groups because of reported mean scores for 
one item: medical services for evaluative purposes. With current and future 
importance rates of 2.16 and 2.0, respectively, this item was one of the lowest 
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rated items by the Policy group. The Policy group was also the only group to 
report a decrease in the item's importance. The statistically significant 
variations among groups in perceived importance of these sections are 
summarized in Table 14. 
In summary, the data analysis showed that the three groups defined 
quality of special education in different ways, and that there were significant 
differences in response within the groups and among the groups. The tables 
and discussions in this chapter support the data. Further discussion and 
conclusions from these statistical analyses are included in Chapter V. 
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Table 14 
Significant Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
By Section Among the Groups 
Section Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
1 . X X 
2 X X X 
3 X X X 
4 X 
5 X X X 
6 
7 X 
8 X X 
9 
10 X X X 
11 X X X 
12 X X X 
13 X X X 




18 X X X 
19 X X X 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goal of this study was threefold: (1) to analyze and organize key 
factors which define quality special education from legislation and subsequent 
judicial rulings; (2) to determine from experts within the field of special 
education what indicators of quality, based upon these factors, are perceived 
as necessary in order to have quality special education; and (3) to analyze 
changes they anticipate will occur in how quality special education is defined. 
In this chapter, a summary of the study, the conclusions from the findings, a 
discussion of the results, and recommendations for further study will be 
presented. 
Summary 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the basic framework for determining 
the quality of special education in the public school setting was measured 
primarily by using inclusion or exclusion as the key value or factor. The 
measurement of quality has shifted away from "zero reject" and other basic 
entitlements to factors which are not so clearly defined or observed. 
While special educators seek to better establish what is "quality," they 
are nonetheless still being evaluated and held accountable for programs and 
services that are driven by law and supportive documents. Laws and policies 
often reflect sociological expectations and changes in ideas, or even more 
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generally, "quality." Expansion of the modern concept of "special education 
quality" began with the rulings of PARC and Mills. With Rowley, "quality" 
has diminished in definition with descriptors such as "basic floor of 
opportunity" and "passing from grade to grade." Historically then, "special 
education quality" has sometimes been defined by the expanse of a concept 
which used to be defined in a much more narrow scope, and vice versa. 
Despite the presence of political empowerment which mandates 
change in a system, legislative policy does not automatically guarantee social 
endorsement. Additional confusion occurs which one considers that the 
special education reform movement and subsequent legislation were enacted 
to correct social inequities. The current (regular) education reform 
movement is founded on economic concerns. These polemics further 
complicate the establishment of a framework to evaluate the quality of special 
education. Nevertheless, the legislative acts and judicial rulings are the 
standards by which schools must comply. What inner values of quality 
educators choose may be another matter. 
During the period of social awareness and educational reform (1950s-
1970s), special education benefited from the fact that handicapped conditions 
are not tied to sociopolitical boundaries. If the quality of education is to be 
based upon outcomes of economic productivity, which is the latest trend in 
educational accountability, then the previous definitions constructed for 
quality in special education will not be compatible with those definitions of 
quality in regular education; that is, the quality of special education will not 
be tied conceptually to an agreed-upon central purpose or platform presented 
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by general educators as in the past. 
The direction of proposed change under this latest wave of educational 
reform and the organization of special education is still being defined. Three 
of special education's greatest influencers come from legislation, judicial 
interpretations, and professional educators. As policies, procedures, and 
programs are being formulated to improve the quality of special education, it 
is important to know and clarify if special education leaders perceive special 
education quality in similar or dissimilar ways. 
Using three of our special education laws, P.L. 94-142; P.L. 99-457; and 
Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act; and cross-referencing 
citations found in special education, several patterns emerged. The frequency 
of standards referred to in judicial cases resulted in a survey being developed 
which incorporated these standards with the concept of "quality." 
Three groups were surveyed to determine their perceptions of quality 
based upon the legislative standard cited in the survey. Two of the groups, 
the Policy group and the Law group, were composed of special educators in 
institutions of higher education who are nationally recognized for their 
contributions to issues involving quality in special education. The third 
group, the Directors group, was formed by special education directors in 
North Carolina who have participated in a study of special education 
program quality in their local school districts. 
The participants were asked to react to the survey items and to rank 
each statement for its value, based upon (a) its current use as an indicator of 
quality; (b) its current importance as an indicator of quality; (c) its future use 
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as an indicator; and (d) its future importance in defining quality in special 
education. 
Since the development of special education continues to be 
economically and politically driven by these policies and procedures, the 
results of the survey can act as indicators from which leaders in special 
education may individually or collectively decide if they value these 
standards as part of a working definition of a basic foundation known as 
"quality special education." 
Conclusions 
1. The three groups indicated that the current use, current importance, future 
use, and future importance of the statements are perceived to have different 
values in defining quality special education. 
A. Current Use 
1) The Directors group tended to rank current use of most items 
higher than the values assigned by the other two groups. Overall, on 16 items 
(40%), the Directors group perceived the statements as having higher values 
than the other groups in their current use as indicators of quality. The 
Directors group was the only group to indicate that the presence of existing 
preschool programs was of low value (> 2.0) in defining whether quality of 
special education is present. As practitioners, the mandated practice of full 
services for preschoolers by Fall, 1991, may have influenced their responses. 
Still, on the 4-point value scale, the discrepancy between their response and 
the other two groups was 1.0. 
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2) Policy group scores were similar to the scores of the other two 
groups. Their selection of statements of high value were more similarly 
shared by the Directors group, while their low values more closely matched 
the perceptions of the Law group. On three items, their responses 
significantly differed from the other groups, and on all three they perceived 
the value as being lower than either group. 
Parent participation in meetings was given a moderate value, as was 
prior notice to a parent. Both of the other groups perceived these parental 
rights in their current use as indicators of quality to be high, while the Policy 
group rated it lower. 
The third area which the Policy group rated low (and a full point lower 
than the Directors group), is the provision of medical services for evaluative 
purposes as an indicator of quality. The distinction between medical and 
health services remains a debated issue, and policies are still be drafted to 
assist special education providers with further guidelines. 
3) The Law group responses to the statements indicated they 
share similar opinions with the Policy group to the current use of the items as 
indicators of quality. On all but 3 items, this group shared similar beliefs with 
at least one of the other groups. Their 3 statements which varied when 
compared to others were (a) use of school and community resources; (b) 
service to private school handicapped children; and (c) provision of a 
continuum of service. Only the last one— the provision for a continuum of 
services— was rated significantly lower than the other 2 groups. 
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B. Current Importance 
1) The Directors group remained consistent in their variation; 
that is, for two items that they ranked lower in value with the other two 
groups for their current use, they also ranked the items lower in terms of 
their current importance. The two items whose values are reported 
significantly lower in defining importance of quality are (a) the availability of 
preschool handicapped programs, and (b) accountability of IEP progress. 
2) The Policy group reported a perceived lower value of current 
importance on 11 of the 39 statements when compared to either of the other 
two groups. Of these, 5 are significant. 
In relation to the other two groups, the Policy group reported a lower 
value for the current importance of the presence of a qualified individual 
who is knowledgeable with evaluation results at an IEP meeting. The 
presence of measurable goals and objectives on an IEP is perceived to be of 
less value than when compared with either of the other two groups. They 
still see these items as important (X= 2.83 and 2.9, respectively), but at a 
significantly lower value than the other groups. The other area which is 
significantly different encompasses a whole subsection of the survey: items 
35-37 (17A-17C). This area defined a broad scope of continuum of services for 
special education, related services, and their locations. The availability of 
more than one option for a given service is covered by these statutes. Again, 
with a mean range assigned between 2.5-2.9, the group perceived the items to 
be of current importance, but these mean scores are almost a full point value 
lower than the other two groups. 
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3) The Law group showed no significant differences in their 
mean scores on current importance of these statements in defining quality of 
special education. 
C) Future Use 
1) There were few variations in opinions of the future use of the 
statements in defining quality special education by the Directors group. They 
rated that IEP accountability will significantly increase in value, while the 
other two groups reported that the current standard as it is written for 
accountability of IEPs will not change significantly. This remained one of the 
lowest rated items. It is felt that perhaps their opinions were shaped as much 
from the fact that accountability is not a requirement, and therefore is of little 
value, as it does from the issue of whether accountability is, or is not, a 
measure of quality. 
2) The Policy group also differed significantly in opinion on one 
item. The other two groups assigned a high value to the future use of 
documentation that teachers make a good faith effort to assist the 
handicapped child in achieving the IEP's goals and objectives. The Policy 
group perceived this to be of less value than the other two groups as a 
measure of quality in the future. 
3) The Law group did not report any values for statements that 
varied significantly from both of the other groups. 
Of interest, one item- that of providing medical services as outlined in 
P.L. 94-142- had a wide range of values, although the Policy group reported 
207 
the only mean score that was significantly different. The Directors group, 
Policy group, and Law group assigned mean scores of 3.24, 1.96, and 2.89 to 
this item, thus giving it a wide degree of variance. 
D) Future Importance 
The Policy group continued to score many items for future importance 
to be of less value in the future compared with the perception of the other 
two groups. On one item, the presence of a knowledgeable individual at an 
IEP meeting, was significantly different from that of the Directors group. Four 
other items were assigned values which varied significantly from both 
groups. These items covered such topics as the medical services previously 
mentioned, and the availability of alternative placement. For both of these 
topics, the Policy group rated these significantly lower than the other two 
groups in their future importance in defining quality special education. 
2. Based upon the selections listed in Part B of the survey, the following 
topics (selected from the 19 subsection titles) were reported to be the most 
important by the groups: 
A) Directors Group 
1) General Provisions 
2) Content of the IEP 
3) Evaluation Procedures* 
4) Participation in Regular Education* 
5) Least Restrictive Environment/Continuum of Services 
B) Policy Group 
1) General Provisions* 
2) Equal Opportunity* 
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3) Free Appropriate Public Education 
4) Content of the IEP 
5) Participation in Regular Education* 
6) Parent Participation* 
C) Law Group 
1) General Provisions 
2) Participation in Regular Education 
3) Accountability of the IEP 
4) Free Appropriate Public Education 
5) Least Restrictive Environment/Continuum of Services* 
6) Parent Participation* 
For further analysis, mean scores reported for current importance by 
the groups were obtained for the sections. The items receiving the highest 
mean scores reported by each group were compared to the selections in Part B. 
Those sections receiving high scores in both Part A and Part B have been 
marked with an asterisk (*). 
3. For the comparison of current use to future use within groups, the 
following patterns emerged: 
A) The Directors group reported that they do not predict any change in 
(1) the use of items which measure the quality of general provisions; (2) the 
value of the IEP and its provisions— timeliness, participants in meetings, and 
parent participation; (3) the availability of public special education for 
private school parent placements of handicapped children; and (4) the use of 
due process procedures, including prior notice and parent consent 
requirements. 
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Areas that they predict will change significantly in value based upon 
their current value in use as indicators of quality include: (1) the definition of 
"handicapped"; (2) the participation of the handicapped in regular education 
programs; (3) accountability for the IEP; (4) LEA responsibility to serve 
handicapped children in private schools; (5) the use of alternative 
placements available to handicapped children to measure quality; (6) the 
expansion of equal opportunity; and (7) accessibility. 
B) The Policy group predicted no significant changes in the value they 
assigned in the use of (1) timeliness in developing an IEP; (2) all components 
relating to private school services and placement; and (3) all items relating to 
due process. They believed that changes in use of the following items will 
improve the value of special education: (1) the definition of "handicapped"; 
(2) participation by the handicapped in regular education; (3) accountability 
of the IEP; and (4) protection in evaluation procedures. 
C) The Law Group indicated distinct opinions for all but 3 of the 19 
sections. Only the topics of FAPE, use of related services, and accountability 
failed to reach consensus among the group whether or not they predicted a 
change or no change in use of these items as indicators of quality. They 
indicated that they do not perceive a change in the value assigned to the 
general provisions for use as indicators of quality. For all of the remaining 15 
sections, the Law group believed that there will be a significant change in how 
these indicators are currently used to define quality and how they will be used 
in the future. 
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4. There were some differences in opinions between the current use and 
future use among groups. All three groups reported that there will be a 
significant increase in value in the use of the following indicators to define 
quality: (a) public school responsibilities for private school services for the 
handicapped; (b) due process procedures; and (c) equal opportunity for the 
handicapped. The Directors group perceived change in general provisions 
and definition of "handicapped" differently from the other groups, while the 
Policy group predicted significant changes in the future for participation in 
regular education programs and the timeliness in developing an IEP. The 
Directors and Policy groups shared similar opinions in changes for parent 
participation in IEP meetings, and accessibility of facilities and services. The 
Law group perceived that no changes will occur in the future in the sections 
that were not shared in opinions by the others. 
5. The Directors group and Policy group believed that there will be a minimal 
increase in values from most of the statements' current importance to their 
future importance as indicators of quality. The Law group, on the other hand, 
reported that they anticipate a change in value between the current 
importance of the statements and their future importance. All three groups 
believed that there will be no significant changes in the reported values 
assigned to the importance of items which define provisions and issues 
relating to private and public school mandates. Each group reported that the 
values they assigned to the current importance will significantly increase in 
future importance for non-discrimination issues. 
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6. The analysis of variance revealed that among groups, the perceptions of 
the Directors group for the current importance and future importance of 
participation in IEP meetings and the least restrictive environment were 
significantly different from those of the other two groups. The other two 
groups reported increases in values for these items, but the Directors group 
indicated that these items' value will drop or remain unchanged. For the 
Policy group, the related services projected change from current importance to 
future importance is significantly different, and they reported that it will 
decrease in value. The Law group anticipated that the importance of the 
availability of a continuum of alternative placements was significantly 
different from the other two groups. 
Summary of the Conclusions 
In order to analyze which indicators of quality are perceived as useful 
and important by these groups, the survey responses were evaluated within 
each group and among each group. Based upon these factors, a variety of 
patterns emerged, which provided insight to the group's preferences for 
indicators of quality and their differences in responses. The similarities and 
differences were reported in detail. The following conclusions summarize 
this compilation. 
1. The indicators that were assigned the highest values were as follows: 
A. Directors Group 
Regular Education Participation 
Continuum of Alternative Placements 
Free Appropriate Public Education 
212 
B. Policy Group 
Regular Education Participation 
Parent Participation 
"Good Faith" Efforts 
Non-Discrimination: Equal Opportunity 
C. Law Group 
Free Appropriate Public Education 
Parent Participation 
Due Process 
2. Each group reported they anticipate an increase from the current use to 
future use as indicators of quality for the following topics: 
A. Directors Group 
IEP Process 
Preschool Services 
Regular Education Participation 
Continuum of Services 
Non-Discrimination 
B. Policy Group 
FAPE for Nonacademic and Extra-Curricular Activities 
Mobilization of School and Community Resources 
Regular Education Participation 
Non-Discrimination Practices— Accessibility 
C. Law Group 
FAPE for Nonacademic and Extra-Curricular Activities 
Expansion of Definition of Handicapped 
Continuum of Services 
Non-Discrimination Practices 
3. The groups indicated that they anticipate a decrease in use of the following 
topics as indicators of quality: 
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A. Directors Group 
General Provisions 
Timeliness of IEP Development 
Due Process 
B. Policy Group 
FAPE—Special Education and Related Services 
Timeliness of IEP Development 
Continuum of Services Outside Typical School Settings 
C. Law Group 
FAPE 
Accountability of IEP 
4. The importance of certain indicators was anticipated to increase in value 
over the next 10 years for defining quality. By group, they are: 
A. Directors Group 
Preschool Programs 
Expansion in Definition of Handicapped 
Equal Opportunity for Participation 
B. Policy Group 
Health Services 
Mobilization of School and Community Resources 
Regular Education Participation 
"Good Faith" Efforts 
Evaluation Procedures 
C. Law Group 
Mobilization of School and Community Resources 
Evaluation of IEP Effectiveness 
Private School Participation 
Non-Discrimination: Accessibility 
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5. The groups reported that they anticipate a decrease in the importance of 
specific issues within the next 10 years. Those areas which they reported will 
decrease in value were: 
A. Directors Group 
General Provisions 
Regular Education Participation 
Timeliness of IEP Development 
B. Policy Group 
FAPE--General 
Evaluative Medical Services 
Timeliness of IEP Development 
Due Process 
Alternative Placement Provisions 
C. Law Group 
FAPE ~ General 
Evaluative Medical Services 
Transportation 
Timeliness of IEP Development 
Written Notice Procedures 
Implications 
The three groups shared similar beliefs on many issues which they 
regarded to be indicators of quality based upon legal mandates. As leaders, 
most of the participants perceived that the basic provisions-the right to a free 
appropriate public education, which includes special education and related 
services- are in place and provide useful and important indications of quality 
services. Each group also perceived that the importance of these provisions 
will decrease, perhaps as a result of general acceptance of the philosophy that 
215 
handicapped children should be afforded the opportunity to attend public 
school. 
The use and importance of the whole IEP process—from the point of 
referral to placement—was perceived by special education directors as an 
important tool to measure quality. This perception was not shared by the 
other two groups. 
The Law group valued indicators which help define procedural issues 
that may extend the current concepts of services for the handicapped. These 
rights included the expansion of services and activities beyond the traditional 
academic framework which, in turn, may increase non-discriminatory 
practices. The Law group was also interested in provisions for options of 
service delivery plans and methods to measure IEP effectiveness, yet they 
were unsure whether the IEP would still be a useful tool to measure quality. 
The Policy group was interested in "participation," whether it was in 
the form of extra-curricular activities, parent involvement, community 
involvement, or even other agency involvement. They were also concerned 
with methods of measuring effectiveness, and whether school personnel may 
need to look at other ways of showing quality of services rather than just by 
documenting a "good faith effort." 
Special Education Directors were very concerned with providing 
services to preschoolers. Beginning in the fall of 1991, all states must have 
procedures to serve this population. Although a tempdrary waiver is 
allowable, the services must be provided shortly thereafter. The Directors 
perceived that educating preschoolers will be of importance, but reported that 
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the use of services for preschoolers currently was not a useful measure of the 
overall quality of special education services they provide to other 
handicapped children. 
Perhaps at the center of these issues was the concept of regular 
education participation. This also included the provision for alternative 
placements. In order for a handicapped child to obtain appropriate services, 
assurances must be given that the location selected was considered to be the 
least restrictive as possible in terms of its variation from regular education. 
This is sometimes difficult to assure because of limited options, whether the 
result of philosophical or financial constraints, or a combination of these 
factors. Both the Directors group and Policy group reported that participation 
in regular education helped measure quality of special education, but the Law 
group remained more focused on procedural rights and use of alternate 
resources. 
Each group brought its own set of values: the Law group appeared to 
define special education quality from an analytical and practical perspective. 
The Policy group selected a mixture of concrete specifications interspersed 
with the application of less easily measured components of quality, such as 
"good faith efforts." The Directors group reported the use and importance of 
quality special education more from a perspective of the presence or absence 
of available services. As practitioners, they must juggle what they would like 
to have with that which is practicable. All three groups demonstrated their 
desire to improve the quality of services for the handicapped and believed 
that the overall use and importance of these indicators will remain as valued 
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measures of quality. 
Thus, the values or antecedents shared by special educators contribute 
to the complexity of defining special education quality. As educators strive to 
assure and enhance the value of public education for handicapped children, 
precautions should be taken not to overlook the basic construct or framework 
of special education. This framework, based upon experts' opinions, is best 
viewed as a dynamic and diverse system that provides the key values or ethos 
of special education quality. 
Recommendations 
1. Further research needs to be completed to determine if other groups which 
influence the quality of special education perceive these values in similar or 
dissimilar ways. Possible group selection includes (a) state directors of special 
education; (b) LEA special education directors in other states; (c) lobbyists; and 
(d) parents. 
2. As a supplement to this study, clarification of some responses should be 
obtained through alternate survey techniques. An interview format might 
help redefine and pinpoint responses that were unclear in their definition of 
future use and importance. For example, questions remain whether 
accountability and "good faith efforts" are perceived as measurable indicators 
of quality. So, too, is the relationship between "mainstreaming," least 
restrictive environment, regular education participation, and 
appropriateness. Whether each group perceived the regular education 
initiative in similar ways has not been determined. The use of the statutes' 
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language did not allow for this type of exploration. 
3. As educators attempt to integrate more handicapped children into regular 
education programs, it would be beneficial to survey regular educators to 
determine whether they perceive "mainstreaming" as a part of quality for 
special education students. 
4. A follow-up to the review of legal aspects of quality in special education 
needs to be conducted to determine if these groups perceive the 19 quality 
issues most frequently litigated by parents as indicators of quality. While 
there was some compatibility between the review of the literature and the 
survey, a simplified version of the legal issues would augment the findings of 
the survey. 
5. Superintendents and school board members, along with local special 
education directors, need to be aware of the topics of disagreement most 
actively litigated by parents of handicapped children. A published summary 
of the findings presented in this study with periodic updates is recommended. 
6. A review of the impact of the Rowley decision needs to be conducted. This 
ruling has defined the basic parameters of quality special education as much 
as the framework provided by the public laws. The actual student, Amy 
Rowley, probably has just completed her public education. It would be of 
great interest to determine if the school personnel, parents, and Amy, 
perceive that the quality of her special education was, in fact, appropriate. 
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34 CFR 301 Preschool Grants for Handicapped Children 
34 CFR 302 State Operated Programs for Handicapped Children 
34 CFR 303 Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers 
with Handicaps 
45 CFR 84 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act 
United States Codes 
Federal 
20 U.S.C. 1401 P. L. 94-142 
20 U.S.C. 1401 (100 Stat. 798 §5) P. L. 99-372 
29 U.S.C. 794 (87 Stat. 355 §504, §505) P. L. 93-112 
42 U.S.C. 1983 P. L. 88-352 
State 
17 La. St. Stat. §1943 (1) Act 1072 Louisiana 
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Luanne Biles, Program Administrator for Exceptional Children in 
Henderson County, North Carolina and a doctoral candidate at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro has undertaken a study of 
program quality in special education. She is asking for your assistance— 
about 20 minutes of your time—in order to assess how professionals who 
are differentially knowledgeable about special education view "quality." 
Her selection of those to whom her survey form is being sent was done with 
care to ensure that recipients are among those who have both expertise 
and influence so that their views will matter when the results of her 
study are assembled and interpreted. 
We knew from the outset that we are asking the busiest professionals 
to respond. But we believe that the persons asked are among those who 
care deeply about children with special needs and are likely to be 
professionals who will give time to respond to the survey. 
Please assist Ms. Biles if at all possible. She can make the results 
of her study available to you if you wish. We think she can make a 
substantial contribution to our understanding of what "good" means as we 
continue to evaluate our programs and try to Improve services. 
Sincerely yours 
Vic/i V hi'-
'Jack I. Bardon, Ph.D. 
Excellence Foundation Professor 
of Education and Director of 
The Collegium for the Advancement 
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I am a doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and Program Administrator for Exceptional 
Children in Henderson County. NC. My dissertation addresses issues of quality in special education, much of the basic 
foundation for defining quality in special education has been determined by legislation. 
As part of my study. I have developed a survey which encompasses all of the major statutes that help define issues of 
quality covered by P.L. 94-142. P.L. 99-457. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The survey also focuses on those 
items which have been most actively litigated in the past 10 years, thus representing the areas of concern to parents, 
educators, and other advocates. 
I am writing to secure your assistance in studying how quality in special education is perceived. Your selection was made 
on the basis of your established expertise, publications, and/or national reputation related to special education quality. 
Of utmost interest is your opinion of each statement based upon its: 
•  c u r r e n t  i m p o r t a n c e  a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  i n  d e n n i n g  q u a l i t y  
• future u s e  a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  nf Quality 
•  f u t u r e  i m p o r t a n c e  a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  i n  d e f i n i n g  q u a l i t y  
Please keep in mind that I am interested in your personal beliefs of these statements as indicators of quality, rather than your 
judgment of the presence or absence of practices as indicators of quality. 
The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete, and it would be especially helpful if it could be returned by 
March 20.1990. If you are interested in the results of the survey, please include the form located at the end of the survey, 
and I will be happy to share my findings with you. Although there is an identifying number on each survey for tracking 
purposes, the identify of each respondent will be kept confidential. 
I know that you receive many requests for your time, but I hope that you can see the merits and importance of this study. 
This study requires the response Rom individuals with the expertise and knowledge about issues of quality that you 




SPECIAL EDUCATION QUALITY SURVEY 
M a n y  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  q u a l i t y  i n  s p e c i a l  e d u c a t i o n  a r e  f o u n d e d  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  c i t e d  i n  P .  L .  9 4 - 1 4 2 ,  P .  L .  9 9 - 4 5 7 ,  a n d  S e c t i o n  5 0 4  o f  
t h e  R e h a b i l i t a t i o n  A c t .  P l e a s e  r e a d  e a c h  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  l i s t e d  b e l o w ,  a n d  i n d i c a t e  y o u r  o p i n i o n  o f  e a c h  s t a t e m e n t ' s  v a l u e  b a s e d  u p o n  
i t s  c u r r e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  u s e ,  a n d  c u r r e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  i m p o r t a n c e .  U s e  t h e  y e a r  2 0 0 0 ,  o r  1 0  y e a r s ,  a s  a  g u i d e l i n e  f o r  t h e  t e r m  " f u t u r e . "  
Directions-- Part A: R e c o r d  y o u r  r e s p o n s e s  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  4  c o l u m n s ,  a n d  d a r k e n  o r  c i r c l e  t h e  v a l u e  y o u  s e l e c t  o n  a  s c a l e  o f  0  
t h r o u g h  4 ,  w i t h  0 =  o f  n o  v a l u e  a n d  4 =  o f  h i g h e s t  v a l u e  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  q u a l i t y  s p e c i a l  e d u c a t i o n .  
C u r r e n t l y  b e i n e  u s e d  a s  
a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  q u a l i t v  
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  I h i s  
c a t e g o r y  i n  d e f i n i n g  
F u t u r e  u s e  a s  a n  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  q u a l i t y  F u t u r e  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  
s p e c i a l  e d u c a t i o n  
s e r v i c e s  
a u a l i t v  s p e c i a l  e d u c a ­
t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
s p e c i a l  e d u c a t i o n  
s e r v i c e s  
d e f i n i n g  a u a l i t v  s n e c i a l  
e d u c a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. Purpose 
1A. Procedures are evident to assess and insure the effectiveness of 
efforts to educate handicapped children. (§300.1 (d)| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
IB. Handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public 
education which includes special education and related services 
specially designed to meet their unique needs. |§300. 1(a); 
§3U0.14(aMl); §l04.33(a)l 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
1C. Procedures are evident which insure that the rights of handicapped 
children and their parents are protected. l§300.HbiJ 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
2. Free Appropriate Public Education 
2A. Special education is provided at public expense and without charge to 
parents. !§300.4<a); §3UO.I4<a>t lj| 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
2B. Related services are provided at public expense and without charge to 
parents. (§300.4<a)l 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
2C. Free appropriate education is available to all handicapped children in 
grades K-12. !§300.4<c»;§m4JckM2»| 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
2D. Free appropriate education is available to all preschool handicapped 
children. [§300.4<c); §104.33(a>; §301.1 ia)| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
© Luanne Biles 
Currentlv beine used as 
an indicator of aualitv 
special education 
services 
Imnortance of this 
cateeorv in definina 
quality special educa­
tion services 
Future use as an 
indicator of aualitv 
special education 
services 
Future imnortance in 
defining uualitv special 
education services 
2E. Schools make available to handicapped children the variety of 
educational programs and services available to non-handicapped 
children (ait, music, voc. ed., etc.). [§300.305] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
2F. Schools provide handicapped children an equal opportunity for 
participation in nonacademic and extracurricular services and 
activities. |§300.306<a); §104.37(i)| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
3. Handicapped Children 
3A. Definition of handicapped is not limited just to terms currently 
defined as "handicapped." [§300.5 - §300,6; §l043(j)] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
4. Related Services 
4A. School health services are provided by a qualified school nurse or 
other qualified person. |§300.13(bxl0)l 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
4B. Mobilization of school and community resources enables the child to 
receive maximum benefit from his or her educational program. 
[§3lX>.13<bHllXiv>| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
4C. Services are provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's 
medically related handicapping condition. |§300.13<bx4)] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
41). Transportation and specialized equipment for transporting a handi­
capped child, including travel to and from school, is available. 
i§3(X).13fbX13Hi>] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
4E. Transportation and specialized equipment for transporting a handi­
capped child, including travel in and around school buildings, is 
available. I§3lXM3(bH 13M11) 1 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
4F. "GENERAL PROVISIONS Other 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
••Optional response 
€) Luanne Biles 
Currently being used as 
an indicalor of quality 
special education 
services 
Importance of this 
category in defining 
quality special educa­
tion services 
Future use as an 
indicalor of quality 
special education 
Future importance in 
defining quality special 
education services 
CONTENT 
5. Participation in Regular Education Programs 
5A. To the maximum extent practicable, school personnel provide special 
services to enable handicapped children to participate in regular edu­
cational programs. |§300.227(a); S104.34(a)] 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
SB. "CONTENT— Othen_ 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM 
i Timeliness 
•A. An 1EP is in effect before special education and related services are 
provided to a child. [§3O0.342(bK 1 )| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
6B. An IEP is implemented as soon as possible following a meeling to 
develop, review, or revise the IEP. | §300342 (bM 2)1 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
7. Participants in Meetings 
7A. Qualifted individuals who are knowledgeable and familiar with 
evaluation results are present al IEP meetings. [§300.344<bii2): 
§104.35<c)| 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
7B. A representative at the IEP and placement meetings is qualified in the 
area of the child's suspected/identified disability. [§30U.344(bx2)| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
8. Parent Participation 
8A. Parents, guardians, or surrogates are afforded the opportunity to 
consult with school personnel and to participate in meetings. 
[§300.226; §300.345(a)| 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1  2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
••Optional response 
© Luanne Biles 
3 ro 
CO 
Currently beme used 
as an indicator of 
I m o o r t a n c e  o f  t h i s  
c a t e g o r y  i n  d e f i n i n g  
F u t u r e  u s e  a s  a n  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  q u a l i t y  F u t u r e  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  
quality special 
education services 
a u a l i t v  s n e c i a l  e d u c a ­
t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
s p e c i a l  e d u c a t i o n  
s e r v i c e s  
d e f i n i n g  a u a l i t v  s n e c i a l  
e d u c a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
9. Content of the IEP 
9A. The IEP has measurable goals and short term objectives. 
[{300346(b)] 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
9B. The IEP and review of the IEP determine whether the instnictional 
objectives are being achieved. (§300346<e)] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
10. Accountability 
10A. School personnel ait not held accountable if a handicapped child 
does not achieve the growth projected in the annual goals and objec­
tives. (§300.3491 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
10B. School personnel must make good faith efforts to assist the child in 
achieving the objectives and goals listed in the IEP. |§300.349| 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
10C. *• INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM—Other 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
11. Placement by Parents 
11 A. If parents place a handicapped child in a private school, the public 
agency shall make special education services available but is not 
required to pay for services at the private school. |$300.403taj| 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
12. LEA Responsibility 
I2A. Each LEA provides special education and related services designed 
to meet the needs of private school handicapped children residing in 
their district, (in their jurisdiction). |§3(X).4S3(a)] 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
12B. ••PRIVATE SCHOOLS- Other. 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
••Optional response 
© Luanne Biles 
4 l\5 
•r*. 
Currently beine used as 
an indicator of qualitv 
inmoitance of this 
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Future use as an 







defining qualitv special 
education services 
DUE PROCESS 
13. Prior Notice 
13A. Written notice is given to parents prior to a proposal to initiate or 
- change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a 
child. | §300^04(1)1 
0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
14. Parent Consent 
14A. ftiiental consent of changes after initial placement is not required. 
!§300.504{b)] 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
14B. ••DUE PROCESS Other 
0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
PROTECTION IN EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
IS. Evaluation Procedures 
ISA. Handicapped children are evaluated with a variety of materials 
tailored to assess specific areas of educational need. l§300.532(bi: 
§im.3Sb*2>l 
0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
15B. No single procedure is used as the sole criterion for detemiining an 
appropriate educational program. (3<x>.532[dj; 51(U.35(i1l) 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
ISC. ••PROTECTION IN EVALUATION PROCEDURES- Other 
0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
16. Continuum of Alternative Placements 
16A. Various alternative placements arc available to the extent necessary 
to implement each child's IEP. |§300.]4(aX 0: §300.S52(b)| 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 0 12 3 4 
••Optional response g 
© Luanne Biles 
Currently beine used 
as an indicator of 
Imnortance of this 
calecorv in defining 
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indicator of qualitv Future imnortance in 








ltB. In selecting the LRE, consideration is given to any potential harmful 
effect on the child. |§300.552<d)] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
14C. In selecting the LRE, consideration is given on the quality of services 
which each handicapped child needs. |§300.S52(d)] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
17. Placements 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
17A. A continuum of alternative placement is available to meet the needs 
of children for special education. |§300.551(a>) 
17B. A continuum of alternative placement is available to meet the needs 
of children for related services, j §300.227 (bx t); §300.55t(a>] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
17C. Alternative placements include instruction in regular classes, special 
classes, special schools, home instruction, and hospitals and institu­
tions. [§3(l0.55l(allll] 0  1 2  3  4  0  1  2  3 .  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
17D. "LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT— Other 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
18. Equal Opportunity 
18A. Handicapped children have an equal opportunity to participate in 
programs, facilities, and services as non-handicapped children 
MUVMtblml | 
19. Accessibility 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
19A. Handicapped children have accessibility to the same programs, 
facilities, and services as non-handicapped children. (§104.21) 
19B. ••NON-DISCRIMINATION— Other 
0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  0  1 2  3  4  
••Optional response 
& Luanne Biles 
Directions-Part B: Review each of the items listed on the survey. Select the 5 indicators of quality from the survey that 
you feel are currently most important. List those numbers (1 A- 19B) in the left-hand column. 
Please allocate a value of points to these 5 selections. Not all of the five selections need receive an 
allocation. Your total score, when added together, should equal 100 points. List your values in the 
ripht-hand column. 
5 Most Important Indicators of Quality 
from Survey Items # IA-19B Weighted Importance 






| Please answer the following: 
1) Number of years actively associated 
with special education: 
•  0 - 5  y e a r s  
• 6-10 years 
• 11-15 years 
• 15+ 
2) Sex: MaleQ Female! I 3) Highest acadcmic degree received: 
Please fill out the following and enclose with the 'Cia I 
questionnaire if you would like a copy of this report: 
Name 




Organization of Survey by Sections 
1. Purpose 
2. Free Appropriate Public Education 
3. Handicapped Children 
4. Related Services Components 
5. Participation in Regular Education Programs 
6. IEP Timeliness 
7. Participants in IEP Meetings 
8. Parent Participation in Meetings 
9. Content of the IEP 
10. Accountability of Personnel for Child's IEP 
11. Accessibility of Public School Special Education to Children in Private Schools 
12. LEA Services Offered to Handicapped Children in Private Schools by Request 
13. Prior Written Notice to Parents 
14. Parent Consent Obtained 
15. Evaluation Procedures are Varied 
16. Least Restrictive Environment Considered 
17. Continuum of Services Available 
18. Non-Discrimination: Equal Opportunity 
19. Non-Discrimination: Accessibility 
Appendix A-5 
Survey Issues 
1. Procedures for assessment in place and effectiveness of service 
2. Specially designed education/curriculum 
3. Protection of rights 
4. Special education at no cost 
5. Related services at no cost 
6. FAPE, K-12 
7. FAPE, 0-5 
8. Variety of educational programs available 
9. Nonacademic and extra curricular programs available 
10. Definition of "handicapped" in place, but may be modified through revisions 
11. School health services are a part of related services 
12. Provisions for use of school and community resources to "maximize benefit" 
13. Medical services (evaluative only) are a part of school responsibility 
14. Transportation to and from school is available 
15. Transportation in and around school buildings is available 
16. Participation in regular education to the maximum extent possible 
17. IEP is in effect immediately upon placement 
18. Revisions of the IEP decisions are promptly held 
19. Qualified evaluative personnel involved in the development of the IEP 
20. Qualified personnel familiar w/ child's handicap help make decisions 
21. Parents/guardians have opportunity to meet with school staff 
22. The IEP has measurable goals and objectives 
23. The IEP is reviewed periodically/annually to determine effectiveness 
24. IEP staff not accountable if projected progress is not achieved 
25. IEP staff must be able to demonstrate "good faith effort" to assist child 
26. Handicapped children in private schools have access to public programs 
27. LEA is responsible to provide services to local private schools 
28. Prior written notice to parents given before placement or change in placement 
29. Parent consent not necessary for all changes after initial permission obtained 
30. Evaluation must be comprised of a variety of procedures/instruments 
31. No single instrument determines special education program/placement 
32. A variety of alternative placements is available 
33. The LRE and possible harmful effects are considered 
34. LRE and quality of services are considered 
35. A continuum of services for special education is considered 
36. A continuum of services for related services is considered 
37. A continuum of services- outside of the regular school settings- is considered 
38. Non-discrimination is assured so that child is offered a FAPE 
39. Accessibility is provided to all programs and services 
250 
Appendix A-6 
Organization of Survey by Items 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Purpose 
1. Procedures are evident to assess and insure the effectiveness of efforts to educate 
handicapped children. [§300.1 (d)] 
2. Handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public education which 
includes special education and related sen/ices specially designed to meet their unique 
needs.[§300. 1 (a); § 300.14(a)(1); §104.33(a)] 
3. Procedures are evident which insure that the rights of handicapped children and their 
parents are protected. [§300.1(b)] 
Free Appropriate Public Education 
4. Special education is provided at public expense and without charge to parents. [§300.4(a); 
§300.14(a)(1)] 
5. Related services are provided at public expense and without charge to parents. [§300.4(a)] 
6. Free appropriate education is available to all handicapped children in grades K-12. 
[§300.4(c); §1 04.3(k)(2)] 
7. Free appropriate education is available to all preschool handicapped children. [§300.4(c); 
§104.33(a); §301.1(a)] 
8. Schools make available to handicapped children the variety of educational programs and 
services available to non-handicapped children (art, music, voc. ed., etc.). [§300.305] 
9. Schools provide handicapped children an equal opportunity for participation in 
nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities. [§300.306(a); §104.37(a)] 
Handicapped Children 
10. Definition of handicapped is not limited just to terms currently defined as "handicapped." 
[§300.5 - §300.6; §104.3(j)] 
Related Services 
11 . School health services are provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person. 
[§300.13{b)(10)] 
1 2. Mobilization of school and community resources enables the child to receive maximum 
benefit from his or her educational program. [§300.l3(b)(H)(iv)] 
251 
1 3. Services are provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's medically related 
handicapping condition. [§300.13(b)(4)] 
1 4. Transportation and specialized equipment for transporting a handicapped child, including 
travel to and from school, is available. [§300.13(b)(l3)(i)] 
1 5. Transportation and specialized equipment for transporting a handicapped child, including 
travel in and around school buildings, is available. [§300.l3(b)(l3)(ii)] 
CONTENT 
Participation in Regular Education Programs 
1 6. To the maximum extent practicable, school personnel provide special services to enable 
handicapped children to participate in regular educational programs. [§300.227(a); 
§104.34(a)] 
INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM 
Timeliness 
1 7. An IEP is in effect before special education and related sen/ices are provided to a'child. 
[§300.342(b)(1)] 
1 8. An IEP is implemented as soon as possible following a meeting to develop, review, or revise 
the IEP. [§300.342 (b)(2)] 
Participants in Meetings 
1 9 .  Q u a l i f i e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  a r e  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  a n d  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  e v a l u a t i o n  r e s u l t s  a r e  
present at IEP meetings. [§300.344(b)(2); §104.35(c)] 
2 0 .  A representative at the IEP and placement meetings is qualified in the area of the child's 
suspected/identified disability. [§300.344 (b)(2)] 
Parent Participation 
21. Parents, guardians, or surrogates are afforded the opportunity to consult with school 
personnel and to participate in meetings. [§300.226; §300.345(a)] 
Content of the IEP 
2 2 .  T h e  I E P  h a s  m e a s u r a b l e  g o a l s  a n d  s h o r t  t e r m  o b j e c t i v e s .  [ § 3 0 0 . 3 4 6 ( b ) ]  
2 3 .  The IEP and review of the IEP determine whether the instructional objectives are being 
achieved. [§300.346(e)] 
Accountability 
2 4 .  School personnel are not held accountable if a handicapped child does not achieve the growth 
projected in the annual goals and objectives. [§300.349] 
2 5 .  S c h o o l  p e r s o n n e l  m u s t  m a k e  g o o d  f a i t h  e f f o r t s  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  c h i l d  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
and goals listed in the IEP. [§300.349] 
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PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
Placement by Parents 
2 6. If parents place a handicapped child in a private school, the public agency shall make 
special education services available but is not required to pay for services at the private 
school. [§300.403(a)] 
LEA Responsibility 
2 7. Each LEA provides special education and related services designed to meet the needs of 




28. Written notice is given to parents prior to a proposal to initiate or change the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child. [§300.504(1)] 
Parent Consent 
2 9 .  Parental consent for changes after initial placement is not required. [§300.504(b)] 
PROTECTION IN EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
Evaluation Procedures 
3 0 .  H a n d i c a p p e d  c h i l d r e n  a r e  e v a l u a t e d  w i t h  a  v a r i e t y  o f  m a t e r i a l s  t a i l o r e d  t o  a s s e s s  s p e c i f i c  
areas of educational need. [§300.532(b); §104.35(b)(2)] 
3 1 .  No single procedure is used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate 
educational program. [300.532(d); §104.35(d)] 
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
Continuum of Alternative Placements 
3 2. Various alternative placements are available to the extent necessary to implement each 
Child's IEP. [§300.14(a)(1); §300.552(b)] 
3 3 .  In selecting the LRE, consideration is given to any potential harmful effect on the child. 
[§300.552(d)] 
3 4 .  In selecting the LRE, consideration is given on the quality of services which each 
handicapped child needs. [§300.552(d)] 
Placements 
3 5 .  A  c o n t i n u u m  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  p l a c e m e n t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  m e e t  t h e  n e e d s  o f  c h i l d r e n  f o r  s p e c i a l  
education. [§300.551 (a)] 
3 6 .  A continuum of alternative placement is available to meet the needs of children for related 
services. [§300.227 (b)(1); §300.551 (a)] 
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3 7 .  A l t e r n a t i v e  p l a c e m e n t s  i n c l u d e  i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  r e g u l a r  c l a s s e s ,  s p e c i a l  c l a s s e s ,  s p e c i a l  
schools, home instruction, and hospitals and institutions. [§300.551 (a)(1)] 
NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Equal Opportunity 
3 8 .  Handicapped children have an equal opportunity to participate in programs, facilities, and 
services as non-handicapped children. [§i04.4(b)(1)] 
Accessibility 
3 9 .  H a n d i c a p p e d  c h i l d r e n  h a v e  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  s a m e  p r o g r a m s ,  f a c i l i t i e s ,  a n d  s e r v i c e s  a s  
non-handicapped children. [§104.21] 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES OF RAW DATA 
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Table B-l 
Analysis of Variance Among Groups 
Item # Directors Group Policy Group Law Group F Value P Value 
1.1 3.24 2.16 2.10 8.27 .0007* 
1.2 3.33 3.09 3.51 .926 .402 
1.3 3.33 2.83 3.34 2.36 .103 
1.4 3.24 3.35 3.58 .921 .404 
2.1 3.52 3.03 2.96 •4.31 .on* 
2.2 3.67 3.41 3.46 1.04 .357 
2.3 3.61 3.19 3.36 1.73 .185 
2.4 3.60 3.35 3.46 .641 .530 
3.1 3.52 3.06 2.63 5.64 .0058* 
3.2 3.21 3.29 3.2 .03 .970 
3.3 3.42 3.16 3.06 1 .374 
3.4 3.33 3.32 3.06 .502 .608 
4.1 3.09 3.03 2.86 .215 .807 
4.2 3.0 2.96 2.66 .59 .557 
4.3 2.97 2.96 2.76 .229 .796 
4.4 2.94 2.93 2.70 .311 .733 
5.1 2.97 2.87 2.53 1.05 .355 
5.2 2.79 2.83 2.8 .059 .942 
5.3 2.94 2.83 2.9 .062 .939 
5.4 2.88 2.87 2.8 .035 .966 
6.1 3.21 3.09 3.23 .306 .737 
6.2 3.24 3.19 3.33 .183 .833 
6.3 3.27 3.03 3.4 1.22 .301 
6.4 3.33 3.09 3.3 .818 .446 
7.1 1.52 2.45 2.13 9.60 .0002* 
7.2 2.79 3.16 2.96 .71 .496 
7.3 3.06 3.12 3.06 .011 .989 
7.4 3.12 3.29 3.06 .263 .769 
8.1 2.73 2.03 2.1 3.07 .054 
8.2 3.24 3.25 3.16 .216 .806 
8.3 3.36 3.03 2.83 3.238 .046* 
8.4 3.36 3.38 3.26 .259 .772 
9.1 2.49 1.90 1.76 2.70 .075 
9.2 2.97 3.38 3.13 1.07 .349 
9.3 3.15 2.87 2.76 1.67 .197 
9.4 3.21 3.41 3.16 .579 .563 
10.1 1.33 1.32 1.36 .01 .989 
10.2 1.91 1.77 2.33 1.27 .286 
10.3 2.24 1.96 2.53 1.31 .275 
10.4 2.30 1.96 2.63 1.78 .176 
[Table continues] 
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Table B-l (cont.) 
Analysis of Variance Among Groups 
Item # Directors Group Policy Group Law Group F Value P Value 
11.1 2.3 2.29 2.33 .104 .901 
11.2 2.91 2.67 2.86 .405 .668 
11.3 3.0 2.67 2.66 .556 .576 
11.4 3.0 2.83 2.93 .182 .833 
12.1 2.58 2.12 1.7 5.54 .006* 
12.2 3.24 3.09 2.93 1.19 .31 
12.3 3.33 2.96 2.96 1.616 .207 
12.4 3.36 3.51 3.33 .42 .658 
13.1 2.81 1.87 2.16 5.38 .007* 
13.2 3.09 2.16 2.73 5.53 .006* 
13.3 3.24 1.96 2.8 12.49 .0001* 
13.4 3.33 2.0 2.73 11.47 .0001* 
14.1 3.33 2.87 2.83 •3.54 .035* 
14.2 3.30 2.93 3.03 1.366 .263 
14.3 3.36 2.96 3.06 1.93 .154 
14.4 3.36 3.0 3.06 1.26 .288 
15.1 3.09 2.43 2.43 3.61 .033* 
15.2 3.24 3.10 3.03 .219 .803 
15.3 3.27 2.93 3.16 1.094 .341 
15.4 3.39 3.13 3.03 .953 .391 
16.1 2.97 2.45 2.63 2.26 .133 
16.2 3.69 3.54 3.4 1.43 .247 
16.3 3.78 3.32 3.4 3.98 .024* 
16.4 3.66 3.37 3.6 .871 .423 
17.1 3.69 2.13 2.9 5.78 .0051* 
17.2 3.69 2.96 3.1 4.76 .012* 
17.3 3.55 3.06 3.43 5.61 .005* 
17.4 3.6 3.06 3.26 4.38 .016* 
18.1 3.69 2.1 3.0 13.72 .0001* 
18.2 3.72 3.16 3.33 4.39 .016* 
18.3 3.72 2.83 3.4 14.08 .0001* 
18.4 3.69 3.26 3.36 4.5 .015* 
19.1 3.42 1.76 2.63 9.22 .0003* 
19.2 3.6 3.13 3.23 5.92 .004* 
19.3 3.6 2.76 3.2 7.32 .001* 
19.4 3.57 3.16 3.33 5.20 .0083* 
20.1 3.42 1.36 2.13 13.87 .0001* 
20.2 3.45 2.33 3.16 2.67 .076 
20.3 3.48 2.74 2.63 3.66 .031* 
20.4 3.42 2.64 3.23 3.79 .028* 
[Table continues] 
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Table B-l (cont.) 
Analysis of Variance Among Grouns 
Item # Directors Group Policy Group Law Group F Value P Value 
21.1 3.69 2.9 3.2 6.80 .0023* 
21.2 3.84 3.56 3.33 1.37 .260 
21.3 3.78 3.4 2.13 5.27 .008* 
21.4 3.84 3.63 3.16 1.69 .193 
22.1 3.51 2.61 2.96 8.13 .0008* 
22.2 3.72 2.90 3.26 5.46 .006* 
22.3 3.66 2.83 3.23 5.67 .005* 
22.4 3.66 2.90 3.66 4.08 .021* 
23.1 2.57 2.29 3.8 5.38 .007* 
23.2 3.60 2.90 3.86 3.87 .026* 
23.3 3.69 2.87 2.46 7.08 .001* 
23.4 3.75 3.03 3.23 4.96 .010* 
24.1 1.94 1.41 3.1 1.007 .372 
24.2 2.78 1.78 3.23 4.81 .012* 
24.3 2.75 1.96 2.26 5.55 .006* 
24.4 2.75 2.03 3.2 3.34 .043* 
25.1 3.27 2.16 3.23 10.99 .0001* 
25.2 3.81 "i i"> 3.46 8.66 .0005* 
25.3 3.81 2.74 1.89 18.18 .0001* 
25.4 3.87 3.48 2.34 3.97 .024* 
26.1 1.93 1.82 2.0 .522 .596 
26.2 2.09 1.93 2.65 3.49 .037* 
26.3 2.12 1.96 2.60 2.81 .069 
26.4 2.03 1.96 2.75 3.11 .053 
27.1 2.0 2.06 1.8 .105 .900 
27.2 2.24 2.16 2.7 2.22 .117 
27.3 2.33 2.20 2.73 1.81 .172 
27.4 2.36 2.23 3.0 3.23 .046* 
28.1 3.57 2.80 3.1 6.055 .004* 
28.2 3.60 3.06 3.2 3.45 .038* 
28.3 3.57 2.83 3.46 7.01 .001* 
28.4 3.63 2.96 3.43 4.97 .010* 
29.1 2.06 1.66 1.93 1.16 .319 
29.2 2.48 1.9 2.13 3.15 .050* 
29.3 2.36 1.8 2.20 2.04 .139 
29.4 2.36 1.86 2.31 1.74 .184 
30.1 3.57 2.6 2.4 13.07 .0001* 
30.2 3.87 3.2 3.5 4.36 .017* 
30.3 3.84 3.0 3.26 7.12 .001* 
30.4 3.90 3.43 3.6 3.02 .056 
[Table continues] 
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Table B-1 (cont.) 
Analysis of Variance Among Grouns 
Ilem # Directors Group Policy Group Law Group F Value P Value 
31.1 3.66 2.80 2.9 8.07 .0008* 
31.2 3.78 3.45 3.7 2.52 .089 
31.3 3.78 3.16 3.63 5.59 .006* 
31.4 3.78 3.67 3.76 .226 .767 
32.1 3.21 2.71 2.53 2.53 .087 
32.2 3.78 3.03 3.6 6.80 .0022* 
32.3 3.69 2.74 3.23 8.82 .0005* 
32.4 3.72 2.80 3.46 8.55 .0006* 
33.1 3.03 2.25 2.26 '4.41 .016* 
33.2 3.69 3.25 3.43 1.61 .208 
33.3 3.66 2.67 3.3 8.95 .0004* 
33.4 3.69 3.38 3.63 .638 .532 
34.1 3.24 2.16 2.4 8.82 .0005* 
34.2 3.87 3.32 3.53 4.53 .0148* 
34.3 3.84 2.87 3.36 9.54 .0003* 
34.4 3.87 3.51 3.66 1.87 .162 
35.1 3.33 3.03 2.62 5.26 .008* 
35.2 3.81 2.93 3.72 9.42 .0003* 
35.3 3.75 2.93 3.51 8.30 .0007* 
35.4 3.84 2.80 3.82 13.23 .0001* 
36.1 2.84 2.58 2.20 1.89 .1599 
36.2 3.51 2.58 3.41 5.80 .005* 
36.3 3.54 2.58 3.27 7.44 .001* 
36.4 3.60 2.54 3.55 8.96 .0004* 
37.1 3.39 2.93 2.43 6.21 .0036* 
37.2 3.66 2.77 3.33 4.33 .0176* 
37.3 3.63 2.71 3.26 8.47 .0006* 
37.4 3.69 2.54 3.46 11.16 .0001* 
38.1 3.18 2.51 2.3 •3.94 .0248* 
38.2 3.66 3.67 3.56 .166 .847 
38.3 3.66 3.35 3.36 1.18 .313 
38.4 3.81 3.80 3.76 .046 .955 
39.1 3.06 2.67 2.33 2.09 .132 
39.2 3.57 3.67 3.5 .337 .715 
39.3 3.63 3.41 3.36 .791 .458 
39.4 3.78 3.80 3.76 .033 .9672 
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Table B-2 
Differences Within Groups: Comparison of Current Use to Future Use 
Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
Item # F P F P F P 
1 .195 .661 9.53 .004 22.62 .0001 
2 .522 .475 1.33 .257 3.55 .069 
3 .421 .521 .154 .697 3.44 .073 
4 .52 .473 .326 .5722 .266 .609 
5 .031 .860 .075 .786 2.20 .148 
6 .13 .721 .244 .625 .602 .444 
7 33.1 .0001 13.86 .0008 14.06 .0008 
8 7.97 .008 35.7 .0001 14.68 .0006 
9 7.65 .009 34.8 .0001 20.71 .0001 
10 15.94 .0004 15.4 .0005 22.7 .0001 
11 10.06 .003 18.94 .0001 5.8 .022 
12 14.407 .0006 23.20 .0001 27.99 .0001 
13 3.2 .08 .421 .521 10.58 .0029 
14 .08 .76 1 .325 1.26 .269 
15 1.84 .18 18.9 .0002 . 10.66 .0028 
16 30.85 .0001 30.04 .0001 13.68 .0009 
17 .036 .85 .039 .845 6.97 .013 
18 .08 .768 .303 .585 9.15 .005 
19 2.34 .135 2.44 .128 6.75 .014 
20 .279 .600 .051 .822 13.67 .0009 
21 1.84 .18 16.11 .0004 13.07 .0011 
22 1.19 .28 1.72 .198 12.04 .0016 
23 16.24 .0003 12.27 .0015 28.06 .0001 
24 13.36 .0009 5.10 .032 .354 .556 
25 9.763 .003 14.55 .0006 15.66 .0004 
26 1.06 .310 1.63 .211 12.78 .0013 
27 4.63 .039 2.07 .160 17.27 .0003 
28 0 .046 .831 5.57 .0251 
29 2.94 .096 .659 .423 7.92 .0088 
30 5.4 .026 7.25 .011 11.78 .0018 
31 1 .324 6.84 .013 15.66 .0004 
32 7.69 .0091 .024 .878 14.06 .0008 
33 11.36 .002 4.13 .050 44.30 .0001 
34 10.81 .0025 11.05 .0023 32.56 .0001 
35 13.51 .0009 .303 .585 26.43 .0001 
36 20.54 .0001 0 -- 29.12 .0001 
37 6.16 .018 .26 .269 18.78 .0002 
38 15.28 .0005 40.39 .0001 35.52 .0001 
39 14.54 .0006 28.54 .0001 25.13 .0001 
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Table B-3 
Differences Between Current Use and Future Use By Item 
Within the Directors Group 
Item Comparison: 
Current Use/ 














































































* p < .05 
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Table B-4 
Differences Between Current Use and Future Use By Item 
Within the Policy Group 
Item Comparison: 
Current Use/ 














































































* p < .05 
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Table B-5 
Differences Between Current Use and Future Use 
By Item Within the Law Group 
Item Comparison: 
Current Use/ 














































































* p < .05 
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Table B-6 
Analysis of Variance Between Current Use and Future Us? 
Among Group Responses hv Survey Sections 






1 12.539 .0349* 3.123 .1848 .328 .7435 
2 .797 .5894 .694 .6471 1.405 .3421 
3 1.862 .0401* 1.15 .3505 1.298 .2407 
4 1.06 .4626 2.458 .1754 .529 .7216 
5 .872 .6497 2.23 .0148* .959 .5445 
6 .471 .5636 27.509 .0345* .011 .9257 
7 .4 .5918 .743 .4794 .018 .9045 
8 5.825 .0001* 3.266 .0009* 1.434 .1659 
9 .398 .5928 .204 .6959 .004 .9574 
10 5.975 .1344 3.735 .193 13.011 .069 
11 9.035 .0001* 13.75 .0001* 4.807 .0001* 
12 9.009 .0001* 18.862 .0001* 2.386 .0103* 
13 8.894 .0001* 3.99 .0001* 2.291 .0136* 
14 7.622 .0001* 5.667 .0001* 22.107 .0001* 
15 .01 .9284 .448 .5724 .595 .5212 
16 .116 .8945 .344 .7334 .004 .9957 
17 .624 .5936 3.036 .1901 .129 .8836 
18 3.276 .0005* 2.216 .0155* 1.913 .0412* 
19 2.563 .0044* 1.97 .0326* 1.474 .1482 
* P < .05 
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Table B-7 
Differences Within Groups: 
Comparison of Current Importance to Future Importance 
Directors Group Policy Group Law Group 
Item # F P F P F P 
1 .593 .447 1.82 .186 .491 .489 
2 .327 .571 .279 .601 0 --
3 2.81 .103 .088 .768 1.63 .211 
4 .17 .676 .088 .768 .326 .572 
5 .814 .373 .088 .374 -- — 
6 1.8 .183 .813 .325 .325 .325 
7 5.5 .025 1 .211 .083 .083 
8 2.06 .160 1.63 .744 .184 .184 
9 3.86 .058 .108 .160 .662 .662 
10 6.86 .013 2.06 .0227 .059 .059 
11 2.36 .133 5.769 .0099 .423 .423 
12 .608 .441 7.59 .282 .011 .011 
13 10.24 .003 1.19 .423 « — 
14 .49 .488 .659 .572 .088 .768 
15 1.49 .230 .326 .017 0 « 
16 .195 .661 6.39 .263 3.95 .056 
17 .814 .373 1.29 .325 3.91 .057 
18 .327 .571 1 - 1 .325 
19 .075 .786 0 .169 3.22 .083 
20 .139 .711 1.98 .423 3.22 .083 
21 0 — .659 — 1.85 .184 
A* .32 .57 0 .325 0 — 
23 3.88 .05 1 .089 4.46 .043 
24 .065 .8007 3.09 .018 .392 .536 
25 1 .3248 6.23 .712 3.22 .083 
26 .27 .60 .139 .325 1.29 .264 
27 1.63 .210 1 .325 4.80 .036 
28 .195 .661 1 .813 .195 .662 
29 2.06 .160 .057 .069 2.38 .134 
30 .327 .571 3.544 .006 .521 .476 
31 0 -- 8.75 .182 .195 .662 
32 .66 .422 1.86 .458 2.82 .103 
33 0 -- .563 .280 2.35 .136 
34 0 ~ 1.20 .292 2.07 .160 
35 .32 .571 1.14 .822 3.23 .083 
36 1.84 .183 .051 .228 1.63 .211 
37 .327 .571 1.5 .043 2.82 .103 
38 5.71 .0029 4.44 .043 2.71 .11 
39 6.32 .017 4.44 7.86 .0089 
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Table B-8 
Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
By Item Within the Directors Group 








































* p < .05 
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Table B-9 
Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
By Item Within the Policy Group 








































* p < .05 
Table B-10 
Differences Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
By Item Within the Law Group 








































* p < .05 
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Table B-11 
Analysis of Variance Between Current Importance and Future Importance 
Among Group Responses bv Survey Sections 

























* P < .05 
23.271 
4.256 
8.409 
3.406 
5.793 
4.109 
.98 
1.524 
.592 
1338.248 
35.063 
11.995 
12.448 
19.318 
9.529 
.221 
9.976 
3.3 
5.986 
.0149* 
.0533* 
.0001* 
.1042 
.0001* 
.3333 
.0194* 
.0001* 
.8698 
.001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0198 
.0115* 
.7017 
.0001* 
.0001* 
1.067 
22.708 
7.83 
19.034 
4.452 
8.889 
1.891 
8.069 
1 
64.198 
25.255 
54.621 
12.052 
10.671 
3.059 
7.932 
4.094 
6.133 
8.2 
.4468 
.0008* 
.0001* 
.0032* 
.0001* 
.0965 
.3029 
.0001* 
.4226 
.0152* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.2224 
.0634 
.1389 
.0001* 
.0001* 
23.539 
52.901 
8.409 
3.406 
5.793 
4.109 
.98 
1.524 
.592 
1338.248 
35.063 
11.995 
12.448 
19.318 
9.529 
.221 
9.976 
3.3 
5.986 
.0147* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.1056 
.0001* 
.1799 
.4265 
.1284 
.5222 
.0007* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0001* 
.0909 
.8138 
.0473* 
.0008* 
.0001* 
